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Introduction
 In an international system deprived of central authority, mediation 
has often been advocated as the most suitable way of third-party con-
flict management. Traditional academic literature studying internatio-
nal mediation, derived most of its insights from labor-management dis-
putes (Zartman 2008). These insights relied mainly on the assumption 
that the mediation is conducted by a single trustworthy third-party that 
is deprived of any interest in the conflict. Over the past three decades, 
this traditional conceptualization of international mediation experien-
ced important advancements and changes. As it will be illustrated later 
in this research, the issue of impartiality was gradually challenged, and 
several theories formulated conditions under which a third-party’s bias 
might not be liability to the peace-process. As such, today mediation 
is defined simply as a process in which a third-party helps conflicting 
sides to find a solution to their conflict that they cannot find themselves 
(Touval and Zartman 2006). Nevertheless, despite these important the-
oretical developments, the core assumption that mediation is conducted 
by a single third-party still limits the practical applicability of various 
academic studies of international mediation. As numerous cases around 
the world show, international conflicts are increasingly being managed 
by more than one third-party. 
 Contemporary scholarship defines the processes where a conflict is 
managed (i.e. mediated) by more than one third party as multiparty me-
diation (Crocker et al. 1999; Crocker et al. 2001). Even though in recent 
years multiparty mediation processes have been under growing acade-
mic scrutiny, traditional literature on international mediation recogni-
zed the benefits of having multiple mediators working in concert. As 
emphasized by Zartman, “if a number of conciliators are available to the 
parties themselves and if a number of friends of the conflicting parties 
can coordinate their good offices and pressure, the chances of success 
are improved” (Zartman 1989, 276). To this day, several studies have 
shown the potential benefits and liabilities of having multiple mediators 
(Crocker et. Al 1999; Crocker et al. 2001, Diehl and Lepgold 2003), the 
relationship between the size of the mediating coalition and its effecti-
veness (Böhmelt 2011), and the need to have a cooperative endeavor by 
multiple mediators in order to achieve success in the mediation process 
(Whitfield 2007, Böhmelt 2011, Hampson and Zartman 2012). 
Analysis of Multiparty Mediation Processes / Doctoral Dissertation
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 Contemporary studies of multiparty mediation are unanimous in 
the claim that cooperation is the key ingredient for a successful multi-
party mediation. However, apart from empirically confirming that coo-
peration exerts positive influence on multiparty mediation effectiveness 
(Böhmelt 2011, 874), the complexities of cooperation as a concept have 
not yet been scrutinized. Thus, some shortcomings in the previously 
mentioned studies could be easily observed. First of all, in all of them 
the concept of cooperation has often been equated to the concept of 
coordination, which has limited the analytical depth of such studies. Se-
condly, in each study cooperation has been treated as a static phenome-
non, which does not change over time, but is rather observed in a binary 
manner: as present or not throughout the entire process. Therefore, what 
these studies failed to integrate was the impact of a potential change of 
mediators’ attitudes that could occur throughout the process. In other 
words, while in the beginning one mediator might show clear inten-
tions of cooperating with the rest of the mediating coalition and thus 
contribute to the overall potential effectiveness of the process, along the 
way as the mediating process unfolds, due to different circumstances, 
such attitude might completely change. Similarly, an initially non-co-
operative mediator might alter its preferences, and decide to cooperate 
with the rest of the mediators. The fact that mediators’ attitudes might 
change from cooperative to non-cooperative behavior, and vice-versa, 
throughout the process will inevitably have an effect on the effectiveness 
of the mediating coalition. 
 Although considerable progress has been made in studying multi-
party mediation, the process still poses several unanswered questions. 
Following the logic of earlier studies that challenged the traditional li-
terature regarding the impartiality of mediators, contemporary research 
on multiparty mediation still lacks a clear emphasis on specific self-
interests that drive various mediators to get involved in managing the 
conflict. Publically third-parties often invoke humanitarian concerns as 
their sole motivation to act as mediators. However, given the conside-
rable costs that mediation produces, it is reasonable to presume that 
mediators are at least as motivated by self-interest as by humanitarian 
impulses (Touval and Zartman 1985, 8). Mediation represents a useful 
foreign policy tool that helps international actors to promote specific 
self-interests (Touval 1992). As such, the investment of substantial ma-
terial and non-material resources should not be seen as only aimed at 
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resolving a dispute; it is also done so that mediators can gain something 
from managing the dispute (Greig 2005). Thus, just as mediators’ invol-
vement needs to be compatible with their self-interest, their choice to 
cooperate once they’ve committed to mediation also needs to be percei-
ved as useful for the promotion of their self-interests. 
 International conflicts usually draw into the mediation process all 
sorts of outside actors, that are “just as numerous and frequently as di-
verse in their interests as the warring parties themselves” (Hampson 
and Zartman 2012, 1). Since each mediator will try to promote its self-
interests, the larger the number of participants in a multiplayer media-
tion, the larger the probability of conflicting interests and positions and 
the more complex the relationship among the parties will be (Crocker 
et al. 1999). Potential conflict in mediators’ interests will have a direct 
impact on the likelihood of achieving cooperation. In other words, com-
patibility or convergence of interests between mediators is a necessary 
precondition for the achievement of cooperation. In this research a spe-
cial focus is given to the impact of ‘drop-outs’ - mediators that due to 
various circumstances believe that non-cooperative behavior is in the-
ir self-interest, and as such choose not to cooperate with the rest of 
the mediating coalition - and potential factors that might change their 
general strategy/attitude from defection to cooperation. This research 
identifies three basic factors - exogenous geo-political shifts, change in 
conflict dynamics and bargaining for cooperation - that might induce 
mediators to alter their attitude from non-cooperation to cooperation. 
 Once actors achieve full convergence of interests, the mediating coa-
lition will then have to overcome the challenge of coordinating different 
mediators’ actions. While in earlier studies, the conceptual difference 
between coordination and cooperation was at best blurry, this research 
will aim to avoid such analytical limitation. When joining a mediating 
coalition, each mediator enters with a specific set of resources that could 
be used to leverage the disputants towards a mutually acceptable solu-
tion. The theory of international mediation defines these resources as 
power or leverage, which is ‘the ability to move a party in an intended 
direction’ (Touval and Zartman 2006, 436). Such ability derives from 
the very fact that disputing sides need mediators’ assistance in finding 
solutions to their problems (Touval and Zartman 1985, Touval 1992). 
Earlier studies have shown that one of the most important comparati-
ve advantages of multiparty mediation efforts is in the dynamic where 
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various mediators pool in their resources, which allows for a creation 
of necessary incentives for resolution that would have been unavailable 
through a single mediator (Crocker et al. 1999). A harmonious em-
ployment of various leverages can be instrumental for the effectiveness 
of the mediation process - “where direct leverage is limited it may be 
borrowed from others” (Crocker et al. 1999, 40). This research looks at 
coordination as a method of synchronized usage of different leverages 
and resources each mediator has at its disposal in the process in order to 
create incentives which are instrumental for successfully resolving the 
conflict. Since power/leverage is never aimlessly employed, the decision 
to use a particular type of leverage (depending on the mediator’s relative 
capacities) will be directly linked to the self-interest that the mediator 
aims to promote through the process. 
 In essence, the aim of this dissertation is to explain in more details 
the effects of cooperation and coordination on multiparty mediation. As 
previous illustrated studies have shown, crucial challenges that must be 
overcome in multiparty mediation processes are the (1) achievement of 
adequate cooperation among the mediators and (2) consequent coordina-
tion of their activities in the mediation process. While the two concepts 
have in common the presumption that actors involved in the mediating 
coalition need to have shared goals on how to resolve the conflict, they 
is still a clear difference between the two: a necessary prerequisite for 
a successful cooperation is that all parties recognize mutual benefits of 
working together; once the parties perceive the benefits of working to-
gether, cooperation might lead to a coordinated endeavor which implies 
a more mechanical process of dividing the labor effectively, and cla-
rifying who needs to do what, when and how. 
 With all this in mind, crucial ingredients for a successful multiparty 
mediation seem to be ‘consistency in interests’ and ‘cooperation and coor-
dination’ between mediators. The aim of this dissertation is to further 
expand the existing knowledge on multiparty mediation by answering 
a number of (sub)research questions. First of all, how much do the ‘con-
sistency of interests’ and ‘cooperation and coordination’ affect the ove-
rall process? Given the dynamic nature of cooperation, and likelihood 
that a party changes its behavior from cooperative to non-cooperative 
throughout the process of multiparty mediation, it is important to un-
derstand if the efforts that lack cooperation inevitably end in failure. 
Similarly, what happens to the mediation process when mediating par-
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ties do not share the same idea and interest in a common solution? At 
the same time, present research will explore the obstacles in achieving 
coordination and coherence between various mediators in such an envi-
ronment and how to surmount the problems that multiple mediators 
face when operating without a ‘common script’ in attempting to me-
diate a negotiated settlement. In other words, this study will investigate 
which mechanisms (both on the systemic and contextual level) have the 
potential to deter defection from a (potential) member of the multiparty 
mediation coalition?  Finally, as the number of states and international 
actors that are involved in mediation increases, a careful assessment is 
necessary not only of their relative institutional strengths and weakne-
sses, but also of how to promote complementary efforts and how to 
synchronize the whole process when one actor is transferring the res-
ponsibilities for mediation to others. In other words, this research will 
try to point out the importance of self-interests that motivate third-
parties to get involved and to unveil the link between coordination and 
self-interests (also described as strategic interests) and the impact of 
such interaction on the overall effectiveness of the mediating process. 
 Multiparty mediation is not a new theory of mediation, rather an 
advancement of the existing knowledge. Therefore this dissertation will 
start by laying out a theoretical framework of mediation in Chapter 1. 
Existing literature will reflect the multicausal nature of the mediating 
process, where interplay of a variety of factors (systemic and behavioral) 
directly affects the effectiveness of the process. Once the fundamental 
theoretical framework of international mediation has been described, 
this research will move to the exiting knowledge of multiparty media-
tion in Chapter 2. Given the existing limitations of current knowled-
ge on multiparty mediation, this research will aim to expand it with a 
game theoretical model that was developed in order to observe a general 
pattern of mediators’ behavior in multiparty mediation. The model will 
be interpreted using the Theory of Moves (Brams 1994). Reflecting on 
the insights from the existing literature on mediation and the game the-
oretical model, this research will generate several hypotheses regarding 
the dynamic of cooperation and coordination in multiparty mediation. 
These will be tested on the basis of five different case studies, of recent 
international conflicts that were managed through a multiparty endea-
vor. The existing studies (Kriesberg 1996, Crocker et al. 1999, Crocker 
et al. 2001, Böhmelt 2011) have all shown that there is a strong correla-
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tion between cooperation and coordination among multiple mediators 
and success in multiparty mediation. Present research will aim to go one 
step further and try to analyze potential existence of a causal mechanism 
between success in multiparty mediation and cooperative and coordina-
ted activities of multiple mediators. One of the most suitable methods 
of examining causality is certainly process tracing (George and Bennett 
2005, Beach and Pedersen 2012), and this study will conduct a process 
tracing analysis on five different case studies of multiparty mediation.   
 The cases were selected based on two criteria. The first one is quite 
straightforward, and it implies that a particular international conflict 
was managed by multiple mediators. Second criteria, prescribed in pro-
cess tracing literature (Beach and Pedersen 2012), implies the existence 
of both hypothesized X and outcome Y, which in this research means 
the existence of a cooperative (and coordinated) effort and (un)succe-
ssful outcome. Therefore, three cases that were selected had a successful 
outcome - Tajikistan, Namibia and Cambodia - while two failed - Sri 
Lanka and Kosovo. In principle, using a process tracing method, this 
research will analyze various dynamics surrounding the achievement of 
necessary cooperation and subsequent coordination between mediators, 
and the effect these had on the outcome of the peace process.  The dis-
sertation will conclude with a discussion on various factors that could 
induce the change in mediators’ attitudes and promote cooperative be-
havior within the mediating coalition, which in turn would improve the 
chances of successfully managing the conflict.
 In conclusion, it should be mentioned that nearly the entire disser-
tation has been already published in various academic forms. The the-
oretical background in Chapter I together with the existing theory on 
multiparty mediation from Chapter II (section 2.1) has been published 
in the Special Issue on Literature Review in the International Journal 
of Conflict Management (Vukovic 2012b). The segment on mediation 
strategies and mediator’s bias from Chapter I was also published in Co-
operation and Conflict (Vukovic 2011). An abbreviated version of the 
Chapter II, which included the game theoretical model and existing 
hypotheses, together with the analysis of three cases studies (Tajikistan, 
Cambodia and Kosovo) has been published in International Negotia-
tion (Vukovic 2012a). Finally, the case of Sri Lanka together with the 
hypothesis regarding the link between strategic interests and coordina-
tion (H9) has been published as a book chapter together with a visiting 
doctoral fellow Maria Groeneveld-Savisaar (Groeneveld-Savisaar and 
Vukovic 2011).

TheoreTical background
CHAPTER 
I 
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CHAPTER I: Theoretical background
 
1.1 The Need to Manage Conflicts: Different Conflict  
 Management Activities
 Among all social processes, conflicts can be identified as the most 
insidious and costly. In their fundamental form, violent (militarized) 
conflicts imply a methodical and structured employment of force and 
violence. Human causalities and material damage, produced in conflicts, 
are generally regarded as the most salient type of political costs a society 
might experience (Gartner et al. 2004; Gartner and Segura 2000). Not 
surprisingly, there is an increasing demand coming from the same (po-
litical) actors that are involved in the conflict, accompanied by pressures 
from both local and global civil society, to manage conflicts.
 Since conflicts commonly produce high levels of distrust, conflic-
ting parties often find it useful to delegate management activities to a 
distinct third party. According to Bercovitch et al. (2007) ‘conflict ma-
nagement is the product of the interaction of strategic choices made 
by disputants and third parties, rather than the result of a decision by 
conflict managers to indiscriminately manage any dispute that arises’ 
(pg. 2). In other words, a decision to manage a conflict is not unilateral 
but rather a result of a careful analysis by all sides on whether a conflict 
has become “ripe” for resolution (Zartman, 1989). As the ripeness the-
ory explains, conflict is ripe for resolution when the conflicting parties 
perceive their present situation to be a “mutually hurting stalemate”. 
This refers to a situation “when the parties find themselves locked in a 
conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock 
is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or 
for the same reasons), they seek an alternative or a Way Out” (Zartman 
2001, 8). Both conditions - “mutually hurting stalemate” and “way out” 
– are based on conflicting parties’ subjective perceptions: they have to 
recognize that they are in an impasse (no matter what the “evidence” 
on the ground tells and/or is perceived by someone else) and develop a 
sense of finding a negotiated solution as an alternative to the fighting. 
Since ripeness is a perceptual condition, in order to develop a subjective 
awareness of the present situation as ripe for resolution, parties might 
look for objective indicators. These indicators can be brought to the 
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conflicting party by an outside actor or by its opponent (Zartman 2001, 
9). Given the costs that conflicts generate, the absence of ripeness is 
rarely a reason for inaction by third-parties. As Zartman and De Soto 
emphasize, outside actors “can develop a policy of ripening, cultivating 
both objective and subjective elements of ripeness if these elements do 
not appear on their own” (2010, 7). In order to ripen the stalemate and a 
way out, third parties might employ various measures - diplomatic, eco-
nomic and/or military – which can help in reframing the conflict and 
accentuate the attractiveness of conflict management as an alternative 
to fighting.           
 Broadly speaking, third-party interventions vary from joining the 
dispute (i.e. taking side of one of the disputants) to managing the dispu-
te. The main focus of this research is on the latter aspect of intervention. 
More specifically, the intention is to discuss third-party intermediary 
interventions, ‘where an actor outside of a dispute solicits or accepts 
a role to peacefully manage a conflict’ (Frazier and Dixon 2006, 387). 
Frazier and Dixon (2006) offered a useful taxonomy of different con-
flict management activities, each one characterized by a different extent 
of commitment by a third-party to manage the dispute. They divided 
the third-party intermediary actions into five types: verbal expression, 
diplomatic approaches, judicial processes, administrative assistance and 
the use of military force.      
 Verbal expression might stand for appeals for a cease-fire or even 
offers to facilitate or mediate the negotiations. According to Frazier and 
Dixon (2006) they represent the bulk of third-party activities. Never-
theless, ‘third parties are not all talk’, since diplomatic activities (namely 
mediation) ‘account for slightly over 40% of third party activity’ (pg. 
395). The last three types – judicial processes (for example arbitration), 
administrative (such as humanitarian assistance, election supervision, 
monitoring) and military (such as military observations, peacekeeping, 
demobilization monitoring) compose a rather small fraction of third 
party activities. Since the latter three types inevitably imply increased 
levels of commitments (such as financial costs, or providing personnel 
and necessary logistic support) these findings do not come as a surprise.
Having this in mind, numerous scholars tried to explain why diploma-
tic activities are so frequently used. Prior to Frazier and Dixon (2006), 
Bercovitch et al. (1991) also stressed that diplomatic (i.e. mediation) 
activities are the most widespread form of active third party conflict 
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management. The popularity of this method was commonly argued to 
be due to a belief that it can halt intensification of a dispute while still 
tackling the whole array of issues to the dispute (Raymond and Kegley, 
1985). At the same time, given the fact that mediation is not compulsory, 
‘it provides another opportunity beyond bilateral negotiations to solve 
conflicts with only limited infringement upon sovereignty’ (Frazier and 
Dixon 2006, 396). Thus, already for decades, mediation has been vo-
ciferously advocated as the most efficient method for solving conflicts 
that cannot be resolved by peaceful means on a bilateral level between 
conflicting sides (Ott 1972, Young 1972, Bercovitch 1984, Holsti 1991). 
The growing  interest in mediation as a method of conflict management 
is also provoked by the acknowledgment that civil or inter-communal 
conflicts are not easily dealt with by other modes of conflict manage-
ment (such as legal tribunals, arbitration, or the use of force). In fact, 
mediation represents a relatively low-cost alternative between the choi-
ces of doing nothing and a large scale military intervention.
1.2 Mediation as a Distinct Form of Conflict   
 Management Activity
1.2.1 Definition(s)
 Mediation is widely considered to be a non-coercive and voluntary 
form of conflict management, particularly practical within the intrica-
te dynamics of international relations dominated by the principles of 
preservation of actors’ independence and autonomy (Bercovitch 2005). 
However, there are small but significant variations among scholars in 
defining third-party mediation, especially when it comes to actions that 
are observed. Over time, several definitions of mediation have been 
formulated. For Mitchell (1981) a distinct feature of mediation as an 
intermediary activity is in its purpose of achieving some compromise 
settlement of issues at stake between conflicting sides, or at least en-
ding disruptive conflict behavior. According to Raymond and Kegley 
(1985) this activity can be seen as a method of conflict management 
and conflict resolution which brings about the use of third parties to 
help disputants in reaching a voluntary agreement. They see third par-
ty involvement usually through actions of facilitation such as: agenda 
setting, simplification of communication, clarification of respective po-
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sitions, issue ‘reconceptualization’, bargaining facilitation and support 
for agreement. Moore (1986) on the other hand, emphasizes the nature 
of mediation as an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process. 
Through the intervention of an ‘acceptable, impartial and neutral’ third 
party, holding no ‘authoritative’ power, mediation facilitates conflicting 
parties so that they can reach a mutually acceptable settlement. Berco-
vitch, Anagnoson and Wille, also highlighted the importance of media-
tion as a process that has no commanding power. For them mediation is 
“a process of conflict management where disputants seek assistance of, 
or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organiza-
tion to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting 
to physical force or invoking the authority of the law” (Bercovitch et al. 
1991, 8). 
 Mediation usually represents an extension and continuation of par-
ties’ own conflict management efforts (i.e. extension of the negotiations 
process) where a mediator enters the dispute in order to affect, change, 
resolve, modify or influence the dynamics of previous relations betwe-
en conflicting sides (Bercovitch and Houston 1996, Bercovitch 2002). 
Frazier and Dixon (2006) emphasized the importance of mediators in 
formulating potential solutions, that are still “legally non-binding” and 
described third-party mediation as a process during which “the third 
party proposes specific, non-legally binding options or procedures for 
the purpose of ending hostilities or crises, or suggest options for resol-
ving a dispute” (pg. 396).
 It should be said that, initially, the study of international mediation 
mostly relied on insights derived from the analysis of collective bargai-
ning in economics (Zartman 2008). Drawing parallels from mediation 
activities in labor-management disputes, scholars assumed an axiomatic 
stand toward the role of a mediator as a neutral and impartial third par-
ty that was stripped down of any self-interest or leverage in the conflict. 
As such mediation was often equaled to facilitation and a mediator’s 
role reduced to a mere channel through which complex communication 
between disputants can be alleviated. This simplistic and naïve treatment 
that persisted for several decades (in some cases even to this day), was 
gradually challenged. As the number of mediation activities increased 
in international relations, scholars started to unveil complex dynamics 
behind mediation activities, pointing out the interplay of several factors 
that might influence the outcome. Already in 1975, Touval emphacized 
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that a biased mediator is not a liability to the process but a potential ad-
vantage as it is able to move the party toward which it is biased to reach 
a negotiated solution. Following these findings, Zartman and Touval 
refused mediator’s impartiality and neutrality as a necessary prerequisi-
te, and defined mediation in a very simple yet usefully flexible manner, 
as ‘a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a 
solution which they cannot find by themselves’ (1996, 446). 
 With bias not being a taboo anymore, scholars started analyzing 
mediation strategies that were characterized by both third-parties’ self-
interest to get involved and a specific leverage that could be used by a 
mediator to deliver a solution to the dispute. Soon the notions of mani-
pulative and directive mediator were introduced (Touval and Zartman 
1985, Bercovitch et al. 1991). By analyzing these and other factors, me-
diators were no longer just simple bystanders that only facilitate the 
peace talks; they are rather an active party in the complex dynamics of 
peace talks, whose particular characteristics become instrumental for 
the outcome of mediation.
 Contemporary scholarship has almost unanimously accepted a mul-
ticausal approach in order to explain mediation. This way mediators’ 
characteristics (such as impartiality, interests, leverage, etc.) represent 
just one set of features that might shed light on the mediation outcome. 
Other important factors can be clustered as contextual (such as type of 
the conflict, characteristics of the disputing sides or geopolitical/syste-
mic dynamics) and behavioral (such as mediation strategies).
1.2.2 Incentives to Start the Mediation Process: (im)Partiality, 
Costs, Interests, Leverage and Legitimacy
 Parties will agree to mediation when they perceive it to work in favor 
of their interests. More specifically, disputants will accept a mediator’s 
offer to the extent that the expected utility of an agreement exceeds 
the expected utility of continued conflicts (Maoz and Terris 2006). As 
Zartman and Touval note, mediators are sometimes faced with initial 
rejections from the disputing parties, “thus their first diplomatic effort 
must be to convince the parties of the value of their services before me-
diation can get started” (1996, 446).
 At the same time, it would be implausible to expect that mediators 
are only driven by humanitarian concerns to intervene. Having in mind 
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considerable investment of resources that mediation calls for it is reaso-
nable to presume that mediators are no less motivated by self-interest 
than by humanitarian impulses (Touval and Zartman 1985, 8). Media-
tors play their role in negotiations and spend resources not only because 
they aim to resolve a dispute, they also seek to gain something from it 
(Greig 2005). For a lot of actors, international mediation is a useful (fo-
reign) policy instrument through which they can pursue some of their 
interests without creating too much opposition (Touval 1992). 
 As indicated previously, conventional standpoints of earlier studies 
highlighted mediator’s impartiality as a crucial prerequisite for succe-
ssful mediation (Assefa 1987, Miall 1992, Hume 1994). It assumed 
a cause-effect relation between impartiality and success. Namely, a 
mediator’s impartiality was essential for conflicting sides’ confidence in 
the mediator, which, in turn, was needed for the mediator to become 
acceptable. This in turn, was fundamental for a successful outcome of 
the mediation. This traditional approach was challenged by numerous 
scholars who realized that impartiality might be an elusive concept and 
in turn accentuated the relevance of a biased mediator (Touval and Zar-
tman 1985, Bercovitch et. al 1991). For instance, having a biased media-
tor may have practical implications in case the mediator has particularly 
strong relations with the side that has a greater say over the outcome of 
the conflict. In this case, the less powerful conflicting side might expect 
that the mediator will use partiality to influence the other side. Simi-
larly biased mediators “might empower weaker parties in their interest 
of an equitable settlement to end human misery” (Kleiboer 1996, 370). 
Therefore, in contemporary literature impartiality is generally subordi-
nated to the issue of leverage the mediator has towards the disputing 
sides.
 As Bercovitch and Gartner emphasize, mediation is essentially a 
“voluntary process”. In order to make mediation effective, mediators 
need to be perceived as “impartial, acceptable to the disputants, and de-
serving their trust” (emphasis added; pg. 26). Given the apparent am-
biguity of the concept of impartiality, some scholars offered an analysis 
of perceived credibility of a mediator. In other words, while mediators 
may maintain a biased attitude, and with it contribute to the overall 
effectiveness of the process, they still need to be perceived as credible 
in order to be acceptable to the disputants (Maoz and Terris 2006). 
For Maoz and Terris mediator credibility is the “extent to which dispu-
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tants think that (1) the mediator’s offer is believable (i.e. the mediator is 
not bluffing and/or is not being deceived by the opponent) and (2) the 
mediator can deliver the offer (i.e. mediator can make the offer stick)” 
(2010, 69). Their empirical analysis confirms that in case mediation ta-
kes place, a mediator’s credibility “increases the likelihood of a partial 
or full settlement” (pg. 88). Similarly, Walter (1997) notes that in order 
to be credible, a guarantor must fulfill at least three basic conditions: 
it must have a specific self-interest in upholding a promise; it must be 
willing to use force if necessary (and capable to punish whoever violates 
the treaty); and to be able to signal determination. Hence, a direct inte-
rest which leads to a more unyielding presence by the third party makes 
the agreement gain necessary relevance for the conflicted parties, which 
would be additionally induced to obey the contract (Bercovitch 2002).
Evidently, there can be no triumphant third party intervention unless 
there is a direct (self )interest involved that pushes a new actor to join the 
process (Kleiboer 1996, Walter 1997, Bercovitch 2002, Carnevale 2002, 
Pruitt 2002, Bercovitch and Gartner 2006, Touval and Zartman 2006). 
The interests may have different aspects and vary in intensity. They ran-
ge from security and stability concerns to economic advantages or even 
have some normative angle involved. Nonetheless, this interest must be 
strong enough to set in motion the direct involvement of the third party. 
Obviously if the interests are weak or null, the results of the mediation 
process are going to be imperiled (Kleiboer 1996). The significance of a 
third party’s interest in finding an adequate solution through a media-
tion procedure is that it makes a third party’s presence stronger, which 
directly affects the quality of the agreement, due to the third-party’s 
position as a credible and mutually acceptable guarantor of the contract. 
Clearly the sole interest of the third party is not sufficient for the me-
diation procedure to be efficient. In order to have a durable and rock-
solid agreement, the third party has to have a specific leverage which 
would stimulate the conflicting sides to obey the rules and uphold the 
agreement (Kleiboer 1996, Bercovitch and Houston 1996, Bercovitch 
2002). Leverage in mediation – ‘the ability to move a party in an inten-
ded direction’ (Touval and Zartman 2006, 436) - derives from the very 
fact that disputing sides need mediators’ assistance in finding solutions 
to their problems (Touval and Zartman 1985, Touval 1992).
 Usually, the literature dealing with third party intervention empha-
sizes the significance of military power (Walter 1997, Carnevale 2002, 
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Walter 2004, Werner and Yuen 2005). Since it allows for a very direct 
involvement for the third party, by being enabled to use coercive means 
whenever it feels that the agreement was not upheld, this form of power 
clearly represents a very valuable asset. However, this form of authority 
is not usually recognized as the most stimulating by the conflicting par-
ties, especially if there are no belligerent activities underway. 
Carnevale identified two main forms of power, based on actors’ ‘will 
and skill’. On the one hand there is the resource-based aspect of social 
power, to which he refers to as ‘strategic strength’ and it is a clear-cut 
extension of mediation, and on the other there is a behavioral aspect of 
mediation, which he identifies as ‘tactical strength’. According to that 
classification, “strategic strength in mediation refers to what the media-
tor has,  what the mediator brings to the negotiation table; the tactical 
strength refers to what the mediator does at the negotiation table” (Car-
nevale 2002, 27-28).
 Tactical strength is exemplified through a mediator’s premeditated 
choice of specific techniques and the ability to follow a particular pro-
cedure. Most emblematic are: communication tactics (later discussed in 
communicator strategy, see Touval and Zartman, 1985), image tactics 
(mediator manages to alter the negative image disputants have of one 
another), momentum tactics (mediators set in motion a framework of 
trust which paves the road for further cooperation between the parties), 
and relational tactics.   
 On the other hand, strategic strength includes different types of social 
power: legitimate power (a mediator’s ability and right to prescribe be-
havior, accepted by disputants), informational power (a mediator offers 
“information that makes compliance with the mediator’s request seem 
rational), expert power (a mediator’s experience and knowledge of the 
mediation process recommend him for the job), referent power (found 
in features such as a mediator’s charisma, prestige, status, etc.), coercive 
power, and reward power (sticks and carrots from the manipulator stra-
tegy) (Carnevale 2002, 28; Touval and Zartman, 1985). The latter two 
have proven to be highly instrumental in recent practices of mediation 
activities between states and political terrorist organizations.
According to Carnevale (2002), coercive-reward power is closely related 
to the ‘carrots and sticks’ approach in mediation. In this case, coercive 
power refers to the ‘pressure’ a mediator imposes on efforts to reduce the 
parties’ limits or aspirations. For instance, coercive power can be seen 
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in threats, such as different types of sanctions, or a lack of support in 
various multilateral bodies. On the other hand, carrots of mediation are 
reflected by ‘reward power’, which Carnevale defines as ‘compensation’. 
It involves the mediator’s ‘provisions of rewards or benefits’ in exchange 
for a compromise solution or acceptable agreement. These inducements 
might take diverse forms, such as economic aid, financial support and 
improvement of a party’s international reputation. 
 Contemporary practice shows that in some cases the mediating co-
alition must be prepared to employ an extensive amount of resources, 
which range from targeted financial incentives to military deployment. 
Sisk (2009) identified three very important rewarding, or non-coerci-
ve, measures that mediators can use as leverage: First the transfer of 
financial means to the parties in conflict, which are intended to encou-
rage them to alter their positions. Second, promises of the deployment 
of neutral peacekeeping operations to “induce weaker parties to accept 
vulnerabilities in the post-accord environment… guaranteeing non-de-
fection by other parties’ (Sisk 2009, 54). Third, to confer legitimacy to a 
faction’s cause, which would otherwise be marginalized (Sisk 2009, 55).
Coercive measures are generally exercised through various forms of 
threat or punishment. Diplomatic pressure is the softest coercive 
mechanism at mediators’ disposal, and usually it includes different types 
of ‘persuasion, mass media appeals, withdrawing recognition, or public 
shaming’ (Sisk 2009, 55). This tool has been used quite often, especially 
by mediators, as cases of the US contribution in the Dayton peace talks 
or their involvement in Sudan’s north/south dispute show. A more ri-
gorous coercive measure is the imposition of sanctions regimes, which 
projects mediators’ discontent with party’s behavior and attitude in the 
process. Finally, the most intrusive and violent form of coercive power is 
the use of military power. Several scholars (Rubin 1980, Hiltrop 1985, 
1989) have shown that an intense conflict with an elevated number of 
casualties necessitates a more powerful/manipulative intervention than 
a low intensity conflict, mainly because the cost of not reaching a solu-
tion is exceptionally high.  While weak mediators excel when the parties 
are motivated to settle but lack the necessary optimism or communica-
tion facilities to move forward, strong mediators, like the US, are espe-
cially needed when the parties lack sufficient motivation to settle (Pruitt 
2002, 51; Bercovitch 2009, 348).
 A recent study by Svensson showed that “most effective are those 
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mediation attempts when both power and pure mediators are active as 
third parties” (2007, 229). On the one hand, powerful mediators manage 
to broker a peace agreement much faster than ‘pure’ mediators, and are 
especially more effective in achieving a deal that regulates the military 
dimension. On the other, ‘pure’ mediators still tend to be more capable 
in delivering settlements that cover territorial and political power-sha-
ring arrangements. However a combined intervention, of both types of 
mediators allows them to produce agreements that manage to regulate 
both military and power-sharing dimensions, as required in state con-
flicts with political terrorist organizations.  
 Another very important type of leverage is reflected through the 
level of legitimacy invested in the mediator. Here Carnevale defines 
‘legitimate power’ as influence ‘driven by belief that the mediator has 
the right to prescribe behavior, and derives from a norm that has been 
accepted by the disputants’ (2002, 28). This influence is best observable 
when comparing different types of mediators (see below), thus some-
times a mediation process performed by an international organization 
is deemed more legitimate and bears with it higher authority than a 
process carried out by a state (Touval 1992). This issue is directly related 
to the matter of a mediator’s interests in managing the dispute. Since 
international organizations represent a composite entity, their interests 
reflect a specific combination of various interests of their members.          
 Finally, once mediation is accepted and put in motion, all those in-
volved experience certain costs. On the one hand the disputants may be 
enticed into making unexpected concessions, by giving up a certain level 
of control over the process which increases the overall level of uncerta-
inty regarding a desired outcome. Thus they may end up accepting less 
than what was initially planned for a satisfactory outcome, or experience 
the degradation of political and economic ties with the mediator (Ber-
covitch and Gartner 2006). At the same time, the mediator is also expo-
sed to certain levels of risk such as domestic and international political 
costs, diminishing of reputation and criticism in media (Princen 1992). 
In order to produce successful results “mediators have to possess a high 
motivation to enter a conflict arena, a strong desire to get involved and a 
perception of higher benefits than costs” (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006, 
332).
Siniša Vuković
28
1.3 Factors Affecting the Mediation    
 Process and Outcome
 Mediators’ characteristics (such as impartiality, interests and levera-
ge) represent just one feature which explicates mediation success. Most 
scholars (Kriesberg 1991, Kleiboer 1996, Bercovitch 2002) agree that 
defining success is generally very difficult because the evidence is almost 
always vague. Success and failure are mainly a result of interpretation 
rather than being discovered by the analysts. As Kleiboer emphasizes, 
this potential elusiveness might not complicate the research, as long 
as “embraced definitions and operationalizations of mediation results” 
are constrained in a systematic way by the analyst (1996, 362). For the 
purposes of this research, mediation success will be defined as a significant 
(or even essential) contribution to de-escalation of conflict, movement 
towards an acceptable agreement or reconciliation, under the prevai-
ling conditions (Kriesberg 1991, 20). In order to explain the mediation 
outcome (i.e. success), the analysis should take into consideration two 
distinct types of factors: contextual (nature of the dispute and characte-
ristics of the parties) and behavioral (process of mediation and mediati-
on strategies). 
1.3.1  Contextual Factors: Systemic Features,  
Parties’ Characteristics and Nature of the Conflict 
 To evaluate mediation activities it is crucial to consider the ove-
rall context and conditions that surround the conflict. The first set of 
contextual factors can be labeled as systemic features. These include all 
those geopolitical aspects that might affect the outcome of the media-
tion process. For instance, one of them is the international context. As 
Kleiboer (1996) explains, the influence of other parties and of other 
conflicts taking place at the same time are very relevant in this respect. 
On the one hand, various forms of pressure (such as economic and po-
litical) used by outside parties that have an interest in the conflict may 
have both constructive and destructive effects on conflict management 
efforts. On the other, concurrent and similar events of conflicts that 
take place in proximity might have an impact on mediation activities. 
Kriesberg highlights that when a conflict’s salience decreases “as other 
fights become of greater importance for one or more of the adversaries, 
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de-escalation is more likely to occur” (1991, 20). This issue is directly 
related to settlements and documents produced over time in those con-
flicts. The creation of peace settlements and similar documents has been 
under careful analysis by conflict management theory. As Fortna (2003) 
indicates, there are specific mechanisms within cease-fire agreements 
that might affect the ‘durability of peace’, such as the withdrawal of 
forces, creation of demilitarized zones, formal cease-fire agreements, 
peacekeeping, third party guarantees, and dispute resolution procedu-
res (pg. 339).  Ultimately, another systemic feature that should not be 
overlooked is the pattern of alignments on the international level with 
a specific focus on the distribution of power among the actors.
 Apart from the external conditions of the conflict, internal charac-
teristics of each party represent an important set of factors that affect 
the mediation process and outcome. In general, features such as regime 
type, internal cohesiveness, international capacity and previous relati-
onships between parties represent the focal group of these characteri-
stics.  According to Bercovitch (2005), in case the conflict is between 
open democracies, there are better chances that the mediation activities 
will have a successful outcome, while in case of non-democratic regimes 
third party intervention will have to rely much more on coercive met-
hods in order to manage the conflict. The level of internal cohesiveness 
is directly related to the issue of legitimacy, as the pressure mediators 
experience from various domestic actors usually complicates a construc-
tive involvement in the mediation process. Thus their legitimacy might 
be contested by some fractions, which directly reduces their legitimate 
right to represent the party as a whole. The international capacity is 
often measured as a party’s capability to endure in conflict and attract 
international support for its cause. Ultimately, previous relationships 
between parties directly affect the mediation, since for instance protrac-
ted conflicts might develop situations where conflicting sides cement 
their positions which obstruct the likelihood for a successful outcome of 
the mediation. In other words if conflicting parties in the past have not 
had a very constructive relationship, and their enmity is deeply rooted, 
this might also condition (negatively) the outcome of mediation efforts. 
Finally, previously mentioned mechanisms in cease-fire agreements – 
such as the study by Fortna (2003) - are strongly related to the formati-
on and configuration of intra-party relationships over time.  
 Thus directly related to the nature of relationships between actors 
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involved in the mediation process is the third set of contextual factors 
found in the nature of conflict. The nature of conflict is vital in establis-
hing how it should be managed. According to Bercovitch “certain issues 
in conflict, such as beliefs, core values, and identity, have a high saliency 
and are apt to encourage decision makers to accept high levels of costs” 
(2005, 108). In cases where the conflict is over intangible issues, media-
tion activities might be seriously hampered. Issues at stake become the 
focal point of a conflict’s progression, intensification and termination. 
At the same time, conflict intensity, costs, and casualties represent ele-
ments that have also a very significant impact on mediation activities. 
Especially problematic are the so called intractable conflicts. 
 Broadly speaking, intractable conflicts are those conflicts that imply 
perpetual tension and violence; they persist over an extensive period of 
time and stimulate countless unsuccessful attempts of conflict manage-
ment. According to Bercovitch (2005) there are several specific charac-
teristics that distinguish intractable conflicts from other malignant so-
cial processes. First of all these conflicts have a tendency to be enduring 
in time, sometimes even for decades. They imply the use of destructive 
means with frequent acts of militarized activities and violence – which 
can be also sporadic or suspended (usually referred to as frozen con-
flicts) – with a large number of civilian causalities. A very distinctive 
characteristic of intractable conflicts is the fact that there is an extensive 
list of unsolved or seemingly irreconcilable issues at stake. As Berco-
vitch points out “this means that the parties in conflict feel that at best 
they may reach temporary cessations of violence and that they cannot 
reach fundamental and genuine resolution of their issues” (2005, 100). 
At the same time intractability implies that the relationship between 
belligerent parties is tainted with signs of utter animosity and profound 
sentiments of fear and distrust. Thus unending conflict becomes a fertile 
ground for creating exaggerated stereotypes and misgiving among par-
ties involved. This only fuels mutual hostile perceptions where potenti-
ally each actor becomes inclined to develop an interest in perpetuating 
the conflict. Having all this in mind, such conflicts might induce a vast 
array of external actors to engage in managing and resolving the con-
flict. Few of them, however, tend to be successful. 
 In fact, according to Bercovitch (2005), “in the context of intractable 
conflicts it is more sensible to talk about conflict management only … 
since the very intractability of the conflicts we are dealing with me-
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ans that they can at best be managed, contained or de-escalated; they 
are unlikely to be resolved” (pg. 104). Bercovitch considers success of a 
conflict management activity in intractable conflicts when the process 
achieves a degree of change in the basic structure of the conflict, and 
the issue structure and actor transformation. According to Bercovitch’s 
(2005) data, mediation represents almost 44 percent of total conflict 
management activities aimed at resolving intractable conflicts. Despite 
the fact that mediation is ‘ideally suited for intractable conflict’ due to its 
‘low-visibility, low-cost, and voluntary method of conflict management’, 
mediation is conditioned by several factors which affect the level of its 
success (pg. 119). His study shows that more than 52 percent of media-
tion efforts in intractable conflicts end in failure while full settlement 
is achieved only in 5.2 percent. The failure of mediation in intractable 
conflicts can be derived from several aspects. First of all, many attempts 
to mediate fail because major powers have ‘competing interests’ (idem). 
At the same time, there may also be many ‘spoilers’ who have serio-
us problems with conceding anything and are implicitly determined to 
preserve the status quo of an intractable conflict (idem). This leads us 
to the second group of factors which affect the mediation process and 
outcome.
1.3.2 Behavioral Factors: Mediation Process and Role  
of the Mediator
 There are numerous scholars (e.g. Kolb 1983) who strongly contri-
buted to defining mediation strategy and behavior. In mediation litera-
ture, strategy is defined as ‘a broad plan of action designed to indicate 
which measures may be taken to achieve desired objectives in conflicts’ 
while behavior refers to actual ‘tactics, techniques, or instruments’ at a 
mediator’s disposal (Bercovitch 2005, 113). This research will reflect on 
the typology put forward by Touval and Zartman (1985; 1989; 1996) 
who classified the mediator’s behavior and corresponding strategies on 
an intervention scale raging from low to high. At the low end of this scale 
are strategies labeled as communication-facilitation. Using this strategy, 
the mediator assumes a very passive role in the process. This passivity 
is mirrored in the level of involvement which is based on channeling 
information to the parties and facilitating collaboration while exercising 
modest control over the actual process of mediation. Tactics that are im-
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plemented are purely procedural, and they include establishing contact 
with conflicting sides, developing confidence of the parties, facilitating 
communication, identifying pertinent issues and elucidating the overall 
situation for both sides. In this case, the mediator is reluctant to take 
sides and is rather inclined to allow the interests of all sides to be taken 
into consideration. 
 The second strategy is more active and allows the mediator to 
assume a more formal control over the process. Procedural-formative 
strategy implies that the mediator actually enters the substance of the 
negotiation. Since the conflict might imply a certain level of distrust 
that impedes the parties to communicate with each other directly, the 
mediator takes over the role of a formulator. For Zartman and Touval 
‘formulas are the key to a negotiated solution to a conflict; they provide 
a common understanding of the problem and its solution or a shared 
notion of justice to govern an outcome’ (1996, 454). Acting as a formu-
lator, the mediator persuades conflicting sides that suggested solutions 
to their dispute are valid. Since persuasion requires a certain level of in-
volvement the mediator does not only act as a communicator but needs 
to get involved much more directly in the process, by offering innovative 
solutions which could downplay those commitments that constrain the 
parties. Thus the tactics at a mediator’s disposal vary from choosing the 
conveying site, formulation of protocol and drafting the procedure of 
mediation.
 Finally the most active strategy a mediator might use is described 
as directive- manipulator. In this case the mediator becomes ‘the full 
participant’ who is able to affect the substance of the bargaining process 
by presenting incentives or delivering ultimatums to the disputing sides. 
In other words, the mediator uses its power to induce the parties to a 
settlement. Tactics that are at a mediator’s disposal vary from ‘taking 
responsibility for concessions, making substantive suggestions and pro-
posals, making parties aware of nonagreement… rewarding party con-
cessions… pressing parties to show flexibility, promising resources or 
threatening withdrawal’ (Bercovitch 2005, 115).  
 This research describes a successful outcome as an effort toward de-
escalation of conflict, thus it is important to discuss some crucial steps 
towards de-escalation such as preparation, initiation, negotiation and 
implementation (Kriesberg 1991). In the preparation stage, the media-
tor explores which parties are willing to discuss de-escalation and which 
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parties can be excluded from the process in order to make the process 
more efficient. In the initiation stage the parties start discussing the 
pertinent issues which will lead them to de-escalation. In case there 
was a scarce level of exploration in the preparation stage the mediation 
might be hampered already in the initiation phase through inadequate 
proposals. Nevertheless, the main stage of a mediation process is facili-
tating negotiation between disputing sides. Negotiation dynamics have 
been under strict scrutiny by numerous scholars (Zartman and Berman 
1982, Druckman 1997). For the purposes of this research, the analysis 
will focus on theoretical contributions provided by Lax and Sebenius 
(1991). 
 In a nutshell, the negotiation process is characterized by several 
techniques such as party arithmetic, identification of key negotiators, 
subtraction of players, sorting out the preferences and issues and affec-
ting the BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement). So 
for instance, the mediator needs to have a very clear idea who its ne-
gotiating partners are and identify the most constructive ones. If the 
situation allows, the mediator might want to exclude those destructive 
elements which are less willing to engage in the de-escalating process, 
in order to have a successful outcome. At the same time, the mediator 
needs, firstly, to explore the situation to the most minute of details and, 
secondly, be clear what the issues at stake are and establish the best 
way to proceed with negotiations. This - usually referred to as ‘strategic 
sequencing’ (Lax and Sebenius 1991) - could be done by either starting 
with low issues or with the most salient ones, depending on the type of 
conflict. Finally an active mediator needs to be able to manipulate the 
situation, and offer incentives to conflicting sides which might induce 
them to detach from initially planned positions and perceived alterna-
tives and accept the negotiated agreement. Thus in the implementation 
stage the mediator seeks ‘to gain support for the settlement by the con-
stituencies of the negotiating parties. A formal mediation offers legiti-
macy and credibility to an agreement… and improves the likelihood of 
compliance’ (Kriesberg 1991, 25).
 As Zartman and Touval note, “mediation is a triangular relationship” 
(1996, 445). All parties involved invest significant resources, time and 
personnel. Mediators deliver resources and other capacities proportio-
nate to their rank and status. Thus another significant issue that needs 
to be addressed is the type of mediator that specific circumstances de-
mand. 
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1.3.3 Potential Mediators
 Up to date, most of the scholarly literature on mediation, as a form 
of third-party intervention, focused its attention on effectiveness (Ber-
covitch et al. 1991). However, directly related to the argument of effec-
tiveness is the debate on the most suitable type of conflict manager to 
deliver a nonviolent resolution to a dispute. Frazier and Dixon (2006) 
made a noteworthy contribution in this regard. Their work on Militari-
zed Interstate Disputes (MID) was an important effort to parse out the 
differences in efficiency between three forms of actors acting as media-
tors: states, coalitions of states, and multilateral bodies.
Their work departs from a historical analysis, which identifies a clear 
pattern of third party intervention by these three types of actors. As 
highlighted in their work, traditionally, states were the principal third 
parties because they were the only actors invested with legitimacy on 
the international level. In fact while the international system was domi-
nated by ‘realpolitik’ conceptions of interstate relations, management of 
conflicts was consigned mainly to the powerful states. However, quite 
often even the most powerful states were induced to form coalitions 
with other states, in order to create a more unbiased setting for nego-
tiating peace. On the other hand, since the end of the Second World 
War, non-state actors (notably international organizations, and non-go-
vernmental organizations) gradually became essential intermediaries. 
 Following this line of thought Crocker et al. (1999) indicated a 
number of recent important developments in international politics that 
have changed both the content and the nature of international mediati-
on. The end of the Cold War has untied (to a certain extent) internati-
onal organizations from the preexisting bipolar constraints and allowed 
them to take on new roles in mediation and conflict management in 
general. Regional organizations and coalitions of small and medium si-
zed powers have also become more active as mediators, facilitators and 
conflict managers. Even in cases where great powers have intervened 
due to domestic political pressure or because of threats to their national 
interests, there is seemingly greater willingness to share the costs of 
intervention with other international actors. As previously mentioned, 
given the high risks, costs and resources that mediation implies, motiva-
tions for an outside actor to act as a mediator are found in their dome-
stic and international self-interest. For states, self-interest is mirrored 
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in attempts to produce settlements that will “increase the prospects of 
stability, deny their rivals opportunities for intervention, earn them the 
gratitude of one or both parties, or enable them to continue to have a 
role in future relations” (Zartman and Touval 1996, 446). In principle, 
the activities of states as mediators are a genuine blend of both defen-
sive and offensive goals. Defensive reasons are seen in cases when the 
conflict prolongation directly threatens outside states’ interests who are 
then inclined to intervene. Also, continuation of conflict might induce 
other states to join, so a fear of such escalation encourages states to in-
tervene as mediators. Finally, in some cases the conflict intensity attracts 
more than one state to intervene, so the mediation activity becomes 
a shared enterprise. In these cases, cooperation between mediators is 
essential. 
 Offensive motives of state intervention are in short “the desire to 
extend and increase influence” (idem, 447). In this case, a very important 
factor is a mediator’s leverage on disputing parties. Through its power, 
the mediator can enhance its influence and create an environment in 
which the actual mediation success is dependent on its involvement. 
This strong presence is reflected in situations where conflicting sides 
“depend on it to garner concessions from the other party” and when the 
mediator assumes the role of a guarantor of the agreement. Neverthe-
less, since mediation bears inevitable costs for mediators, third parties 
are much more inclined to share these costs with fellow countries and 
even more to pursue these activities through collective entities such as 
international organizations. 
 Undoubtedly, motives behind involvement of international organi-
zations (excluding military alliances) are much more complex. Rarely, 
an international organization has the leverage and resources its mem-
ber-states posses. Lacking these capabilities, it has to rely on its status 
as a global/regional organization (i.e. the United Nations and the Euro-
pean Union), the legitimacy it acquires from this status, its credibility as 
an international actor, the cohesiveness of its members, and mediators’ 
experience and persuasiveness (Fretter 2002, 98). Many of the establis-
hing charters and statutes of interventional organizations have promo-
tion of peace and security (globally and/or regionally) as their distinct 
element. At the same time, these entities are also constrained by specific 
interests of their member-states. Despite the fact that interests of mem-
ber states might differ, international organizations attain their perceived 
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legitimacy from two sides: on the one side because their interests are a 
result of channeling and balancing process of diverging member-states’ 
interests, and on the other side, because of the norms and values that are 
recognized as commonly shared and promoted by the same member-
states. The acceptability of international organizations as mediators is 
reflected in the possibility that conflicting sides can address their diffe-
rent opinions to all member states and potentially find support within. 
The last group of potential mediators can be found in actors that this 
research will label as ‘low key’ and they are individuals and NGOs – 
actors that have no coercive power on the international level and rely 
on their reputation as successful mediators whose primary interest is in 
ending the conflict itself. Individuals that are not government officials 
or political actors might contribute to the efforts of de-escalating the 
conflict, through their distinct capabilities such as a developed network 
of contacts, and/or previous experience in mediation. Such actors, des-
pite their limited effectiveness, if accepted, might reduce the friction 
through unofficial talks between conflicting sides and pave the road for 
a more formal process.
 NGOs represent a type of actor whose interests are “not as apparent 
or suspect as the primary players of power politics” (Zartman and Tou-
val 1996, 450). They are interested in establishing and maintaining the 
role and reputation of a good and successful mediator over time. The 
extensive presence of development, humanitarian and religious NGOs 
in countries and regions affected by conflicts has produced a very valua-
ble entry point to the conflict. However, apart from trying to alleviate 
the problems of violent conflicts, NGOs also see themselves as having 
the necessary capacity, knowledge and expertise to instigate a process of 
dialogue between conflicting sides. This position should not be viewed 
as egoistic, because NGOs do not only tend to enhance their position 
but actually believe they have something new to offer to the process 
(idem).
 Although each type of potential mediator has been under serious 
academic scrutiny, they all have been analyzed separately. However, 
as experience shows mediation activities are quite often conducted by 
more than one mediator. Therefore, reflecting on insights from studies 
that analyzed each type separately, this research goes one step further 
and in the next chapter aims to extend the study of international media-
tion to the dynamics and principles generated in multiparty mediation 
activities.
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CHAPTER II: Multiparty Mediation  
2.1 Existing theory
2.1.1 Definition
 While in certain settings (such as domestic or legal disputes) it is 
customary for mediation to be conducted by a single trustworthy ac-
tor with a necessary degree of authority, international conflicts usually 
draw into the mediation process all sorts of outside actors, that are “just 
as numerous and frequently as diverse in their interests as the warring 
parties themselves” (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 1). By noticing this 
significant difference, several scholars and practitioners of conflict re-
solution have underlined that today the multiplication of mediators is 
less a matter of choice and more a fact of life (Crocker et al 1999; Sisk 
2009). The popularity of mediation as a conflict management activity 
and recent proliferation of potential mediators shifted the interest of 
academia to analyze the process and dynamics of multiparty mediati-
on (Crocker et al 1999, Crocker et al 2001, Diehl and Lepgold 2003, 
Whitfield 2007, Böhmelt 2011, Hampson and Zartman 2012). 
 In their analysis, Frazier and Dixon (2006) find that the more the 
mediation effort is multilateral the greater the chance of a negotiated 
settlement (pg. 403), as “coalitions serve as a good example of how states 
utilize their power in an ad hoc but multilateral manner. Coalitions pro-
vide states the opportunity to act outside of formal multilateral settings 
but with some of the benefits of multilateralism such as legitimacy and 
pooling of resources” (2006, 391). 
 It is very simplistic to assume that coalitions are formed only by sta-
tes. In the contemporary international society, which is increasingly be-
coming multilateral, ad hoc coalitions are continuously changing shape. 
The archetypical ad hoc coalitions of states are now complemented by 
participation of other multilateral bodies. In fact “multiparty mediation 
refers to attempts by many third parties to assist peace negotiations in 
any given conflict … it may be undertaken by international or regional 
organizations, national governments and non-governmental organiza-
tions” (Crocker et al. 1999, 230). These attempts may occur sequenti-
ally – one institution at a time – over the life of the conflict, or may 
occur simultaneously involving many different mediators with various 
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institutional bases on the ground at the same time. In fact, the concept 
refers to simultaneous interventions by more than one mediator in a 
conflict, interventions by composite actors such as contact groups as 
well as sequential mediated interventions that again involve more than 
one party. Thus the real multilateralism of different ad hoc coalitions can 
be perceived by parties in conflict as formed not to serve the interest of 
only one state, but to produce a body that will act with an increased level 
of legitimacy since it might bring together states and IOs that all act 
upon a specific interest. 
 Since mediation is being undertaken by a variety of institutions, 
comprised of individual states, coalitions of the willing, international 
organizations, and various transnational NGOs, a number of very im-
portant questions challenge contemporary academia (Crocker et al. 
1999): how and why these multiparty interventions take place; who is 
endowed with leadership; what establishes the extent of dedication in 
terms of human and financial resources; who is accountable for keeping 
an already mediated settlement on track and preventing the collapse of 
the agreement lest it become orphaned. As the number of states and 
international actors that are involved in mediation increases, a careful 
assessment is necessary not only of their relative institutional strengths 
and weaknesses, but also of how to promote complementary efforts and 
how to synchronize the whole process when one actor is transferring 
the responsibilities for mediation to others. Finally, it would be of great 
value to know more about the main obstacles in achieving coordination 
and coherence between various mediators in such an environment and 
how to surmount the problems that multiple mediators face when ope-
rating without a ‘common script’ in attempting to mediate a negotiated 
settlement. 
2.1.2 Benefits and Liabilities of Multiparty Mediation 
 According to practitioner literature (Crocker et al. 1999) there are 
several serious challenges that the process of multiparty mediation is 
faced with. In case the mediation is conducted by a multitude of ac-
tors there is always a possibility of confusion in the process. Namely, as 
Crocker, Hampson and Aall specify, ‘if there is no shared analysis of the 
problem and no sense of a common solution, different mediators will 
confuse the parties’ (2001, 57). This lack of shared ideas tends to produce 
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mixed signals, which will be sent to conflicting sides, and consequently 
undermine the mediation efforts. With multiple mediators, disputing 
sides might tend to go ‘forum shopping’ with different mediators for se-
veral reasons. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon noted that “multiple 
actors competing for a mediation role create an opportunity for forum 
shopping as intermediaries are played off against each other. Such a fra-
gmented international response reinforces fragmentation in the conflict 
and complicates resolution” (Ban Ki-Moon 2009). At the same time, 
forum shopping can turn into a useful tool for procrastination of the 
overall negotiation process for those parties that lack the real commi-
tment to achieve a settlement. Mediators might also channel their lack 
of commitment by ‘passing the buck’ to other mediators once things go 
wrong, in order to avoid being part of a failed effort. 
 Despite these downturns, multiparty mediation has become a very 
practical solution to modern day conflicts which require elevated levels 
of commitment in order to manage them. Since rarely a single entity 
(being a state or an international/regional organization) is either capa-
ble or willing to invest as much as is really required, more than one third 
party represents a good alternative. First of all, not every mediator en-
ters the process with the same level or type of leverage. A combination 
of mediators with different leverages might contribute to the efficiency 
of collective activity, since the process might rely on ‘borrowing leve-
rages’ from various sides. Participation of influential regional and global 
actors in the mediating coalition can contribute in ‘restructuring’ both 
domestic and regional relationships that hamper the achievement of 
a negotiated solution. Finally Crocker, Hampson and Aall emphasize 
that multiparty mediation’s advantage is that it permits different media-
tors to enter the process according to their capabilities and thus contri-
bute to the facilitation of negotiation and communication between the 
conflicting sides (Crocker et al. 2001; 1999). This fact is directly related 
to the conflict cycle also developed in their analysis.               
2.1.3 Conflict Cycle and Comparative Advantage of Different 
Kinds of Mediators
 According to Crocker, Hampson and Aall, at the ‘low end’ of the 
conflict curve, which indicates the period prior to the occurrence of 
belligerent activities, the combined interventions by non-official actors 
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can be efficient in ‘defusing conflicts before they escalate’ (2001, 61). At 
that time, parties are still inclined to talk to each other, so they might re-
ject efforts by outside states and international organizations perceiving 
them as interfering with internal issues. By creating informal settings 
for communication, mediators might help the parties avoid the pre-
ssure from respective constituencies, and thus improve the likelihood 
of achieving a negotiated settlement. In the ‘middle range’ of the con-
flict curve, parties are reluctant to accept outside intervention, as mutual 
relationships and perceptions between the parties have solidified due 
to escalation of violence (2003, 241). In this case the conflict is still 
not ripe for mutual acceptance that a settlement needs. Thus some low 
key mediators (i.e. NGOs) might be useful to establish communication 
between the parties without making them lose face since publicly they 
might be committed to pursue conflicting policies. Once the commu-
nication has been established it is useful to introduce mediators that 
have coercive/reward power that can be used in a formal setting – a 
tactic described as “mediation with muscle” (Crocker et al.1999, 242; 
Crocker et al. 2001, 62). The use of coercive threats and side payments 
by third parties might induce conflicting sides to change their pre-co-
ined options and convince them away from violence. Without these 
incentives, parties will have little reason to participate in talks and will 
be more inclined to continue with hostilities as a means to achieve an 
acceptable solution. Consequently the ‘upper end’ of the conflict curve 
requires even stronger presence of mediators with ‘muscle’ that will be 
able to develop the needed amount of pressure on parties and lead them 
away from conflicting deadlock. According to Crocker, Hampton and 
Aall, at this point it is expected from mediators to develop inventive and 
plausible solutions for ‘confidence-building measures, cease fire moni-
toring, verification proposals’, to make sure that obligations are being 
executed and other types of ‘political guarantees’ that facilitate addre-
ssing the most complex security issues pertinent to the parties (Crocker 
et al. 1999, 242). In the end, under these circumstances success can be 
obtained only if mediators apply effective procedural control over the 
process. 
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2.1.4 Composition of the Mediating Coalition
 According to a study by Strimling (2008), mediation conducted si-
multaneously by official diplomats and private facilitators are most li-
kely when their efforts are characterized by high levels of communica-
tion, coordination, collaboration and integration. For Böhmelt (2011) 
these four factors could be best observed in coalitions composed of 
democratic states. Democratic peace literature argues that one of the 
most important norms of democracies is the peaceful resolution of con-
flicts (Dixon 1994, Bercovitch and Huston 2000, Mitchell 2002). Dixon 
(1994) already showed that democratic opponents are more likely to re-
ach a peaceful settlement because their systems are based on norms that 
promote compromise and non-violence. At the same time, democratic 
features such as transparency and inclusivity decrease the level of uncer-
tainty and facilitate communication. In multiparty coalitions composed 
of democracies this helps mediators to overcome collective action pro-
blems and consequently promotes cooperative interactions (Böhmelt 
2011, 112). The same argument can be applied to concept of coordi-
nation because coordination is also best achieved through predicable 
procedures that reflect those present in democratic societies. However, 
despite expectations that democracies are best suited for multiparty me-
diation, according to Böhmelt chances for effective conflict resolution 
are not driven by regime type (2011, 127). In fact, as experience shows, 
on numerous occasions multiparty mediation was successful even when 
it was conducted by a coalition composed of democratic and non-de-
mocratic states. 
 Since the diversity of regimes in the coalition was not an obstacle 
to achieve success, the composition should be observed from the angle 
of previous relationships between mediators. For instance, patterns of 
predictable behavior that are instrumental for a more cooperative and 
coordinated effort between mediators can develop through a series of 
repeated mediation interactions. As it was previously stated, while it 
is useful for a coalition to be composed of actors that have compatible 
interests, the “team of rivals” hypothesis (Hampson and Zartman 2012) 
illustrates that successful mediation is also possible even if mediators 
have competing interests. The crucial challenge is to have “negotiating 
teams that are not necessarily comprised of likeminded, ideological soul 
mates but are ‘teams of rivals’ who develop mutual respect and a common 
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understanding that they share wider strategic interests and goals which 
go beyond the conflict in question” (Hampson and Zartman 2011, 17). 
Positive past relations between actors that intervene as mediators in a 
given conflict – even with conflicting agendas - might contribute to the 
success of multiparty mediation activity through a coordinated effort. 
 Conflicting sides are often reluctant to accept third party mediation 
if they perceive an external actor’s preferences bias to the advantage of 
the opposing side. Prior to their decision to start negotiations, conflic-
ting sides do a cost-benefit analysis on whether continuing the conflict 
is less advantageous than resorting to a negotiated settlement. At the 
same time, the achieved settlement needs to deliver results that wo-
uld increase (if not maximize) the utility for both sides; otherwise they 
would just resort to war (Bercovitch et al. 2007). Since the conflict is 
intractable to the extent that conflicting sides are unable to achieve a 
settlement bilaterally, the role of the mediating coalition becomes very 
delicate. It is quite possible that each one of the actors within the coali-
tion will have a distinct agenda to promote, and thus be inclined to one 
of the disputants’ claims. This way, a confirmation that their claims are 
well embedded within the coalition will certainly give a positive impul-
se to both conflicting parties to accept the multilateral mediation. As 
previously stated, multiparty mediation allows a distinct mechanism of 
‘borrowing leverage’. Generally, increasing leverage in such circumstan-
ces improves the position of mediators in the process and contributes to 
the efficiency of collective activity. Involvement of important regional 
and global actors in the process can help change relationships between 
conflicting parties that hamper the achievement of a negotiated soluti-
on. As such, the various mediators may provide numerous carrots and 
sticks that can facilitate and improve communication between parti-
es and change the attitudes of parties that are not fully committed to 
achieving an agreement.  
 For the purposes of this research, the analysis will focus on two types 
of actors that are invested with a particular amount of relative leverage 
and are capable of conducting a formal mediation process: states and 
international organizations. As previously illustrated, international or-
ganizations rarely have any coercive power of their own whenever they 
join the mediation process, but they have to rely on their member-sta-
tes. Presently, the only type of power international organizations have 
at their disposal is reward power. But the main type of leverage inter-
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national organizations can count on is legitimacy. This type of leverage 
makes them being perceived as credible and thus acceptable mediators, 
which makes them a valuable asset for a potential mediating coalition. 
But quite often, legitimacy in itself is not enough to keep the process 
going and abusing reward power might have a converse effect. States on 
the other hand, usually have at their disposal coercive means and (on 
occasions) reward policies towards conflicting sides, but their legitimacy 
is much more limited. For this reason a very beneficial feature of mul-
tiparty mediation - ‘borrowing leverage’ - can be observed through the 
creation of a specific leverage which blends coercive-reward power and 
legitimacy. 
 As explained earlier, ‘borrowing leverage’ is a clear illustration of a 
coordinated activity. In cases when the mediating coalition lacks the 
necessary leverage to move the parties toward an agreement, they might 
explore the option of including those actors that possess the much nee-
ded leverage. Once a new actor offers or is invited to join the mediating 
coalition, the crucial challenge for a multiparty endeavor is to achieve 
the necessary level of “mutual respect” despite the possibility that their 
interest in the dispute might be conflicting. 
2.2 Advancing the Theory of Multiparty Mediation
2.2.1 Challenges of Cooperation and Coordination
 Reflecting on the previous statement by Frazier and Dixon (2006), 
the more multilateral the mediation effort is, the greater the chance 
of a negotiated settlement; there might also be a converse relationship 
between the number of players and issues in a multiparty mediation and 
the probability of creating and supporting a synchronized interventi-
on strategy. As Crocker, Hampson and Aall claim, “increasing numbers 
and difficulties in negotiation are related to heterogeneity of interests 
and perceptions” (1999, 250). So the larger the number of participants 
in a multiparty mediation, the larger the probability of conflicting inte-
rests and positions, and the more complex the relationship among the 
parties will be (idem, 252). Böhmelt (2011) empirically confirms this 
argument. He finds that the relationship between the size of a media-
ting coalition and the effectives of a multiparty mediation effort can 
be illustrated with a U-shape: “both small and very large groups are 
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less likely than medium-sized intervening coalitions to mediate dispu-
tes effectively” (Böhmelt 2011, 109). He argues that a single mediator 
or a small group rarely have the needed amount of leverage to produce 
crucial incentives for the parties in conflict; while the bigger coalitions 
are more likely to possess the necessary leverage. However their size 
makes them more difficult to organize and does not allow them to have 
a “greater heterogeneity of interests” (Böhmelt 2011, 122). 
 In cases where the mediation is conducted by a coalition, intractable 
barriers of the process can be avoided if interests of mediators are ho-
mogeneous or converging and the coalition is ready to delegate power 
and accountability to the mediator while also granting the mediator the 
authority to bargain for the group as a whole (Crocker et al 1999, 252). 
However, in reality mediators often do not have a shared interest in the 
conflict. It is hard to imagine that a mediating effort could be successful 
if conducted by mediators with competing interests that do not wish to 
cooperate with each other. In cases where mediators have competing 
interests and diverse alliances (relationships) with parties in conflict, 
meditation coalitions can be seen as “teams of rivals” (Hampson and 
Zartman 2012). In such cases, in order to be efficient, the mediators 
agree to work as a team, which is a clear signal of acceptance of coope-
ration (initial cooperation), while still maintaining diverging interests. 
The fact that they maintain diverging interests sends a signal to the 
parties in conflict that their stakes might be secured (i.e. they have an 
ally in the team of rivals). 
 Having all this in mind, key concepts for a successful multiparty 
mediation appear to be ‘consistency in interests’ and ‘cooperation and co-
ordination’ between mediators. But how much does this affect the ove-
rall process? Do efforts that lack cooperation inevitably end in failure? 
What happens to the mediation process when mediating parties do not 
share the same idea and interest in a common solution? 
 Crucial challenges that must be overcome in multiparty mediation 
processes are the (1) achievement of adequate cooperation among the 
mediators and (2) consequent coordination of their activities in the me-
diation process. Böhmelt (2011) already showed that cooperative inte-
ractions between mediators improve the likelihood of mediation succe-
ss. Looking at coordination, Crocker notes that when broader policy 
objectives diverge, this tends to result in confusion and a lack of coor-
dination in negotiation efforts (emphasis added, Crocker et al. 1999, 
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687). Similarly, according to Zartman, “if a number of conciliators are 
available to the parties themselves and if a number of friends of the 
conflicting parties can coordinate their good offices and pressure, the 
chances of success are improved” (emphasis added, Zartman 1989, 276). 
Unfortunately, existing literature goes only as far as to make it clear that 
for a successful mediation it is important to achieve necessary coopera-
tion and coordination among the actors as if these features were exoge-
nous to the process. Synchronized activities are only observed as if they 
are either present or not in the process, without considering whether or 
not these features might change over time and if this change could have 
an impact on the overall mediation process.
 As numerous cases of multiparty mediation indicate, it is not rare 
that parties who are initially willing to pool their resources and act in 
concert, at a certain point decide to stop cooperating with the rest of the 
coalition. However, without this willingness to continue cooperating 
with other mediators, it is illusory to talk about coordinated activities. 
Given that cooperation is a precondition for coordination, under what 
conditions will potential dropouts see cooperation as their dominant 
strategy? How does cooperation or lack of cooperation affect the outco-
me of peace talks?
 It would be implausible to expect that mediators are only driven by 
humanitarian concerns to intervene. Bearing in mind the considera-
ble investment of resources that mediation requires, it is reasonable to 
presume that mediators are at least as motivated by self-interest as by 
humanitarian impulses (Touval and Zartman 1985, 8). Mediators play 
their role in negotiations and spend resources not only because they aim 
to resolve a dispute, they also seek to gain something from it (Greig 
2005; Touval 1992). In a similar vein, just as their involvement needs 
to be compatible with their self-interest, their choice to cooperate once 
they’ve committed to mediation also needs to be perceived as useful for 
the promotion of their self-interests.
 Cooperation can be understood as a situation where parties agree to 
work together to produce new gains for each of the participants that 
would be unavailable to them by unilateral action, at some cost (Za-
rtman and Touval 2010, 1). It implies a dynamic through which con-
flicting interests can be pooled together in order to achieve common 
interests. When faced with a shared problem, parties can choose from 
three scenarios: unilateral action, cooperative action and not acting at 
Analysis of Multiparty Mediation Processes / Doctoral Dissertation
49
all. In most cases, parties are inclined to act on their own; or as Touval 
phrases it, to act “unilaterally if possible, multilaterally if necessary” (To-
uval 2010). The decision to act unilaterally is directly related to the costs 
that cooperation implies – when the cost of cooperation is greater than 
the perceived benefits, parties will defect.
 Depending on the type of conflict, cooperation may occur on two 
different levels: between the parties to a conflict directly, via negotia-
tions, or with the help of outside parties, via mediation. In both cases, 
according to Zartman, cooperation is a direct consequence of three ele-
ments that parties take into consideration (Zartman 2010). The first one 
is the ‘effectiveness’ of cooperation as opposed to more conflictual stra-
tegies. The second is the cost/benefit calculation of cooperating. Finally, 
actors must consider ‘playback effects’ – the reputational costs that an 
actor may suffer for non-cooperative behavior. Each one of these ele-
ments plays a crucial role in parties’ decisions for or against cooperation.
 In the realm of multiparty mediation, cooperation can be observed 
in its full complexity. In order to attain a successful outcome, coopera-
tion needs to take place on three distinct yet highly interrelated levels. 
First of all, since the dynamics of the conflict impede the parties from 
negotiating directly (i.e. bilaterally), they have to choose to cooperate 
with the third parties in order to find a commonly acceptable soluti-
on. At the same time, since the conflict is mediated by a multitude of 
outside actors, these actors also need to come up with a ‘common script’ 
which will serve as a clear guideline for resolving the dispute. Thus all 
the third parties need to cooperate among themselves and reduce the 
possibility of sending mixed signals which might jeopardize the ma-
nagement process. Finally, it should not be forgotten that each outside 
actor also has a specific interest in resolving the conflict, and this inte-
rest is directly related to the mediator’s relations with one (or both) dis-
puting sides. For this reason it is essential that cooperation takes place 
also on this third level, as this is the level that gives outside actors their 
added leverage.
 Once cooperation is in place along all of these dimensions, we may 
move one step further and start observing the dynamics of coordination. 
Cooperation and coordination are not two distinct processes; rather, co-
ordination represents a subset dynamic of a larger cooperation process. 
While both cooperation and coordination imply that the actors invol-
ved need to have shared goals, there is still a very clear difference betwe-
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en the two phenomena. A precondition for cooperation to be successful 
is that all parties recognize mutual benefits of working in concert. Once 
acknowledged as beneficial, cooperation opens the doors to the dyna-
mics of coordination which involves the more mechanical aspects of 
dividing the labor effectively, and clarifying who needs to do what, when 
and how. In other words coordination is the next step in the process of 
achieving full cooperation, as parties make sure that they do not cross 
purposes or stumble over each other in their efforts to accomplish their 
shared cooperative goal. 
 This research looks at coordination as a method of synchronized 
usage of different leverages and resources each mediator has at its dis-
posal in the process in order to create necessary incentives for resolution 
that would have been unavailable through a single mediator. As Croc-
ker, Hampson and Aall already underlined, a harmonious employment 
of various leverages represents a crucial element of an effective mul-
tiparty mediation process: “where direct leverage is limited it may be 
borrowed from others” (Crocker et al. 1999, 40).
 It is essential to keep in mind that while producing new gains, coo-
peration is also generating certain costs for participants. When multiple 
mediators act in concert, they all face dual costs: those of cooperating 
plus the inevitable costs of mediation. Given the combined costs of mul-
tiparty mediation, for cooperation to take place, parties need to know 
that benefits will outweigh detriments. However, as previously mentio-
ned, it is not uncommon that at a certain point in the process of coope-
rating, a party decides to defect from the group. Defection may come in 
different forms – from procrastination to the full abandonment of the 
process – but its distinct feature in multiparty mediation processes is the 
fact that a party is unwilling to use the full potential of its leverage and 
resources to move the conflicting parties toward an agreement.
2.2.2 Game theoretical model
 In order to fully understand the complexities of achieving coope-
ration in a multiparty mediation effort, this research will first provide 
an abstraction of the process through a game theoretical model. Game 
theoretic approaches are useful insomuch as they allow us to analyze the 
decisions parties make regarding potential strategies available to them 
in the mediation process as they pursue maximization of their expected 
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utilities. Numerous studies of mediation have already benefited from 
the use of rational choice models (Kydd 2003, Kydd 2006, Maoz and 
Terris 2006). The intention here is not to create a new theoretical model, 
but to bring into play those findings that can help understand general 
relationship patterns between parties and enhance our understanding of 
specific decisions they made as the process of mediation advanced.
 Because one of the underlining assumptions of this research is that 
cooperation can change over time, the model will utilize the dynamic 
Theory of Moves (ToM). Brams developed this theory in order to bring, 
“a dynamic dimension to the classical theory of games, which its foun-
ders characterized as ‘thoroughly static’” (von Neumann and Morgen-
stern 1944; 3rd edn, 1953, pg. 44 as quoted in Brams 1994, 1). The first 
rule of ToM is that a game has to start at an outcome, called “initial sta-
te” (Brams 1994, 22). The assumption is that from this state, players can 
aspire to move to a better state by switching their strategies. As Brams 
explains it, “as they look ahead at their possible moves, the possible co-
untermoves of other players, their own counter-countermoves, and so 
on, the players try to anticipate where play will terminate” (Brams 1994, 
7). Thus, the game ends when, after a series of “alternating responses,” 
the player who has the next move decides not to switch its strategy 
(Brams 1994, 22). Another important rule of ToM is that a player will 
not move from an initial state if this move “leads to a less preferred 
final state; or returns play to the initial state” (Brams 1994, 27). Brams 
calls this rule “a rationality rule, because it provides the basis for players 
to determine whether they can do better by moving from a state or 
remaining in it” (Brams 1994, 28). The last rule is that of “precedence”, 
and it implies that once a player makes a move “its move overrides the 
player who stays, so the outcome will be induced by a player who mo-
ves” (idem).  As each player looks ahead and makes rational calculations 
where to move from each initial state, the process ends in outcomes that 
Brams calls nonmyopic equilibria or NME (Brams 1994, 33). 
Brams’ theory proves its applicability to the case of mediation by argu-
ing that: 
 “some decisions are made collectively by players in which case it would be reaso-
nable to say that they choose strategies from scratch, either simultaneously or by coor-
dinating their choices. But if say two countries are coordinating their choices, as when 
they agree to sign a treaty, the important question is what individualistic calculations 
led them to this point. The formality of jointly signing a treaty is the culmination of 
their negotiations, which covers up the move-countermove process that preceded it. 
This is precisely what ToM is designed to uncover” (Brams 1994, 23).    
Siniša Vuković
52
 For the purposes of simplification let’s assume that there are two 
disputing sides – side A and side B – who are unable to negotiate a 
settlement themselves. The intractable nature of their conflict and the 
issues at stake draw attention from more than one outside actor who 
have an interest in managing the peace process. Again, for the purposes 
of simplification, let’s assume that we have (at least) three such players, 
each one with specific interests in the conflict, leverages they can exert 
in the peace process and relationships they have with other mediators 
and conflicting sides. Therefore, let’s presume that mediators 1 and 3 
are what scholarship calls biased mediators due to the particular nature 
of their relationship with parties to the dispute (Touval and Zartman 
1985). Mediator 1 is biased toward party A, and has particular leverage 
over it, so as it is able to move party A in an intended direction. The 
same relationship can be found between mediator 3 and party B. On 
the other hand, mediator 2 is what scholarship calls a pure mediator, who 
does not have any special relationship with neither of the conflicting 
sides but nevertheless has a strong interest in resolving the conflict. The 
model will assume that mediator 2 is the only actor that is unwilling to 
dropout from the process, while actors 1 and 3 might opt for this stra-
tegy, and thus undermine cooperation within the mediating coalition. 
Under all these assumptions, the model prescribes four different scena-
rios. In the first scenario all three mediators choose to cooperate thro-
ughout the process. In the second and the third scenario, actors 1 and 
3 respectively choose to defect from the group while still maintaining a 
biased relationship with either A or B. In the fourth scenario both 1 and 
3 chose to deflect, leaving the entire mediating process to 2, though they 
again keep biased relations with conflicting sides.
The model(1) prescribes two choices (X) for each actor involved: to coo-
perate (1) or not to cooperate (0). That is: AX , BX , 1X , 2X 3X = 0 or 1. 
All other values in the model also range from 0 to 1.
In case parties are unable to engage in mediation, payoffs of resolving 
the conflict through fighting are described through expected utility 
functions:
1  This model was originally developed during the 2009 YSSP research at IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, and 
further expanded to its current state together with Dr. Ben Allen (Harvard University).  
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Where, WP is the probability that a conflicting party will win by fighting; 
fU  is the utility of winning through fighting, which is supposed to be 
very high ( fU ≈1) given the fact that through fighting a party can either 
win or lose; fC represents the costs of fighting, which are supposed to 
be also high ( fC ≈1) in order to make the option of fighting not appea-
ling; finally as third parties are not involved directly in the conflict their 
payoffs are related to the probability of winning by a side they support 
and the utility of that victory ( 1AwU , 3BwU ); obviously party 2 does not 
have any utility if the fighting continues.
If there is agreement to conduct mediation, each actor has a payoff. The 
payoffs are still described through an expected utility function which for 
each conflicting side is: 
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Where, mP is the probability of winning through mediation for a con-
flicting side; agU  represents the utility each conflicting side has from 
an agreement achieved through mediation ( agU < fU ); mC is the cost of 
mediation; i  is the influence a biased mediator has on a conflicting side. 
This relationship represents a cost that biased mediators face in order to 
influence their partners in conflict - it should not be too high, otherwise 
mediation is not very attractive for outside actors. 
 For the purposes of simplification let’s assume that there are two 
disputing sides – side A and side B – who are unable to negotiate a 
settlement themselves. The intractable nature of their conflict and the 
issues at stake draw attention from more than one outside actor who 
have an interest in managing the peace process. Again, for the purposes 
of simplification, let’s assume that we have (at least) three such players, 
each one with specific interests in the conflict, leverages they can exert 
in the peace process and relationships they have with other mediators 
and conflicting sides. Therefore, let’s presume that mediators 1 and 3 
are what scholarship calls biased mediators due to the particular nature 
of their relationship with parties to the dispute (Touval and Zartman 
1985). Mediator 1 is biased toward party A, and has particular leverage 
over it, so as it is able to move party A in an intended direction. The 
same relationship can be found between mediator 3 and party B. On 
the other hand, mediator 2 is what scholarship calls a pure mediator, who 
does not have any special relationship with neither of the conflicting 
sides but nevertheless has a strong interest in resolving the conflict. The 
model will assume that mediator 2 is the only actor that is unwilling to 
dropout from the process, while actors 1 and 3 might opt for this stra-
tegy, and thus undermine cooperation within the mediating coalition. 
Under all these assumptions, the model prescribes four different scena-
rios. In the first scenario all three mediators choose to cooperate thro-
ughout the process. In the second and the third scenario, actors 1 and 
3 respectively choose to defect from the group while still maintaining a 
biased relationship with either A or B. In the fourth scenario both 1 and 
3 chose to deflect, leaving the entire mediating process to 2, though they 
again keep biased relations with conflicting sides.
The model(1) prescribes two choices (X) for each actor involved: to coo-
perate (1) or not to cooperate (0). That is: AX , BX , 1X , 2X 3X = 0 or 1. 
All other values in the model also range from 0 to 1.
In case parties are unable to engage in mediation, payoffs of resolving 
the conflict through fighting are described through expected utility 
functions:
1  This model was originally developed during the 2009 YSSP research at IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, and 
further expanded to its current state together with Dr. Ben Allen (Harvard University).  
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mP  has a function: 
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)0()( mP stands for a fixed probability of winning through mediation; mQ
indicates the influence an outside party has on the mediation process – 
it comes into play only if X=1; the probability has a negative mQ of the 
opposing side since an outside player by increasing chances of winning 
for their partners also decreases the probability of winning for the other 
conflicting side. 
The cost of mediation mC  has a function: )2( 31)1()0( XXCCC mmm −−+= ; 
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mC indicates the fixed costs of mediation; the other part of the formula 
stands for additional costs of mediation that A and B face each time an 
outside actor does not participate in mediation – this refers to biased 
mediators 1 and 3, as the model assumes that neutral mediator 2 will 
always be engaged in the mediation process. 
The model prescribes that mediators also benefit from participating in 
the mediating process. Biased mediators have a utility from what their 
partner state in the conflict wins through a reached agreement ( 1AagU ,
3
BagU ) - multiplied by the probability of them winning - which comes at 
a cost of their influence/relation with the conflicting side ( i ). Thus the 
payoffs for biased mediators are:
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Fighting occurs unless both conflicting sides agree to mediation. For 
mediation to occur, both of these inequalities must be satisfied:
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CASE 1: Neither mediator cooperates
If neither mediator cooperates, the conditions for mediation (1) beco-
me: 
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If conditions (2) fail, fighting continues. The mediation receives expec-
ted payoffs 
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If conditions (2) hold, mediation takes place under mediator 2, without 
cooperation from 1 and 3. The mediators receive expected payoffs:
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CASE2: One mediator cooperates
In case mediator 1 cooperates, but mediator 3 does not, the conditions 
for mediation become:
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If conditions (3) fail, fighting continues, and mediators receive expected 
payoffs
A
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If conditions (3) hold, mediation takes place under mediators 1 and 2, 
without cooperation from 3. The mediators receive expected payoffs:
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The case that mediator 3 cooperates and mediator 1 does not is similar.
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CASE 3: Both mediators cooperate 
If both mediators cooperate, conditions for mediation are
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If conditions (4) fail, fighting continues. The mediators receive expected 
payoffs 
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If conditions (4) hold, mediation takes place under all mediators. The 
mediators receive expected payoffs
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then mediation is so good that the parties agree to it no matter what. 
In this case, the actions of mediators are determined by weighing their 
costs of cooperating against the utility they gain from influencing the 
mediation. 
Thus, mediator 1 will cooperate if
011 >−− m
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and mediator 3 will cooperate if
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The model predicts that cooperation in the process of multiparty me-
diation can be explained through an inverted prisoner’s dilemma. This 
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dilemma describes a situation in which the conflicting sides (A and B) 
get involved in the mediation process, regardless of the action of the 
mediators. In other words, the mediation process will continue even if 
one mediator decides not to cooperate with the rest of the group. Using 
the theory of moves, we can interpret the model as follows:
  1
 Cooperates No cooperation
3
Cooperates
                       2
            (c)
   2
             1
            (b)
   4
No cooperation
                       4
            (b)
   1
                      3
            (a)
   3
 Point (a) is a common starting point for all international conflicts. 
It is the moment when a conflict assumes necessary characteristics to 
encourage outside actors to get involved. Numerous studies have exami-
ned the phenomena, of who, when and why mediates (Bercovitch and 
Schneider 2000; Greig and Regan 2008). As the model shows, here me-
diation is conducted by one outside actor (number 2) that parties per-
ceive as trustworthy and unbiased. In this point, each biased mediator 
chooses not to participate in mediation, while still maintaining a biased 
relationship with a particular conflicting side. In this case, outside actors 
avoid both the costs of mediation and of cooperation. At the same time, 
they still maintain a special relationship with one of the parties at dis-
pute, and thus indirectly still exercise some influence over the mediation 
process, being conducted by actor 2 alone. Theoretically speaking, this 
outcome is NME, because it creates greater benefits than any other, so 
in case the game started at this point, rational actors would not move 
from it. Nonetheless, as only one mediator is involved in the process we 
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cannot talk about multiparty mediation taking place in this state. 
 In the contemporary dynamics of international relations, we can 
expect to observe a proliferation of actors willing to step in and manage 
a conflict in accordance with their particular interests. Knowing that it 
can benefit more by joining the mediation coalition, one actor might 
decide to opt for a cooperative strategy from the beginning. Thus, the 
game actually starts in points (b), when one biased mediator decides to 
start cooperating with mediator number 2. In this state the mediator 
that does not cooperate with the other two faces smaller benefits com-
pared to the one that chose to take part in mediating efforts through 
cooperation (1,4) or (4,1). Nevertheless, in reality we often witness that 
some actors purposefully chose not to cooperate with other mediators. 
Why would this be the case? Because their rationality is myopic, actors 
may fail to recognize that the game cannot revert to point (a), where a 
non-cooperative strategy created far greater benefits. Here the choice 
of non-cooperation (point (a)) is complemented by the fact that some 
actors aim to use their biased position to influence the behavior of a 
particular side in the conflict and consequently to spoil the mediation 
efforts of other actors.  In fact, as the rule of ToM dictates, the next 
move is that of a player that does not yet cooperate, and its next move 
cannot be to move the other player back to non-cooperative behavior. 
Thus they need to realize that the best they can hope to achieve given 
the game’s progress is a move to point c.  
 However appealing the non-cooperation decision might appear at 
a first glance, spoiling the process might actually backfire. When an 
outside actor decides not to cooperate while others are engaged in the 
mediation, it undercuts its own potential to exercise influence over 
other actors involved in the mediation and looses the potential to create 
benefits for itself and its partner side in the conflict. While the biased 
mediator stays outside the coalition, the side it is supporting might still 
remain trapped in the process, and it is to be expected that in such a 
constellation, there are less chances that potential solutions will be tilted 
to its advantage. When one side in the conflict is loosing through me-
diation, so will its outside partners, even though they are officially not 
cooperating in the process. For example, their international reputation 
might be undermined, as might their leverage to influence future deve-
lopments in the process. In such circumstances both the non-cooperati-
ve outside actor and its partner party to the conflict will face far smaller 
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benefits than those who opt to cooperate and potentially (through con-
structive dialogue and exercising necessary leverage) move the proposed 
solution to their advantage.        
 Faced with a lower payoff, a rational second biased mediator decides 
to cooperate, which moves the game to its final state found in point (c), 
which is the outcome of the game and a NME. Even though in this case 
their utility is smaller than in point (a) (due to the costs of both media-
ting and cooperating), they will undeniably experience bigger benefits 
than if they are not part of the mediating coalition. In such a setting 
each mediator will be able to exercise a certain pressure over the proce-
ss, and bargain in favor of the side in the conflict that they have special 
relations with. Biased mediators attain important utility as their partner 
involved in the conflict gains through mediation. Thus, despite the costs 
of mediating and acting in concert, the second outside actor still ma-
nages to create greater benefits through coordinated activities than if 
it opted for a defecting strategy, assuming that mutual defection is not 
an option. This goes in line with the initial statement that cooperation 
implies the creation of new gains for each party that were unavailable to 
them by unilateral action, albeit at some costs.
2.3 Insights from the model and formulation of  
 hypotheses
 This model underlines that employment of cooperative strategies for 
parties involved is actually more beneficial than spoiling the process. In 
fact, even cumulative costs of cooperating and mediating complemen-
ted with potential benefits of acting as a spoiler still do not manage to 
match the benefits generated by cooperative strategies. Since coopera-
tion proves to be decidedly beneficial not only to the process but to the 
parties themselves, it is important to understand what should be done 
once a party opts to defect from a group. As noted by Sisk, “game theory 
contributes to mediation strategies through the finding that one can 
encourage moderation and deter ‘defection’ in bargaining relationships by 
not allowing a player to gain from a defection strategy, even if it imposes 
additional costs to cooperation to prevent a defector’s gain” (emphasis 
added Sisk 2009, 48).
 In view of the fact that defection is often a direct expression of a 
party’s self-interested goals, another way of encouraging change is to 
Siniša Vuković
60
engage a defecting party in a bargaining process, where an alternative 
to their current behavior can be found. It is not always very clear who 
should take responsibility to steer a party off a non-cooperative course. 
While in most cases coordination of mediating activities is attributed to 
players with necessary levels of credibility and legitimacy, they often do 
not have the same leverage over those mediators who represent key pa-
tron states for conflicting sides. Having key patron states or lead-states 
on board has proven to be essential for the peace process. These actors 
- usually an interested regional state or a global power with considerable 
influence in the region - should be ready to produce a well thought-out 
blend of carrots and sticks against the parties, and guide them toward a 
mutually acceptable solution (Sisk 2009). With such capabilities these 
third-parties generally act as biased mediators that were already intro-
duced and illustrated in the game theoretical model. Reflecting on the 
previously illustrated statement by Touval and Zartman (1985) about 
the utility of biased mediators, and their potential constructive role, this 
research proposes the following hypothesis:
 H1: While cooperating with other mediators, biased mediators are useful 
insomuch as they can use their special relationship with one conflicting side 
to influence its behavior, positions and perceptions and consequently move it 
toward an agreement.
 However, when these actors decide to stop cooperating with the rest 
of the group, the conflicting side they have a special relationship with 
might also stop cooperating with other mediators and potentially even 
defect from the process. By cementing their positions, non-cooperative 
actors produce significant complications for the bargaining process and 
put at risk all the mediation efforts. 
 As experience shows in these situations the responsibility for en-
couraging a mediator to develop a common idea about a final solution 
and opt for a cooperative strategy is on the rest of the mediating coali-
tion. More precisely, it is the actors who have strong self-interests in the 
conflict’s outcome that generally take initiative to negotiate with defec-
ting mediators. Confrontation of self-interests between mediators in 
order to find common ground on an acceptable outcome to the conflict 
shifts the focus from negotiating with conflicting sides (mediating) to 
negotiation between mediators. This research proposes three hypotheses 
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in this regard:
 H2: When the mediating coalition is faced with conflicting interests, if 
one mediator decides to defect from the group dynamic, this will lead the peace 
process into a deadlock. 
 H3: If the mediators manage to achieve convergence of policy objectives 
among them, there are bigger chances that the peace process will be successful. 
 H4: In case mediators do not reach such convergence, the conflicting sides 
will be induced to defect from negotiations, making it more likely for the peace 
process to fail. 
 If interpreted through classical game theory, cooperation represents 
a dominant strategy in this model, and the Nash equilibrium is point 
(c) (2,2). ToM also provides a similar interpretation, given that once 
the multiparty mediation starts, cooperative behavior produces higher 
payoffs than defection, and the final state is also in point (c). Ove-
rall, cooperation can be identified as a rational strategy that leads to 
nonmyopic equilibria. Once a party chooses to cooperate, short-term 
goals which induced a party to defect are no longer a priority. Rather, 
for a rational outside party that received low payoffs from a defecting 
strategy, cooperation becomes a useful mechanism through which it is 
possible to limit the other side’s utility. In other words, cooperation pro-
ves to be decidedly beneficial not only to the process but to the parti-
es themselves. Reflecting on the previous statement by Sisk (2009, 48) 
that game theory can help understand how to “encourage moderation 
and deter ‘defection’” in mediation activities, the model might  provide 
useful insights that could be further elaborated in order to better under-
stand what might induce a party to deter from defective strategies and 
switch to cooperation. 
 Discouraging defection is certainly not a simple task, as it directly 
implies interference in another party’s policy objectives. In this case it is 
not enough just to reprove non-cooperative behavior or warn that such 
a strategy is not constructive for the overall process of mediation and 
leave it at that. It is necessary that the defecting party comes to recogni-
ze the benefits of deciding to change its strategy and pursue cooperative 
strategies. This research proposes at least three general reasons why a 
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party would change its policy objectives, and all three will be further 
tested through case studies. 
 On the one hand, exogenous geo-political shifts - significant deve-
lopments on a systemic level caused by pivotal political, social, economic 
and/or natural events - might encourage a party to rethink its guiding 
principles. This is because no policy objective is ever self-motivated or 
independently strong enough to linger indefinitely; it should rather be 
seen as a building block of a complex network of strategic choices de-
veloped by each actor in the international arena. Since such incidents 
rarely affect one actor at a time, they may cause not only a shift in pri-
orities within a party, but also a convergence of interests among several 
actors. Once their interests are compatible, parties will be more inclined 
to cooperate. 
 H5: A strong geo-political shift will induce the defecting mediator to 
change its strategy and engage in a cooperative meditation effort to manage 
the conflict.
  
 On the other hand, changes in the conflict dynamics might induce tho-
se outside actors that are directly involved in the conflict - for example 
by providing logistical and/or military support – to consider using me-
diation as a viable option for ending the conflict. This argument follows 
the logic of the theory of ‘ripeness’ (Zartman 1989) which prescribes 
specific conditions for ripeness to occur. In principle the theory focuses 
on conflicting parties’ perceptions that they are in a ‘mutually hurting 
stalemate’ and that they can identify ‘a sense of way out’ through media-
tion. Zartman and notes that “these can be brought to the conflicting 
parties’ attention by a mediator or an opposing party if they are not 
immediately recognized by the party itself, and they can be resisted so 
long as the conflicting party refuses or is otherwise able to block out 
their perception” (Zartman and de Soto 2010, 6). A similar logic could 
be applied to the perception of a mediator that has been invested in 
the conflict but is not a direct party to the conflict. As Sisk rightfully 
noted, once the mediation process starts it does not produce an auto-
matic termination of hostilities (2010). In fact, violence can be seen as a 
“beyond-the-table tactic used not as an alternative to bargaining but as 
an integral part of the negotiation” (Sisk 2010, 2-3). 
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 H6:  An increase in costs of supporting a war will induce the defecting 
mediator to change its strategy and engage in a cooperative mediation effort 
to manage the conflict. 
 Both exogenous geo-political shifts and changes of conflict dynamic 
imply that the defectors will change their strategy by their own initia-
tive. However, a third trigger of cooperation is also feasible – the initia-
tive might come from the rest of the coalition, through bargaining for 
cooperation. In view of the fact that defection is often a direct expression 
of party’s self-interested goals, another way of encouraging change is to 
engage a defecting party in a bargaining process, where an alternative to 
their current behavior can be found by offering them sufficient incenti-
ves to make participation an attractive option. Hampson and Zartman 
refer to this challenge as building a “team of rivals,” and notes that even 
when the mediation is conducted by “global or regional competitors,” 
they still need to “have the wisdom to realize that they share a common 
problem or project which can only be resolved together” (Hampson and 
Zartman 2012, 2).
 As previously stated, when cooperating with other mediators, biased 
mediators are useful insomuch as they can use their special relationship 
with one conflicting side to influence its behavior, positions and per-
ceptions and consequently move it toward an agreement (Touval and 
Zartman 1985). However, when these actors decide not to cooperate 
with the rest of the group, the conflicting side that they have a special 
relationship with might suffer in the negotiation process.  The potential 
mediator’s decision to deflect is costly for the state it supports. In such 
circumstances, the party to the conflict might find the agreement less 
attractive, and consequently refuse to accept it. By cementing their posi-
tions, non-cooperative actors produce significant complications for the 
bargaining process and put mediation efforts at risk. As the case studies 
show, the lack of conflicting side’s willingness to cooperate in the peace 
process might range from a mere stalling of the process to the use of 
violence as a “beyond-the-table tactic” (Sisk 2010, 2-3). At a certain po-
int, the coalition members might pick up this signal, approach the de-
fector and bargain for a new arrangement which will create new benefits 
for both. However, it is not always clear who should take responsibility 
for steering a party off a non-cooperative course. As experience shows 
that in these situations, the responsibility for encouraging a mediator to 
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develop a common idea about a final solution and opt for cooperative 
strategy might rest with others in the mediating coalition. 
 H7: If a mediator’s defecting strategy produces high costs in the mediati-
on process for the state it supports, this will induce the defecting mediator to 
change its strategy and engage in a cooperative mediation effort to manage 
the conflict.
 Overall, cooperation can be achieved when mediators perceive coo-
peration as being in their self-interest. The reasons why some actors de-
cide not to cooperate can be described as myopic rationality. Mediators 
that see defection as their strategic choice are those that focus on short-
term instead of long term goals. However, the choice of defection will 
inevitably have an impact not only on the mediating coalition, but also 
on the overall process, as it might encourage (at least) one disputing side 
to stop cooperating in the peace process. This dynamic is directly related 
to the fact that mediators often have a particular relationship with (at 
least) one of the disputing sides, which induces them to get involved in 
the mediation process and correlates the pursuit of self-interest with the 
promotion of a partner state’s agenda. 
 Thus, when the mediating coalition is faced with a potential dropout 
from the group, mediators might need to negotiate with the dropout to 
find a compromise solution that can bridge their conflicting interests 
in order to (re)establish a cooperative relationship. The outcome of this 
rapprochement will have a direct effect on the overall mediation effort. 
Accordingly, this research proposes the following hypothesis:  
 H8: If the mediators manage to reach/negotiate an agreement with the 
dropout, the mediation process is more likely to be successful.   
 Even when multiple mediators manage to achieve a convergence 
of interests in managing a conflict, their efforts to operationalize and 
synchronize their activities often prove to be incongruous. As indicated 
previously, one of the most challenging aspects of multiparty mediation 
is the problem of coordination. In the case of multiparty mediations, 
coordination prescribes a method of synchronized usage of different 
leverages and resources each mediator has at its disposal in the process 
in order to create necessary incentives for resolution that would have 
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been unavailable through a single mediator. A harmonious employment 
of various leverages can be instrumental for the effectiveness of the me-
diation process: where direct leverage is limited it may be borrowed 
from others (Crocker et al. 1999, 40). In order to reduce or resolve the 
conflict while still satisfying self-interests, third parties can resort to 
three key methods or strategies that define their relations with the con-
flicting parties. Ranging from most passive to most invasive, they can 
act as communicator-facilitator, formulator, or manipulator (Touval and 
Zartman 1985).
 Coordination among mediators sends a strong signal to disputing 
sides about their commitment to manage and resolve the conflict. A 
strong dedication in alleviating the problem will increase the credibi-
lity of the group, reduce the chances of sending mixed signals to the 
conflicting sides, and minimize the chances for conflicting sides to go 
‘forum shopping’. As a result there will be fewer options for procrasti-
nation of achieving a negotiated settlement. At the same time, a well 
coordinated mediating coalition will be able to exploit the comparative 
advantages of all the mediators – each one entering the process with a 
specific leverage. This way they are able to produce specific incentives 
for resolution that are not available through mediation conducted by a 
single mediator. Thus, impending liabilities of multiparty mediation are 
directly diminished while the benefits are exploited through coordinati-
on of mediators involved in the process. Coordination of mediator acti-
vities implies overall synchronization of communicator, formulator and 
manipulator roles (Touval and Zartman, 1985; Zartman and Touval, 
1996) along with similar negotiating tactics by all mediators depending 
on their comparative advantage (Lax and Sebenius 1991).
 Full employment of mediators’ leverages is directly related with se-
lf-interests that drive mediators to get involved in the process. Mani-
pulation strategies that imply powerful interventions by mediators are 
most needed when the conflict has escalated to the point that the costs 
of continuing become too high. In contemporary mediation literatu-
re, these costs are generally attributed to the conflicting sides. The ripe 
moment to negotiate is when conflicting sides have reached a “mutually 
hurting stalemate,” and any further continuation would only be costlier 
than resorting to peace talks (Touval and Zartman 1985). 
 But current scholarship fails to address another important issue: 
what about the costs that mediators face, especially when they resort 
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to the most coercive measures at their disposal? The mere fact that a 
state is prepared to take very costly measures to change the dynamics in 
a conflict in which it is not directly involved implies that the state has 
something more at stake. 
 The size of the country in conflict is rarely a factor. Even the smallest 
countries, whether islands or landlocked, may represent something of 
strategic importance for more powerful states. A good example in this 
regard is the case of Taiwan and its strategic relevance for the United 
States (Ross 2006; Wu 2006). A conflict, regardless of the size of the co-
untry involved, attracts attention from outside and induces third parties 
to intervene as mediators. 
 Powerful states that might assume the role of lead state are driven by 
geopolitical considerations much wider than the resolution of any spe-
cific conflict—considerations that embrace both defensive and offensive 
motives. The capability to “mediate with muscle” is what distinguishes 
strong mediators. The mediator’s power to punish the disputants—coer-
cive power—encourages respect for the mediator, and greater coopera-
tion in making concessions (Carnevale et al. 1989). In cases when the 
conflict has escalated to the point that disputants cannot engage in joint 
problem solving, forceful mediator intervention becomes most effective 
(Carnevale 2002). 
 Strategic power is never applied aimlessly. Rather, it is a direct con-
sequence of the powerful mediator’s premeditated decision on whether 
applying that power is in its best interest. These strategic interests are 
rarely found in an official document that sets the guidelines for future 
involvement. However, by looking at the different elements that influ-
ence state behavior, we may well discern what is strategically important 
for a powerful state. Reflecting on the U.S. role in Northern Ireland and 
the Middle East, we can see that specific features of the United States’ 
relations with actors in those areas determine the likelihood of a U.S. 
intervention in specific conflicts. This research proposes the following 
elements as the most significant in defining strategic interests:
•	 Proximity to vital economic resources (e.g., water, oil, gas) and 
corresponding infrastructure
•	 Economic relations
•	 Proximity to the source of security instability
•	 Political relations and ideological compatibility
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•	 Proximity to a rival-power state, and relations with it
•	 Proximity to a partner state, and relations with it
•	 Historical record
 Current multiparty mediation scholarship comes short in explai-
ning under which circumstances we can expect a powerful state to in-
tervene in its full capacity. Instead, it focuses either on the possibility 
of “borrowing leverage” from a powerful state or on the importance of 
having a powerful state in the mediating coalition. While less coercive 
measures have become the norm in mediation activities, especially be-
cause of the lower costs they produce for mediators, coercive power has 
not been applied as often. Although one might expect a powerful state 
to use its leverage whenever necessary, this is seldom the case in reality. 
Groneveld-Savisaar and Vukovic (2011) used the case of Sri Lanka to 
illustrate the link between strategic-interest and coercive power. They 
argue that the key factor that drives lead states to employ the most 
coercive measures, thus investing considerable resources, to resolve the 
conflict is its strategic interests. In other words, when the parties lack 
sufficient motivation to settle and strategic strength is needed, the stra-
tegic power must have a strategic incentive to use that power. This rese-
arch will expand this argument by linking a coordinated use of leverages 
between mediators and strategic interests that drive them to get invol-
ved, through the following hypothesis: 
 H9: The stronger the mediators’ strategic interest in the conflict the higher 
the chances of successful mediation through a coordinated effort by mediators 
in a coalition. 
 Jones identifies two necessary conditions for effective coordination: 
a high degree of international commitment and a rough correspondence 
of interests of the major powers ( Jones 2002, 90). While both the ‘high 
degree of international commitment’  and ‘correspondence of interests’ 
point out the importance of prior achievement of cooperation between 
multiple mediators and strategic relevance of the conflict for them, Jo-
nes also hints to a very important aspect of effective coordination - that 
of a leadership. According to Jones, “ideally, strategic coordination sho-
uld establish clear lead actors in the mediation… it should allow those 
lead actors to set priorities, to ensure those priorities are pursued by all 
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the third-party actors involved, and to provide consistency across phases 
of a political process” ( Jones 2002, 111). In other words the role of the 
lead actor is to guide and coordinate multiparty mediation activities.
 Kriesberg points out that “the choice of the person or organizations 
which take on the leadership or the coordinating role may be made 
by the adversaries themselves, by the intermediaries, based on assessing 
who would have the interest and resources, or through a power struggle” 
(Kriesberg 1996, 348). While the choice of assigning (or assuming) the 
leadership role appears to be quite contextual and ad hoc, as no actor, be 
it a powerful state or an international organization, would ever be incli-
ned to easily give up its authority or room to maneuver in the mediation 
process ( Jones 2002, 112). So the real aspects that need to be assessed 
are the conditions under which a particular third-party is most suitable 
to lead and coordinate mediation activities.     
 The utility of having major powers involved in the process has been 
highlighted by several studies ( Jones 2002, Sisk 2009, Hampson and 
Zartman 2012). According to Sisk (2009), the primary role of a power-
ful state in a multiparty mediation effort is to ‘play heavy’. He argues 
that “one state, usually an interested regional state or a global power 
with significant influence in the region should sustain the focus and 
provide the communications, diplomatic consistency, intelligence, and 
finance to make the mediation more effective. This lead state should 
also be willing to provide strongly structured incentives and sanctions 
against the parties” (Sisk 2009, 53). 
 While the value of having a powerful state in the mediating coali-
tion is quite clear, assigning the leadership role to it might prove to be 
counterproductive. Jones pointed out an important limitation of ha-
ving a powerful state coordinating the mediation activities. According 
to him, “coordination by a major power will tend to be coordination in 
support of one party, as distinct from impartial support to the peace 
process itself ” ( Jones 2002, 111). In fact, the role of a lead actor might 
be translated into that of ‘mediating between mediators’. As emphasi-
zed by Jones, “lead actors should also be given the authority to resolve 
disputes between third parties about those priorities or about strategies 
used to achieve them” ( Jones 2002, 111). As stated previously the po-
tential utility of a biased mediator derives from its ability to ‘deliver’ the 
conflicting party with which it has close relationships to an agreement. 
This unique dynamic of international mediation is quite difficult to re-
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plicate on the level of the mediating coalition, as the lead-state might 
not have sufficient or adequate power to leverage the other mediators 
to a more coordinating dynamic coordination. In such conditions, a co-
ordinated effort might be best achieved under the lead of an actor that 
has the ability to prescribe collective behavior, and this ability should 
derive from a norm accepted by all participants. In other words, the 
most suitable actor to coordinate mediation activities is that one with 
most legitimate power (Carnevale 2002, 28).   
 In international mediation, legitimacy has been often associated 
with actions undertaken by international organizations, especially the 
UN (Touval 1992). As Touval points out, the UN’s most resourceful le-
verage is “the aura of legitimacy” as its actions “carry as representing the 
consensus of the international community” (Touval 1994, 52). For Ru-
bin, legitimate power of the UN derives from a general perception that 
the UN is “the official representative of the world community” (Rubin 
1992, 265). Following this argument both Jones (2002) and Sisk (2009) 
highlighted the importance of assigning the role of a lead actor in char-
ge of coordinating mediation activities to an international organization 
- namely the UN, and it’s Special Representatives of the Secretary Ge-
neral (SRSG). According to Sisk, coordination acquires the necessary 
level of legitimacy under the leadership of the SRCG especially as the 
“involvement in and coordination of the mediating effort by the UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) lends a ne-
cessary credibility and consensus and coherence to the initiative” (Sisk 
2009, 52). Jones also claims that “there can be little doubt that there is 
a high correlation between effective strategic coordination and the pre-
sence and good management of an SRSG or equivalent” ( Jones 2002, 
96). However, Jones points out that proliferation of international actors 
with competing interests and strategic disagreement and the diminishi-
ng authority of the UN have unquestionably “constrained the capacity 
of the UN to perform essential strategic coordination functions” ( Jones 
2002, 111). More importantly, “a clear, consistent alternative has not yet 
emerged” (idem). 
 Overall it appears that unless there is a compatibility of interests 
between powerful states and other mediators (both international and/or 
regional organizations and small and/or medium sized states) successful 
coordination of mediation activities cannot take place, which under-
mines the chances of success. In light of this limitation, it appears that 
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the crucial element for a properly executed coordination in multiparty 
mediation is that the lead actor has the necessary degree of legitimate 
power to guide the mediating coalition’s activities, and the necessary 
degree of compatibility of interests with major powers ( Jones 2002, 90). 
Therefore, this research proposes the following hypothesis regarding the 
lead actors.
 H10: The more legitimate the lead actor, the more successful the mediating 
efforts will be.
 H11a: In cases where multiparty mediating activities are coordinated by 
an international organization - the more compatible with powerful states’ 
interests its guidance is the more successful the process.
 H11b: In cases where multiparty mediation activities are coordinated 
by a small or medium sized state - the more compatible with powerful states’ 
interests its guidance is the more successful the process.
 H11c: In cases where multiparty mediation activities are coordinated by 
a powerful state - the more that state’s agenda is in line with other third-
parties’ expectations the more successful the process.
Analysis of Multiparty Mediation Processes / Doctoral Dissertation
71

MeThodology
CHAPTER 
III 
Siniša Vuković
74
CHAPTER III: Methodology
3.1 The problem of causality in social science research
 Given the multicausal nature of mediation processes, a mere analysis 
of correlation between independent variables and outcome does not 
help much in understanding if there was actually a causal mechanism 
present during the process. Although numerous studies (Crocker et al. 
1999, Kriesberg 1996, Böhmelt 2011) have already shown that there 
is a strong correlation between cooperation (and coordination) among 
multiple mediators and success in multiparty mediation, these studies 
may not provide a clear indication of the existence of a causal mechani-
sm which actually links success with the dynamics of cooperation and 
coordination.
 A causal mechanism can be defined as “a complex system, which 
produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan 
1996, 52). Similarly, casual mechanisms represent “analytical constructs 
that provide hypothetical links between observable events” (Hedström 
and Swedburg 1998, 13). However, observing causal mechanisms might 
prove to be a difficult task. According to George and Bennett, causal 
mechanisms are “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psycho-
logical processes through which agents with causal capacities operate” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 137). Similarly, Hedström and Swedberg 
argue that causal mechanisms are primarily social constructs and as 
such they do not have a real-world existence (Hedström and Swed-
burg 1998). For instance, the case of the Cuban missile crisis, studied by 
Allison and Zelikow (1999), represents an important example of ‘group 
think’ mechanisms, where the emphasis is on the small-group forms of 
intrapersonal pressures that generate a specific outcome.  In this case so-
cio-psychological factors play a crucial role in the causal chain of events 
however they are quite difficult to measure. Thus the only possibility in 
such cases is to rely on measuring the mechanisms in an indirect form 
through ‘proxies’ or ‘indicators’ of the observable implications (Beach 
and Pedersen 2012, 62-63).
 In an attempt to solve this problem, Reskin proposes that any 
analysis interested in explaining how an outcome was produced should 
scrutinize only “observable” causal mechanisms, and thus exclude va-
rious psychological and macro-level mechanisms (Reskin 2003). Beach 
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and Pedersen expand this claim by pointing out to the need of carefully 
operationalizing a specific mechanism, as “there are some types of cau-
sal mechanisms that can be conceptualized and operationalized in a 
manner that permits quite close observations of actual mechanisms, and 
where plentiful evidence exists that enable us to measure the mechani-
sms quite closely” (Beach and Pedersen 2012, 62). Thus, if a research 
design accepts that mechanisms are directly observable then the task 
of operationalization of a particular mechanism should focus on iden-
tifying and examining “the empirical fingerprints” that the mechanism 
leaves in the empirical record (Beach and Pedersen 2012, 63).  However, 
even if a research departs from an assumption that a causal mechanism 
is unobservable, it should still look into observable implication that a 
mechanisms should leave. Thus, Beach and Pedersen emphasize, that 
“the two positions result in similar forms of operationalization” (Beach 
and Pedersen 2012, 63).
3.2 Process tracing method
 Overall, as pointed out by Gerring, if properly designed, causal 
mechanisms allow us to “peer into the box of causality to locate the 
intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its pur-
ported effect” (Gerring 2007, 45). Beach and Pedersen argue that the 
only methodological approach which permits a serious analysis of causal 
mechanisms is process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2012, 7). In princi-
ple, process tracing entails “attempts to identify the intervening causal 
process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an indepen-
dent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 206). George and Bennett use dominos to 
illustrate the causal chain:
 “Suppose that a colleague shows you fifty numbered dominoes standing upright 
in a straight line with their dots facing the same way on the table in a room, but puts 
a blind in front of the dominoes so that only number one and number fifty are visible. 
She then sends you out of the room and when she calls you back in you observe that 
domino number one and domino number fifty are now lying flat with their tops po-
inting in the same direction; that is, they co-vary. Does this mean that either domino 
caused the other to fail? Not necessarily. Your colleague could have pushed over only 
dominoes one and fifty, or bumped the table in a way that only these two dominoes 
fell, or that all the dominoes fell at once. You must remove the blind and look at the 
intervening dominoes, which gave evidence on potential process.”
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 Tracing the process that may have led to an outcome helps narrow 
the list of potential causes (George and Bennett 2005, 207). More im-
portantly, process-tracing points out to potential within-case inferences 
about the causal processes by generating various observations within 
the case. Thus, the explanation of the outcome is directly dependent of 
the way these observations are linked together. As George and Bennett 
point out, “it is the very lack of independence among these observations 
that makes them a powerful tool for inference” (George and Bennett 
2005, 207). The blindfold from the previous example represents the ‘box 
of causality’, Beach and Pedersen (2012, 65) illustrate this through a 
diagram (Figure 1):
Figure 1:
 Therefore, process tracing can be defined as a method that involves 
the analysis of evidence or indicators present within the case that pro-
vide sufficient support (or otherwise overturn) for what was hypothe-
sized. The primary focus is to unfold a hypothesized causal mechanism 
through ‘observable implications’ of hypothesized explanations (Bennett 
2010, 208). George and Bennett warn that “in process tracing all the 
intervening steps in a case must be as predicted by a hypothesis or else 
that hypothesis must be amended - perhaps trivially or perhaps funda-
mentally - to explain the case” (George and Bennett 2005, 207). 
 Since this research in part generated hypotheses from a game-the-
oretical model, it should be emphasized that process tracing comple-
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ments well rational choice approaches. As George and Bennett point 
out, “process tracing is a method; rational choice models are theories… 
many proponents of the rational choice approach that its efficacy must 
be judged in part by the empirical testing of decision making-processes; 
process tracing provides an opportunity to do so” (George and Bennett 
2005, 208). The aim of this research is to test and refine theoretical in-
sights built from a deductive framework developed through the game 
theoretical model. Formal models are useful as they help predict outco-
mes however they are likely to fail to generate acceptable causal expla-
nations. Proper casual explanations necessitate “empirically substantia-
ted assertions about both the causal effects of independent variables and 
causal mechanisms or the observed processes that led to an outcome” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 208).  
 At the same time this research expanded insights from the game 
theoretical model, by including different assumptions present in exi-
sting theories of international mediation. Process tracing can be used 
for both theory testing and theory development. Beach and Pedersen 
explain that “in theory testing, a causal mechanism is hypothesized to 
be present in a population of cases of a phenomenon… here the goals 
is to evaluate whether there is evidence that the hypothesized causal 
mechanism linking X and Y was present in the case and it functioned as 
theorized” (Beach and Pedersen 2012, 19). The idea is to go further than 
existing correlations between X and Y, by opening the ‘box of causality’. 
On the other hand, “theory building process tracing involves a theory 
about a causal mechanism between X and Y that can be generalized to a 
population of a given phenomenon, starting from a situation where we 
are in the dark regarding the mechanisms” (Beach and Pedersen 2012, 
20). In other words, in cases where theory is underspecified, especially 
regarding the causal mechanisms, then process tracing method helps 
identifying one or more causal processes.   
 Hypotheses that were generated in this research can be treated as 
both theory testing and theory development. The difference between 
theory testing and theory building is what Beach and Pedersen call 
“theory-before-fact versus fact-before-theory”, meaning that “in theory 
building process tracing, empirical material is used to build a hypothe-
sized theory, inferring first that what is found reflect observable impli-
cations of an underlying causal mechanism… a second influential leap 
is then made by inferring from these observable implications that they 
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actually reflects an underlying causal mechanism” (Beach and Pedersen 
2012, 25). Therefore, on the one side, since H1, H3, H4, H10 and H11 
have all been generated from the existing theoretical assumptions, they 
will be used for theory testing. On the other, H2, H5, H6, H7, H8, and 
H9 are all products of iterative research, where causal mechanisms were 
generated from observable implications; as such they will be employed 
for theory building.
3.3 Case Study Selection and Operationalization  
 of Variables
3.3.1 Case Selection
 This research will conduct case study research of five recent inter-
national conflicts that were managed by multiple mediators. As Beach 
and Pedersen (2012) prescribe, the selection criteria was based on two 
principles: the fact that a given international crisis was managed by a 
multiparty mediation endeavor, and more importantly that each pro-
cess had both the hypothesized X (in this case observable dynamics of 
cooperation and/or coordination between mediators) and outcome Y 
(success or failure of multiparty mediation activities). In order to achie-
ve a large degree of theoretical relevance the cases were selected from 
different regional and spatial contexts: different continents, different 
historical circumstances and managed by different international actors 
(even though some actors, such as the US and Russia/Soviet Union 
tend to be quite present within almost all cases). Therefore, the present 
study will reflect on three cases that contemporary scholarship descri-
bes as successful and two that were unsuccessful. Successful cases of 
multiparty mediation took place in Tajikistan (Iji 2001; Abdullaev and 
Barnes 2001), Namibia (Zartman 1989; Crocker 1999) and Cambodia 
(Solomon 2000; Hampson and Zartman 2012). Multiparty mediation 
efforts were unsuccessful to yield any results in managing the conflicts 
in Kosovo (Ker-Lindsay 2009) and Sri Lanka (Goodhand et al. 2011).
3.3.2 Empirical Evidence and Potential Limitations
 Hypothesized aspects of causal mechanism represent predicted evi-
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dence. In process tracing, predicted evidence is close to what Brady, 
Collier and Seawright, identify as “causal process observations” which 
include “an insight or piece of data that provides information about 
the context or mechanism and contributes a different kind of leverage 
in causal inference” (Collier et al. 2004, 252).  According to Beach and 
Pedersen, “in operationalizing empirical tests of causal mechanisms we 
develop predictions of what we should expect to see in the empirical re-
cord if a hypothesized part of a causal mechanism is present (predicted 
evidence), formulated in a manner that maximizes the level of certainty 
and uniqueness” (Beach and Pedersen 2012, 155). Therefore in order to 
proceed with process tracing it is important to define the central con-
cepts of this research.
 Traditional methodology defines central concepts as variables (King 
et al. 1994). In such a case, causal relationships are formulated in relation 
to independent variable (or variables) that cause variation in the depen-
dent variable. Gerring points out that this type of relationship usually 
indicates a probabilistic causal relationship, where a change in value of 
the independent variable increases the likelihood of a dependent varia-
bles occurrence (Gerring 2005, 167). Since the term ‘variable’ implies 
that a concept needs to indicate a level of variance, Beach and Pedersen 
argue that in process tracing it is more appropriate to talk about ‘condi-
tions’, which primarily indicate the presence (or a lack) of a particular 
concept (2012, 73). At the same time, process tracing requires that not 
only variables (or conditions) are operationalized, but also mechanisms 
in-between. This allows the research to identify the theorized process as 
particular ‘causal forces’ are transmitted through a causal mechanism to 
produce an outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2012, 76). However, it sho-
uld be noted that testing mechanisms can prove to be quite difficult, as 
causal mechanisms are mostly unobservable. While important evidence 
can be generated from primary and secondary documentation, it is still 
very difficult to expect that there will be a very obvious indicator of cau-
sality. In light of these limitations, this research will nevertheless aim to 
accumulate sufficient empirical evidence that would provide sufficient 
support about the indication of causality that occurs in a specific case. 
 According to Yin, in case study research there are six sources of evi-
dence: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, 
participant-observation, and physical artifacts (Yin 2003, 85). Given 
the nature of present research, evidence will be primarily traced using 
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various types of documentation. Documents include: agendas, memo-
randa, communiqués, announcements and minutes of the meetings, and 
other written reports of the events. They also include administrative 
documents (such as proposal, progress reports, and other internal re-
cords) and formal studies or evaluations of the same “site” under study 
(Yin 2003, 86). Weaknesses of using documents as sources of evidence 
are various types of bias that might emerge (the unknown bias of the 
report’s author, biased selectivity) and a limited accessibility to specific 
documents. Thus instead of relying on a single source of evidence, this 
research will employ different forms of triangulation - development of 
converging lines of inquiry - in order to strengthen the support for the 
existence of evidence. It will employ triangulation of data sources and of 
deferent evaluators (primarily using other empirical studies of the same 
phenomena).       
3.3.3 Variables (Conditions)
 Interests refer to a set of a mediator’s preferences regarding both the 
dynamics of the undergoing conflict and the wider context which might 
include relations with other (potential) mediators and regional/global 
strategic concerns. As explained previously, interests are rarely formula-
ted within a single and easily traceable document. The closest formats of 
such kind are various “doctrines” that are associated to numerous states, 
which reflect on a set of strategic concerns and preferences that states 
have regarding a wider geo-political context (either global or regional). 
In relation to the particular conflict areas, these formulations include 
(previously indicated) aspects such as: proximity to vital economic re-
sources and corresponding infrastructure, economic relations with spe-
cific actors (most likely governments of the involved state), proximity to 
the source of global or regional instability, past relations and ideological 
compatibilities, proximity to rival and/or partner states, and a historical 
record. Such formulations have been under serious academic scrutiny. 
Therefore, these studies will represent one of the crucial insights into 
mediators’ preferences. At the same time, this research will aim to trace 
additional information that indicates the nature of a mediators’ prefe-
rences in a particular conflict, by looking into available official state-
ments issued by a relevant actor. These could include public statements 
by officials that either addresses the particularities of the conflict or the 
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actor’s wider geo-political preferences. 
 Convergence of Interests. This research hypothesized that potential 
convergence of interests might occur under three conditions. Geo-po-
litical shift represents the first condition under which convergence of 
interests might occur. Such shifts can be identified in official documents 
and/or in statements by officials that emphasize an imminent political 
rapprochement between two or more actors on the international level. 
The second hypothesized condition for the achievement of convergen-
ce of interests is represented through the costs of supporting the ongoing 
warfare. While such costs could be calculated and present in official 
actor’s documents, there is no actual threshold which would represent 
a turning point in an actor’s preferences. This condition is more in line 
with a perceptive dynamic present in ripeness theory (Zartman 1989), 
where an actor endures a continuous “pain” by baring the costs of war 
without gaining expected pay-offs. Since it is a perceptive matter, this 
condition will rely primarily on indications of a trend of increased costs. 
Finally, this research hypothesized that convergence of interests could 
be achieved if mediators negotiate a solution amongst themselves. This con-
dition is present only once the actors commit to employ what was mutu-
ally agreed on. A mere indication of willingness, without actually com-
mitting to it, does not represent sufficient indication of the condition’s 
achievement.       
 Cooperation. This research will use the previously illustrated definiti-
on of cooperation by Zartman and Touval, who define cooperation as “a 
situation where parties agree to work together to produce new gains for 
each of the participants that would be unavailable to them by unilateral 
action, at some cost” (Zartman and Touval 2010, 1). As the definiti-
on suggests cooperation is only achieved once parties perceive it to be 
compatible with their interests and start working together. There are 
rarely any clear indicators, in a form of official documents, which could 
point toward the dynamic of cooperation. The condition is nevertheless 
more observable while it unfolds as actors show signs of managing the 
conflict through a joint effort. These signs can be traced in public sta-
tements by actors’ representatives and/or empirical studies that provide 
sufficient support for indicators of actors’ willingness to work together 
and subsequent joint engagement in managing the conflict.       
 Coordination. This research defined coordination as a method of 
synchronized usage of different leverages and resources that each me-
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diator has at its disposal in the process in order to create necessary 
incentives for resolution that would have been unavailable through a 
single mediator. It occurs only once there is sufficient indication that 
supports the achievement of cooperation among actors. The process of 
coordination is also difficult to locate within an official document and 
even in a public statement by an actor’s official. It is rather a condition 
which is traceable by actors’ behavior, in which mediators start levera-
ging the actors toward an agreement. Leveraging can be observed by the 
use of “carrots and sticks” that alter the attitudes of conflicting parties 
and induces them to compromise.
 This will now be tested systematically by an in-depth analysis of five 
case studies.
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Chapter IV: Tajikistan
 The lengthy peace process which put an end to a violent civil war 
in Tajikistan represents a fairly successful case of multiparty mediation 
where activities of external actors were “exceptionally well coordinated” 
(Barnes and Abdulaev 2001, 11). This was an extremely complex process 
where essential contribution to resolution of the conflict came from a 
wide variety of actors. Most of the rounds of talks, supported by the 
OSCE, were held under the auspices of the UN, while observer states 
took turns in hosting them and thus providing substantial contributi-
on in reaching an agreement (Iji 2001). At the same time the process 
also benefited from the participation of different non-state actors and 
was aided by a very dynamic second-track dialogue process which came 
out of the US-Soviet Dartmouth Conference (Rubin 1998; Saunders 
1999). 
 Nevertheless, among all the different mediators involved, Russia 
and Iran played a pivotal role in the peace process. According to Iji, “it 
was their collaboration that moved the intractable conflict in Tajikistan 
toward a settlement” (Iji 2001, 365). Both countries had strong interests 
in the conflict and highly developed relationships with warring parties 
which all together allowed them to assume the role of potentially effec-
tive third-parties. Barnes and Abdullaev point out the fact that “with 
an interest in the outcome of the war, they became in effect ‘secondary 
parties’ to the conflict… although they contributed initially to the war 
effort they later became vital resources to the peace process” (Barnes and 
Abdullaev 2001, 8). According to Hay, the main three reasons for the 
breakthrough in the negotiations were: conflicting parties were exha-
usted from continuous fighting, Russia and Iran managed to reach a 
convergence of interests to promote peace in Tajikistan, and security 
concerns created by the Taliban taking over of Kabul (Hay 2001, 39). 
These factors allowed for a UN-led and coordinated multiparty media-
tion effort to produce a mutually acceptable solution for the parties in 
conflict. 
 Therefore, the peace process in Tajikistan has the potential of re-
presenting a case of multiparty mediation where eventual success was 
directly dependent on the interests of powerful neighboring states, regi-
onal geo-political conditions and international organization’s legitimate 
power to coordinate activities of multiple third-parties.   
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4.1 The Nature of Conflict
4.1.1 Sources of Intractability
 Tajikistan’s physical geography of a landlocked mountainous coun-
try induced the creation of several culturally diverse groupings. Altho-
ugh the majority of these groups are “a part of Iranian cultural world 
and are predominately Sunni Muslims”, the mountainous terrain “has 
always made travel between different regions difficult… creating a si-
gnificant obstacle to communication as well as social and economic in-
tegration” (Akiner and Barnes 2001, 18). The simplest distinction of the 
various ethno-cultural groupings in the country can be made between 
the populations that has lived in the flatlands in the northern part of 
the country, which “in ancient times were part of the rich urban-based 
culture of Transoxiana”, and populations that inhabited mountainous 
areas in the rest of the county, which resulted in a creation of “strong 
localized identities” (Akiner and Barnes 2001, 18).
 Until the USSR assumed control over the territory in the 1920s, 
there was almost no contact between the populations of these areas. The 
first decade of Soviet rule widened the gap between different commu-
nities (Roy 2001). Especially important was the impact of different po-
licies that were drafted in Moscow, which treated quite differently the 
northern part of the country compared to the rest. While the plains in 
the north were gradually industrialized and modernized, the mountai-
nous regions were widely ignored and therefore populations that lived 
there not only maintained and strengthened their local identities, they 
also continued to live as their ancestors did for centuries. In principle, 
the most significant political, social and cultural traits of contemporary 
Tajikistan were formed during the Soviet rule.   
4.1.2 Development of Deep Feelings of Distrust and Mutual 
Hatred
 Already in the early 1920s, Basmachi fighters from the mountainous 
areas showed intent of stopping the advancement of the Soviet Union 
to Central Asia. In order to suppress any form of resistance, “the Red 
Army massacred more than 10,000 Tajiks and Uzbeks between 1922 
and 1926, according to official estimates” (Akiner and Barnes 2001, 19). 
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Large parts of the population found refuge in the neighboring Afgha-
nistan, in an attempt to escape “violent purges, forcible resettlement and 
collectivization, and religious persecution” (idem). According to Akiner 
and Barnes, “these events had a lasting effect that contributed to the 
conflict dynamics which emerged during the civil war in the 1990s” 
(Akiner and Barnes 2001, 19).
 In the early 1930s, the Soviet regime started promoting the collec-
tivization and industrialization policies, which required a forcible tran-
sfer of people from the central and eastern areas of the country to the 
north. While these policies produced the first migratory dynamic in 
the country’s history, there was no evidence of any integration betwe-
en populations. Rather, such policies “generated conflict by stimulating 
inter-group competition and sharpening perceptions of social differen-
ce” (Akiner and Barnes 2001, 19). Forced relocation and mixing of the 
people from different regions transformed the previously loose regional 
affiliations into a “more fixed group identity based on regional origin” 
(Roy 2001, 23).   
 Despite continuous efforts by central authorities in Moscow to orga-
nize Tajikistan along the secular-socialist lines, most of the population, 
especially in the predominant rural areas, maintained their clan loyalties 
and religious observances (Hiro 1998). According to Roy, “these networ-
ks have commonly been used to maximize access to and control over 
resources and they were translated into the political and administrative 
structures of the Soviet Union” (Roy 2001, 23). Even the politics of the 
local Communist Party evolved around the regional divide. In a centra-
lized one-party rule system the only method of career advancement was 
loyalty to the party elite. The Party endorsed “administrative territorial 
divisions” and was “grouped around district, province and republic level 
committees” (Roy 2001, 23). Established clan loyalties combined with 
party association represented the source of political factionalism. While 
ideological differences were virtually inexistent, political divide followed 
the territorial cleavage, which emphasized regional administrative divi-
sions. For Roy, “this generated inter-regional antagonisms in the stru-
ggle for access to power, goods and other benefits” (Roy 2001, 23).   
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4.1.3 Internal Characteristics of the Conflicting Sides and the 
Creation of Irreconcilable Positions 
 From the beginning of the Soviet rule, the power in Tajikistan was 
concentrated within two regions – Sogd or Sughd, also referred to as 
Leninabad in the north and Khatlon in the south east. Leninabad was 
by far the region that produced the largest number of public officials. 
While representatives from other regions held various powerful positi-
ons in the Soviet system, “all the first secretaries of the Tajik Commu-
nist Party from 1946 to 1991 were Leninabadis” (Roy 2001, 23). Due to 
their administrative positions, apparatchiks from Leninabad were able 
to develop very strong ties with the ruling elite in Moscow and enjoy 
the benefits of a much more advanced regional economy than the rest 
of the country. 
 On the other hand, the politically completely marginalized and eco-
nomically deprived southwestern region of Gorno-Badakhshan, borde-
ring Afghanistan, became a breeding ground for clandestine Islamist 
movements. What started off as an underground network for Islamic 
worship which rejected the authority of the official state-controlled 
Islamic structures, the movements slowly started assuming a political 
agenda. Despite some differences, “by the early 1990s an alliance was 
formed between the leaders of the distinct Islamic factions who made 
up the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP): the new radicals (led by Said 
Abdullo Nuri), and what was at the time Tajikistan’s official religious 
establishment (led by Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda)” (Akiner and Barnes 
2001, 20). 
 Throughout the 1980s regional, political and economical disparity, 
turmoil in neighboring Afghanistan and proliferation of opposition for-
ces were acutely challenging the authorities in Dushanbe. Along with 
Islamic movements, the underground political scene also generated va-
rious secular socio-political movements, such as the Democratic Party 
of Tajikistan (DPT), which initially had a very strong following. The 
first clear signs of popular dissatisfaction materialized in the street riots 
in February 1990, when participants attacked ethnic Russians and other 
Europeans while shouting “long live the Islamic Republic of Tajikistan” 
(Hiro 1998, 20). However, while most people in Tajikistan consider 
Islam to be of crucial importance to their socio-cultural heritage, it see-
med that “most did not support the creation of an Islamic state” (Akiner 
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and Barnes 2001, 20). It appeared that even local religious leaders were 
not convinced that movements such as IPR represented the only and 
the best alternative to the decaying one-party rule of the Communist 
Party.
 In principle, in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the 
political elites in Tajikistan failed to find adequate policies which would 
tackle the mounting problems of inter-regional disparities. According 
to Abdullo, the crucial challenges that the country was facing as the So-
viet system was eroding were “disparities that had arisen from the incre-
asing economic role of southern population, the demographic structure 
of the population, ideological diversification, and unequal participation 
in political decision-making in a country dominated by a northern po-
litical elite” (Abdullo 2001, 48).   
4.1.4 Employment of Repressive Measures 
    
 By 1989, inter-group skirmishes over the allocation of scarce resour-
ces escalated into violent clashes. Inter-ethnic confrontations between 
Tajiks and other ethnic groups - mainly Uzbeks and Kyrgyz - become 
more regular. After a series of protests, Tajik replaced Russian as offi-
cial language. This action drove large pars of Russian minority to flea 
the country. Xenophobic sentiment continued to linger, and on several 
occasions sparks violent protests - such as protests against re-housing of 
Armenian refuges in Dushanbe (Abdullaev and Barnes 2001, 83).
 Following the dissolution of the USSR, the Tajik Supreme Sovi-
et declared independence of Tajikistan on 9 September 1991. At the 
same time, facing strong public pressure the central authorities recogni-
zed and licensed several opposition movements such as IRP, the DPT 
and the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) People’s Organization. A 14-day rally 
in Dushanbe “brings an estimated 10,000 protesters on to the streets” 
calling for multiparty elections (Abdullaev and Barnes 2001, 83). All 
the opposition parties took part in the November 1991 presidential 
elections, eventually won by the Communist Party’s candidate from the 
Leninabad region, Rahmon Naiyev. The election results were imme-
diately contested by all opposition leaders, accusing the ruling elite of 
rigging the process and taking advantage of disproportionate access to 
resources.    
 Following the election results, the opposition intensified its con-
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testation of the communist regime and especially Naiyev’s decision 
to create a government consisting only of Leninabadis from Sughd 
and Kulyabis from the Khatlon region. In May 1992 demonstrations 
prompted Naiyev to exercise his emergency powers and form a ‘presi-
dential guard’, which also consisted only of Leninabadis and Kulyabis. 
Attempts to counter the pressure from the opposition turned into a 
military confrontation with some deaths (Iji 2001, 360; Abdullaev and 
Barnes 2001, 83). As the situation deteriorated, Naiyev tried to appe-
ase the situation by accommodating the opposition within a coalition 
government. However this experiment did not live very long and only 
managed to outrage the neo-communist elite, taking a country into a 
full-blown conflict. While Dushanbe was occupied by opposition for-
ces, Naiyev urged the Community of Independent States (CIS) to send 
peace-keeping troops. 
 For Russia this situation was absolutely unacceptable, so without 
any hesitation it helped neo-communist forces from Kulyab to reclaim 
Dushanbe and push the opposition forces toward the Tajiki-Afghan 
border. In the meantime, the dissatisfied communist elite replaced Ra-
hmon Naiyev with Emomali Rakhmonov from Kulyab who formed a 
government predominantly composed by loyal cadre from Leninabad 
and Kulyab. By the spring of 1993, the repercussions of the intense 
fighting were more than 30,000 dead and more than 300,000 displaced 
(Hiro 1998). 
4.2 Involvement of International Actors
4.2.1 Powerful States and Their Interests in the Conflict
 In July 1993, 25 Russian border guards were killed during an offen-
sive by opposition forces that took place along the border with Afgha-
nistan. Moscow’s exasperation was best expressed by an irritated presi-
dent Yeltzin who publically questioned Russian policy objectives until 
then, asking ‘Why did we not have a plan to protect this border, which 
everyone must understand is effectively Russia’s, not Tajikistan’s?’ (Hiro 
1998, 20). It was evident that Kremlin’s strong line now regarded the 
Tajik-Afghan border as ‘an advanced Russian base’, even though it is 
1,450 km from Russian territory, ‘that can protect Russia from the infil-
tration of guns, narcotics and Islamic fundamentalism’ (Hiro 1995, 15). 
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Already in August 1993, the new doctrine was materialized through 
Russian-Tajik military cooperation, which paved the road for 25,000 
Russian troops to be located in Tajikistan out of which 17,000 positi-
oned along the border with Afghanistan. The second step was taken in 
November 1993 when the Tajiki government signed a document which 
subordinated its finances to Russia (idem). Tajikistan remained the only 
newly independent country in Central Asia that continued using the 
Russian ruble as the only official currency. It was clear that the Tajiki 
government’s survival depended directly on Russian support.
 Officially, the Russian military maintained a neutral stand in the 
Tajik civil war. However, there are numerous claims that “the army 
supported pro-government forces with vehicles, ammunition and wea-
pons” (Abdullaev and Barnes 2001, 93). Again, officially the Russian 
government indicated a clear interest to maintain and develop offici-
al relations only with the Tajiki government. However, from 1993, as 
many members of the opposition, especially those from the DPT, found 
refuge in Moscow, Russian officials started encouraging the parties to 
talk and subsequently acted as a key sponsor of the inter-Tajik negotia-
tions (Abdullaev and Barnes 2001, 93).      
 In order to counterbalance the asymmetric power, the Islamic-de-
mocratic coalition tried to find external support in Iran. The special re-
lationship between two countries mainly revolved around cultural and 
religious issues: Tajikistan was the only Farsi-speaking new Muslim 
country in Central Asia. However, despite implicit appeals to Iran, ma-
nifestations of Islamic slogans - that echoed Iranian revolutionary days 
- were only a symbolic indicator of radicalization of the pro-Iranian 
Islamic agenda. In reality the Islamic-democratic opposition ‘neither 
believed in the possibility or desirability of an Islamic alternative nor 
was it even united in a preference for and ideologically tainted political 
model for Tajikistan’ (Mesbahi 1997, 143). The common agenda for the 
opposition forces was a pursuit of a democratic political system founded 
on a new constitution. From the beginning, it was absolutely clear to 
the authorities in Teheran that Tajikistan was not ‘ready’ for an Islamic 
revolution, due to it’s soviet heritage which largely dissociated the po-
pulation from Islam, and regional/clan fragmentation. At the same time 
Iran was faced with a wide-ranging and formidable regional and inter-
national consensus, promoted by Russia and the US, on the issue of the 
Islamic threat and Iranian influence in Tajikistan (Mesbahi 1997, 148). 
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Iran’s hesitation to fully promote an Islamic agenda in Tajikistan created 
problems for the opposition forces. Authorities in Teheran refused to 
provide armaments when it was most needed and on occasions failed to 
provide direct rhetorical support for the opposition through diplomatic 
means (Mesbahi 1997, 150). Nevertheless, Iran remained the biggest 
and most influential outside actor that was voicing out an undisputed 
support for the opposition. 
 Both Russia and Iran had an obvious leverage over the conflicting 
sides. Adequate use of such power represented a crucial resource that 
would allow the mediating coalition to produce necessary incentives 
in order to leverage the government and the United Tajiki Opposition 
(UTO) towards a mutually acceptable solution. However, in order to 
produce such incentives biased mediators need to assume a cooperative 
attitude. As this research hypothesized (H1), while cooperating with 
other mediators, biased mediators are useful as they can use their special 
relationship with one conflicting side to influence its behavior, positions 
and perceptions and consequently move it toward an agreement. This 
dynamic will be further analyzed and traced through out the present 
case study. 
 Finally, reflecting on Russia’s and Iran’s formation and projection 
of interests toward Tajikistan, the country was of high strategic impor-
tance for both regional powers. As indicated in the theoretical chapter, 
once third-parties show intent of cooperating with each other, in order 
to produce the necessary incentives and successfully manage the con-
flict, third-parties need to coordinate their activities and adequately use 
various leverages at their disposal in order to guide the parties toward 
a mutually acceptable solution. The intent of adequately applying nece-
ssary and available leverages is directly related to the strategic impor-
tance of the country for the involved third-parties. As hypothesized 
earlier (H10) the stronger the mediators’ strategic interest in the conflict 
for a mediator the higher the chances of successful mediation through 
a coordinated effort by mediators in a coalition. The prospects of em-
ploying adequate (and necessary) leverage in order to steer the two con-
flicting sides toward an agreement will be further explored in the rest of 
the chapter.    
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4.2.2 Involvement of the UN 
 According to Goryayev “the UN was recognized as the leading in-
ternational body driving the peace process and coordinating internatio-
nal responses to the crisis” (emphasis added, Goryayev 2001, 32). The 
UN got involved already in September of 1992, when it dispatched the 
first fact-finding mission to explore the conflict dynamics more closely. 
Once the mission reported in detail about the high levels of violence - 
defining the turmoil as civil war - the UN decided to dispatch a new 
mission (November 1992) which also interacted with representatives of 
neighboring states. These first consultations paved the road for future 
cooperation between the UN and neighboring countries that were able 
to exert necessary the political, economic, and military influence over 
the conflicting parties in order to move them toward a peaceful solu-
tion. By January of 1993 Secretary General established a small United 
Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), mandated to 
monitor the situation on the ground and ascertain positions of all con-
cerned parties. The information provided by the UNMOT prompted 
the Secretary General to appoint a full-time Special Envoy “mandated 
to concentrate on achieving a ceasefire and establishing the process of 
negotiations for a political solution” (Goryayev 2001, 34).   
 Goryayev points out that “over a period of seven years, the Special 
Envoys/Representatives and their staff were responsible for designing 
the negotiation process, maintaining contacts with all parties to the 
conflict and integrating the efforts of other countries and organizations” 
(Goryayev 2001, 34). While lacking muscle, the UN was able to provi-
de leadership in coordinating the activities of various third-parties (Iji 
2001, 347). The mediation process showed that the Special Envoys were 
extremely devoted to maintain and strengthen their relations with the 
officials from the neighboring countries as they were. Regular commu-
nication and consultations with the observer countries created an oppor-
tunity for the UN negotiating team to “inform the governments on the 
negotiations, to coordinate plans and actions, and to prepare for future 
rounds of talks” (emphasis added Hay 2001, 40). Such actions generated 
the needed degree of trust in the activities conducted by the UN, and 
assured the neighboring countries (especially Russia and Iran) that the 
UN led negotiations will not endanger the interest they had in the re-
gion. According to Hay, “the consultations with observer governments 
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kept them informed, engaged and confident that the Tajik delegations 
and the mediators were taking their views and interests into account” 
(Hay 2001, 42). 
 Throughout the process, the UN mediating team was not only in 
charge of facilitating the communication between the belligerents, they 
were also in charge of formulating proposals and drafting initial text to 
the agreement. In order to assure the interested states, and especially 
Russia and Iran, the UN mediators “often coordinated the compromise 
solutions they proposed” which “helped the observers to feel a sense 
of ownership over the negotiating process” (Hay 2001, 43). Such trust 
building efforts generated reciprocal attitudes among the observing co-
untries. For the UN mediators it was of crucial importance to have the 
support of the powerful states, especially Russia which had strong mi-
litary, political and economic interests in the region. For this reason the 
UN team regularly informed and consulted the Security Council, which 
generated a strong support for the SRSG’s mediating efforts from the 
Security Council.       
 While well equipped to perform the mediator roles of communi-
cator and formulator, the UN lacked ‘muscle’ in the mediation process. 
The only leverage it had was that of legitimacy. As pointed out by Iji, 
“the UN’s legitimate and moral authority served as a complement to 
the incentives supplied by Russia and Iran” (Iji 2001, 376). This was es-
pecially important when the two conflicting parties showed no interest 
to compromise. In such critical conditions UN mediators would stop 
the negotiation process and consult the neighboring countries’ officials 
- especially those from Russia and Iran - share their formulas, draft new 
proposals, and “request them to use their leverage with the parties to 
encourage them to compromise” (Hay 2001, 43). Therefore, as hypothe-
sized in H10 and H11a, the necessary conditions for a successful coor-
dination - the needed level of legitimacy and compatibility of interests 
between the international organization and major powers - were pre-
sent, and greatly contributed to the success of the mediation process. 
However, in order to come to the required degree of cooperation, both 
major powers first needed to achieve a mutual convergence of interests. 
This was neither a simple nor a fast endeavor.  
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4.3 Multiparty Mediation
4.3.1 Initial Lack of Cooperation Between Third Parties 
 In such a disproportional constellation of forces, where the go-
vernment had an upper hand from Moscow, while the opposition was 
failing to find similar support elsewhere, Russia saw an opportune mo-
ment to initiate inter-Tajik negotiations under UN auspices. Reflec-
ting on a previously illustrated game theoretical model, at this point the 
multiparty mediation process starts, and the ‘game’ is in point b, where 
the mediator that indicates attentions of cooperating with other third 
parties - in this case Russia showing intent to use the good offices of the 
UN - manages to reap comparatively higher benefits than those third-
parties that are not part of the multiparty mediation endeavor - which 
in this case is Iran. The benefits stem directly from the ability to guide 
and direct the process in a way which is compatible with ‘cooperative’ 
mediator’s interests, especially as these interests are not counterbalanced 
by the involvement of the other ‘non-cooperative’ mediator.    
 Already since the attacks on the border station in July 1993, despi-
te the strong line assumed by the Russian army and president Yeltzin, 
the Russian ministry of foreign affairs was exploring the possibility of 
finding a settlement through negotiation. Acting as communicator and 
facilitator, Russia established direct contacts with the opposition leaders 
that found refuge in Teheran. Resorting to shuttle diplomacy, Russian 
envoys managed to encourage both sides in the conflict to start negotia-
tions (Gretsky 1995; Iji 2001).   
 The first round of talks was held in Moscow from 5th to 9th of April 
1994. The two sides managed to agree on an agenda for succeeding ro-
unds of negotiation, classifying three categories of issues that needed to 
be tackled: political settlement, refugees and internally displaced per-
sons, and the structure of the government of Tajikistan (Iji 2001, 360). 
From the start, substantial discrepancy over the ‘sequencing’ (Lax and 
Sebenius 1991) of these issues emerged. The government wanted first 
to see the mutiny end and a solution to the refugee problem, while the 
opposition called for an “all-party council to govern the country and the 
legalization of opposition parties” (Iji 2001, 360). 
 The following second round of talks was held in Teheran, from 18th 
until 28th of June 1994. The key issue on the agenda was achievement 
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of a ceasefire. Despite the initial readiness to come to an understanding 
regarding the ceasefire, parties failed to agree on a timeframe for its im-
plementation. Once the talks failed, the government abruptly decided 
to hold a referendum on the new constitution and presidential elections, 
scheduling both for September. Irritated by this move, the opposition 
intensified military operations around the border with Afghanistan and 
the situation deteriorated even further.   
 Russia was not happy with an ongoing conflict, especially as it was 
endangering its troops located in the country. It decided to resort to ma-
nipulative strategies in order to force the government to sign a ceasefire 
agreement and to postpone elections and referendum (Hay 2001). At 
the same time Iranian diplomats used the same tactics with the opposi-
tion leaders. Shortly thereafter, a ceasefire was reached at a consultative 
meeting in Teheran in September 1994. According to Hay, the deputy 
foreign ministers of Russia and Iran “were instrumental in convincing 
the respective Tajik delegations to sign the Drat Agreement on a Tem-
porary Ceasefire prepared by the UN negotiating team” (Hay 2001, 40). 
Compatibility of interest between two major powers, coupled by the 
coordinating efforts of the UN whose positions did not contradict ma-
jor powers’ interests, were the necessary conditions for achieving the 
agreement. The armistice was eventually extended until February 1995 
during the third round of talks in Islamabad, held from 20th until 31st of 
October 1994 (Iji 2001). This was a clear indication how a cooperative 
and coordinated effort by biased third-parties can produce sufficient 
incentives to leverage the disputants toward an agreement.
 However, despite these important contributions for achieving a ce-
ssation of hostilities, Russia was still not fully committed to broker a 
negotiated solution to the conflict. According to Iji “Moscow helped 
jump-start the negotiations, move them forward, and focus the attenti-
on of the parties on talking rather than fighting, but was not prepared 
to pressure Rakhmonov strongly enough to accept power sharing with 
the opposition” (Iji 2001, 366). Such an attitude sent mixed signals to 
its partners in Dushanbe that were focused on regaining power throu-
gh new elections (presidential in November 1994 and parliamentary in 
February 1995) and a referendum on the constitution (February 1995), 
that excluded participation of the opposition parties. The government’s 
decision reduced the already fragile confidence the opposition had in 
the peace process, so the spotlight once again shifted toward the frontli-
Siniša Vuković
98
nes. Evidently, the lack of a strong presence of Iran in this phase of the 
process was directly hurting the opposition forces. They were clearly 
experiencing comparatively lower payoffs from the peace process (as 
predicted by the game-theoretical model), which in turn induced them 
to resort to violence in order to improve their negotiating positions.  
 As the belligerent activities escalated, the two conflicting sides 
agreed to meet in Moscow in April 1995, and discuss the possibility 
of extending the armistice. The opposition accepted the talks under the 
condition that they would lead to a more substantial negotiation over a 
potential political settlement. On the eve of this meeting, the Russian 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev issued a statement addressed to Russians li-
ving outside Russia, emphasizing: “We have at our disposal an arsenal 
of methods to defend our compatriots” (Hiro 1995, 15). The opposition 
understood this as a direct warning and walked out from the UN-cha-
ired meeting. Motivated by this unyielding Russian position, the Tajik 
president Rakhmonov reacted in a self-assured tone and offered to meet 
the opposition leader, Said Nuri, from IRP, “any time, anywhere” (Hiro 
1995, 14). 
 After this statement a series of summits and rounds of talks were 
held. In most of the occasions, these talks only served as an outlet for 
both sides to channel their disagreement, without achieving any sub-
stantial progress. Evidently, the government was still having an upper 
hand in the peace process, especially given the overwhelming role of 
their Russian partners. However they were hurting on the battlefield, 
as the opposition resorted to violence to distort the present balance of 
power at the negotiating table, where they were still experiencing lower 
payoffs. Again lack of substantial Iran presence in the peace process was 
hurting the UTO. 
 During a series of summits and rounds of talks, worth mentioning 
are the agreements on refugees and prisoners of war achieved during the 
fourth round of talks in Almaty (22nd May – 1st of June 1995). Another 
important event was signing of the Protocol on the Fundamental Prin-
ciples for Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, which 
was a result of the Rakhmonov-Nuri summit facilitated by Iran in Te-
heran on July 19 and following indirect talks through the UN envoy. 
This protocol was “delineating the road to and the overall shape of a 
final settlement” (Iji 2001, 362). Despite Iran’s contribution in drafting 
the Protocol, its mediation potential was still not set in full motion. 
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Teheran still maintained financial and political support, together with a 
somewhat clandestine military assistance to the Islamic-democratic co-
alition. Iran’s biggest hope was to create “an effective contestant against 
the Rakhmonov regime, although Teheran continued to be very careful 
to maintain good relations with the government side” (Iji 2001, 366). 
While both sides in conflict started sending signals of readiness to start 
negotiating on political issues, fighting on the ground never actually 
stopped. Evidently, conflicting sides used violence as an off-the-table-
tactic, in order to improve their bargaining position (Sisk 2009). As the 
situation deteriorated, the consecutive (fifth) round of talks that was in 
Ashgabat, Turkmenistan – November 30, 1995 and 8-21 July 1996 - 
focused mainly (again) on finding an agreement on a ceasefire. 
 It was evident that neither side was fully committed to negotiate a 
peace agreement. Even though the peace process had been underway 
for more than two years high levels of mutual distrust still existed. The 
opposition questioned the legitimacy of the neo-communists to partici-
pate in negotiations as an official government, given the electoral frauds 
that had occurred over time. Its military success throughout the conflict 
was impressive, proving to Iran that its support was worthwhile. On the 
other hand, the government did not recognize opposition forces as an 
equal partner with whom they would not only negotiate, but eventually 
share the power. Government did not have to look far to find support 
for its claims. Russia was “most unlikely to let Tajik Islamist share power 
in a country which it regards as crucial to its own security” (Hiro 1996, 
14). Clearly, while outside support was still available for their respective 
unilateral solutions, the Tajik parties participated in negotiations only 
‘half-heartedly’ (Iji 2001, 366). 
 As this research hypothesized (H2), when the mediating coalition is 
faced with conflicting interests, if one mediator decides to defect from 
the group dynamic, this will have an important impact on the dynamics 
of peace process between negotiators. At the same time Russia and Iran 
still did not have a shared idea on a potential solution to the conflict, 
which would help them to push the parties toward a peaceful solution 
to their dispute. As previously hypothesized (H4), in case mediators do 
not reach convergence of interests, the conflicting sides will be induced 
to defect from negotiations, making it more likely for the peace process 
to fail. In the case of Tajikistan, this was unequivocally indicated by the 
unyielding positions of both the government and UTO. Neither side 
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was inclined to show any intent to compromise, and abandon maxima-
list claims in the peacemaking process. 
4.3.2 Convergence of Interests Between Multiple Mediators
 Just when the peace process was approaching a severe deadlock, in 
September 1996, violent events in nearby Afghanistan produced enou-
gh reasons for Russia and Iran to settle the conflict in Tajikistan (Abdu-
llaev and Babakhanov 1998; Abdullo 2001). The storming of Kabul was 
the “last drop” that induced Russia to rethink its policy objectives that 
supported a military solution to the conflict. By then, the neo-commu-
nist regime in Dushanbe was in a serious decay, while the opposition 
forces were gaining momentum on the battlefield. Realizing a weake-
ning of its military forces and its inability to fight Muslim insurgents 
– a lesson learned in a 20-month long conflict in Chechnya in 1995-96 
– Russia came to view that “the cost of further military involvement in 
Tajikistan to be too high” (Iji 2001, 366). Since the Tajik-Afghan border 
was still considered to be ‘a Russian border’, Moscow urgently needed 
a stable Tajikistan to serve as a buffer zone against the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism coming from Afghanistan (Iji 2001, 367).
 Iran was also prompted to modify its policy objectives in Tajikistan. 
Despite the temporary military success of the opposition forces, it was 
already clear to Teheran that chances of an armed seizure of power were 
extremely small. And even in that case, in the eyes of policy makers in 
Teheran, Tajikistan was never ready to be modeled into an Islamic state. 
For this reason Iran was always very careful to maintain some relati-
onship with the government in Dushanbe, at last within the cultural 
and religious dimensions. According to several observers, “Iran attached 
more importance to the maintenance of good relations with Russia than 
to the creation of an Islamic state in Tajikistan” (Iji 2001, 367). In fact, 
just in order to preserve good relations with authorities in Moscow, 
Teheran never provided all the assistance requested by the opposition 
forces (Mesbahi 1997). So when the Taliban militia gained power in 
Afghanistan, Iran immediately realized that the conflict in Tajikistan 
needed to be resolved as soon as possible. For Iran, a stable Tajikistan 
represented a solid shield against the regime in Afghanistan that was 
“adverse to their interests because of geopolitical, ethnic and religious 
reasons” (Iji 2001, 367).             
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Given the novel developments, two lead-states had converging intere-
sts in resolving the conflict in Tajikistan. As theorized previously (H3), 
if the mediators manage to achieve convergence of policy objectives 
among them, there are bigger chances that the peace process will be 
successful. In this case, both Russia and Iran shared an idea over the 
final outcome to the conflict: the final agreement should be based on a 
power-sharing arrangement between the government and the opposi-
tion (Hiro 1998). As Iji noted, “such coincidence of interests and po-
sitions rendered possible the joint mediation by Russia and Iran in the 
Tajik conflict… once Russia and Iran became serious about settling the 
conflict through a cooperative mediation effort, the negotiation began 
to gain momentum” (Iji 2001, 368). 
 In fact, both states took the conflict resolution process much more 
seriously. Using particular leverages at their disposal as biased media-
tors and lead-states, they resorted to manipulative strategies in order to 
move both conflicting sides toward an agreement. In cases where outsi-
de actors have a strong strategic interest in a country or region, which 
prompts them to manage a conflict (H9), the stronger the mediators’ 
strategic interest in the conflict the higher the chances of successful 
mediation through a coordinated effort by mediators in a coalition. As 
indicated previously, Tajikistan possessed all the necessary traits of a 
strategically important zone for both Russia and Iran. Therefore, a well 
coordinated action by both Russia and Iran soon brought results. Both 
conflicting sides, exhausted by continuous fighting, saw a military solu-
tion to the conflict as an unattainable option. Eventually as their spon-
sor-states definitely stopped providing assistance for military actions, 
both the government and the opposition started taking the option of 
actually negotiating a solution much more seriously. Thus, Rakhmonov 
and Nuri, each one experiencing increasing pressure from the outside 
patron states, agreed to meet and discuss the most delicate issues of the 
peace agreement. By December 1996 they managed to find a mutually 
acceptable formula for the final solution. In the following rounds of 
talks, hosted by Iran (Teheran, 6-19 January 1997) and Russia (Moscow 
26th February – 8th of March 1997), thanks to well synchronized activi-
ties of powerful states, parties managed to overcome all the differences 
in opinion, accepted to make important concessions regarding the fu-
ture power-sharing arrangement and paved the way to the actual peace 
agreement signed on June 27, 1997 in Moscow. According to Hay, “the 
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personal contribution of Russian Foreign Minister Primakov and his 
deputy Mr. Pashtukov, were invaluable for reaching agreement on the 
Protocol on Military Issues in March 1997, one of the most important 
documents of the process. The direct involvement of Iranian Foreign 
Minister Velayati facilitated the signing of Protocol on Refugees in Ja-
nuary 1997” (Hay 2001, 40). What was even more remarkable was the 
fact that Russia and Iran were not only focused putting pressure on the 
negotiators; they also used all the necessary means in order to create a 
proper atmosphere for the negotiations. Especially important for them 
was to isolate the ‘spoilers’ (Stedman 1997) who had problems accepting 
the proposed power-sharing solution. An unprecedented demonstration 
of Russian dedication to achieve an uphold the peace settlement hap-
pened in August 1997, when Russian air forces bombed a garrison of 
governmental forces led by generals unhappy with the peace agreement 
and the power-sharing arrangement it prescribed. Evidently, Moscow 
was “deadly serious” about helping Rakhmonov implement the peace 
treaty (Hiro 1997, 14).
 Looking back at the game theoretical model, the apparent conver-
gence of interests moved the process to point c. In other words, the pro-
cess reached the NME. The convergence of interests was a direct result 
of a series of factor. As hypothesized earlier (H5), a strong geo-politi-
cal shift will induce the defecting mediator to change its strategy and 
engage in a cooperative meditation effort to manage the conflict. The 
storming of Kabul by Taliban forces represented a serious geopolitical 
challenge for both Russia and Iran. While the Tajik civil war could be 
treated as an isolated conflict, which could be contained within a region, 
without any fear of it spilling over to other countries, neither third party 
showed any intent to push for a more peaceful solution to the dispute. 
However, the projected and feared spill-over effect from Afghanistan 
induced Russia and Iran to rethink their policies toward the region, 
and thus find a stronger interest to stabilize the situation in Tajikistan 
as soon as possible. Therefore, the convergence of interests between two 
mediators was directly induced by a serious geo-political change in the 
region, and the causal link between Taliban occupation of Kabul and 
Russia and Iran’s convergence of interests could be deduced.
 At the same time, this research hypothesized (H6) that an incre-
ase in costs of supporting a war will induce the defecting mediator to 
change its strategy and engage in a cooperative meditation effort to 
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manage the conflict. Both Russia and Iran found the amounting costs of 
perpetuating the war unbearable and in contrast to their self-interests. 
As indicated previously, Russia was especially harmed by the ongoing 
warfare, and this realization directly induced Moscow officials to ret-
hink their policies regarding the peace process in Tajikistan. Therefore, 
the causal linkage between increasing costs of supporting warfare and 
convergence of interests between third parties could be observed. Once 
Russia and Iran realized that a military solution to the conflict was 
unattainable, they were able to reformulate their policies toward their 
partners and using specific power at their disposal and leverage them 
through a cooperative endeavor to find a mutually acceptable solution, 
as hypothesized in H1. While Iran was less affected by the costs of war, 
it was more prone to rethink its policies toward the conflict, due to the 
ineffectiveness of its strategy to produce any outcome that is in line with 
its self-interests. The same attitude can be attributed to Russia’s change 
of attitude. This is in line with what was previously hypothesized (H7) 
- if a mediator’s defecting strategy produces high costs in the mediation 
process for the state it supports, this will induce the defecting mediator 
to change its strategy and engage in a cooperative meditation effort to 
manage the conflict.

naMibia
CHAPTER 
V 
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CHAPTER V: Namibia
 A much different case of multiparty mediation occurred throughout 
the 1980s in Southern Africa. The peace settlement signed on Decem-
ber 22, 1988 at the UN headquarters in New York, by officials repre-
senting Angola, Cuba and South Africa, which granted Namibia with 
a long awaited independence, represented a successful conclusion of an 
eight years long US lead diplomatic endeavor that saw engaged a mul-
titude of international actors. Intricate dynamics of the Cold War era 
coupled with regional problems dating back to the League of Nations, 
were enough reasons for the US to understand that acting alone was 
not enough, and that its mediatory clout, even as a superpower was 
finite (Crocker 1999, 229). In order to guide all parties involved in the 
regional imbroglio toward a settlement they needed a much larger di-
plomatic involvement of various global and regional players. 
 Looking back, it appears quite clear that the peacemaking proce-
ss could not succeed without valuable diplomatic inputs provided by 
members of the Western Contact Group (the United Kingdom, Fran-
ce, West Germany and Canada), frontline states (Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana) and UN and its suborgani-
zations (Iji 2011). According to Crocker, “the multiparty character of 
the mediation was designed to neutralize the obstruction of competing 
parties and states, and add reach, credibility, and access to international 
and regional efforts” (Crocker 1999, 207). However, the most significant 
contribution to the US mediation initiative came from their fiercest 
Cold War rivals in Moscow. In fact it was the rapprochement between 
the USSR and the US that broke the deadlock in the negotiation proce-
ss (Berridge 1989, Wood 1993, Pycroft 1994). When the Soviet Union 
radically altered its policy objectives and “abandoned reflexive obstructi-
onism” in order to “do creative things together” (Crocker 1999, 239), the 
peace process managed to overcome Cold War constraints and produce 
a settlement for a longstanding problem in Southern Africa.
 The rapprochement between the US and the USSR was of crucial 
importance. It allowed for an US-led mediation (primarily conducted 
by Chester Crocker who at that time was the US Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs) to achieve the necessary level of legitimacy, 
and consequently produce success through a well coordinated peace 
process. Thus, despite the fact the US acted as a biased mediator with 
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a specific set of interest it aimed to promote in the peace process, its 
role was acceptable to both the disputants and the other powerful state 
(USSR) (Berridge 1989, 469). 
 Therefore, the case of Namibia provides a unique opportunity to 
observe a case where the outcome was dependent on the interests of 
global powers and global geo-political conditions. At the same time, 
the case will also show how intrinsic dynamics of warfare induced mul-
tiple mediators and actors on the ground to achieve the necessary level 
of convergence of interests, and consequently through a peace process 
coordinated by a powerful state produce a mutually acceptable solution 
to the conflict.    
5.1 The Nature of Conflict
5.1.1 Sources of Intractability
 The territory of present-day Namibia was occupied by Germany af-
ter the Berlin congress in 1878 and remained in its possession until the 
end of the Great War when the League of Nations decided to confer it 
to South Africa as a ‘class C’ mandate which stayed for administering 
the territory as an integral part of the governing state (Zartman 1989, 
174). After a series of events in the post-World War II period and a 
growing global decolonization pressure, in 1968 the UN changed the 
name of the territory of Southwest Africa to Namibia. Soon after, in 
1971, following several appeals and rulings in favor of South Africa, the 
International Court of Justice ruled South Africa’s presence there illegal 
(Crocker 1999, 207). However the real challenge to the South African 
presence in Namibia was created after a sudden Portuguese withdrawal 
from the region in 1975 leaving Angola completely vulnerable to a con-
sequent Soviet-backed Cuban intervention. The link with the events 
unfolding in neighboring Angola will prove to be of crucial importance 
for the subsequent mediation process, as both aspects - the power vacu-
um in Angola and Namibia’s claim for independence - would eventually 
be linked and managed jointly by international actors.                
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5.1.2 Development of Deep Feelings of Distrust,  
Mutual Hatred and Irreconcilable Positions
 
 During the wave of decolonization after the Second World War, 
on the territories of present day Angola and Namibia, several groups 
formed with national liberation as their main goal. Each one embodied 
a particular societal mark, and was inclined to promote a specific socio-
political agenda. 
 During the German colonial rule the Herero community of central 
Namibia and Nama from the south were subjected to brutal exploitati-
on and genocide (Olusoga and Erichsen 2010). Already from the 1920s, 
when the territory was transferred to a South African administration 
(at that time a British dominion), the ideal of an independent Namibia 
started to emerge. In fact, a few thousand Hereros managed to escape 
the German “extermination order” of 1904, finding exile in present-day 
Botswana (Vigne 1987, 87.). According to Vigne, “it was through the 
efforts of exiles that Namibians themselves were able to bring the issue 
of Namibia to the attention of the UN, despite the virtual imprisonment 
of the majority of their own country, and the exile of many more” (Vi-
gne 1987, 87). The growing sense of Namibian nationhood was further 
strengthened in the midst of the global wave of decolonization resul-
ting in a strong resistance to South African rule. Colonial hardship was 
further aggravated with the introduction of apartheid policies in 1948. 
During the 1950s several political movements emerged, such as South 
West Africa’s People Organization (SWAPO) - an inexperienced, po-
pulist and non-aligned movement - and the South West African Na-
tional Union (SWANU) - a sophisticated, perhaps elitist and Peking 
oriented (Vigne 1987, 88). The turning point happened in 1964, when 
the newly formed Organization of African Union (OUA) put forward 
a direct question to both movements about their readiness to take up 
arms against the South African occupation. SWAPO’s ‘yes’ led to its 
recognition, while SWANU’s refusal to accept the prospects of armed 
struggle meant the withdrawal of OAU support (Vigne 1987, 88). As 
a result SWAPO emerged as the “sole and authentic representative of 
the Namibian people” in the eyes of the UN (A/RES/3111, 1973; A/
RES/31/146, 1976).  
 As many African countries, from its onset Angola represented a con-
glomerate of different peoples and groups, each with its distinct history 
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and traditions (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 10). Their shared experi-
ence mainly started with the Portuguese colonial expansion in the regi-
on. Under the colonial regime the Angolan society experienced highly 
discriminatory legislation, which “separated the indigenous population 
from a tiny elite of ‘civilized’ individuals (or assimilados) who enjoyed 
some of the rights of Portuguese citizens” (Meijer and Birmingham 
2004, 11). Such racial and discriminatory politics unquestionably left an 
important mark on the future societal dynamics in Angola. Social cle-
avages that were generated by the colonial rule conditioned the future 
relationships between different social groups which were characterized 
by high levels of mistrust and suspicion.
 While in Namibia SWAPO was able to assume the role of a “sole 
and authentic representative” of the people, which was able to challenge 
the South African rule, in Angola things were quite different. The terri-
tory was affected by an unbroken rivalry between various elites. Over 
time three very strong groupings emerged, all promoting the idea of 
national liberation. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA), led by Holden Roberto, was initially the strongest one, re-
flecting the aspirations of the elites from the north, primarily from the 
hinterland of Kinshasa, while still maintaining some cultural links with 
the old Kongo kingdom (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 12). 
 The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 
emerged from the territory populated by the Mbundu people from the 
surroundings of Luanda, but it also included several urban communities 
of both indigenous and mixed-race descent. Finally, the Union of To-
tal Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi, promoted 
the economic interests of the Ovimbudu people and their merchant 
leaders from the southern planalto (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 12). 
However, according to Meijer and Birmingham, “to a large extent the 
ethnic identification of these movements has come about as a result 
of conscious political maneuvering by each leadership rather than as a 
genuine expression of popular sentiment and aspiration” (Meijer and 
Birmingham 2004, 12). Promotion of particular interests was only 
aggravated with the power vacuum left after the end of Portuguese co-
lonial rule, as each movement aspired to establish power over the entire 
country.           
Siniša Vuković
110
5.1.3 Internal Characteristics of the Conflicting Sides 
and Employment of Repressive Measures
 The anti-colonial struggle in Angola started in the early 1960s and 
was characterized by the methods of guerilla warfare. Since none of 
the armed movements was able to considerably challenge the colonial 
rule, they tried to outmaneuver each other on the political and diplo-
matic level. For this reason the nationalist movements were very eager 
to attain the necessary support from abroad. The FNLA managed to 
secure the backing of some of the African countries, the US and China, 
and in 1962 in established a Revolutionary Government of Angola in 
Exile (GRAE) which was initially recognized by OUA as a legitimate 
representative of Angola and a successor of the colonial rule (Meijer and 
Birmingham 2004, 13). However, despite being militarily much weaker, 
by 1975 the MPLA managed to outmaneuver FNLA diplomatically 
and shift the OUA support to its favor. 
 Both movements suffered strongly from internal fractionalization. 
Especially vulnerable in this regards was FNLA, whose government in 
exile suffered a serious hit in 1964 when Jonas Savimbi - a Minister of 
Foreign Affairs at that time - accused FNLA of being militarily ineffec-
tive, dependent of the US and affected by nepotism and authoritari-
an leadership of Holden Roberto (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 13). 
He went on to visit a number of states - interestingly enough mainly 
communist ones - looking for support. In 1966 he established UNITA. 
Meijer and Birmingham point out that “by exploiting the feelings of 
exclusion in Angola’s largest ethnic group, the Ovimbundu, Savimbi 
built up his own constituency in the centre and south of the country” 
(idem).  
 The first Angolan war - which was part of a greater Portuguese co-
lonial war - was brought to an end in 1974, not because of the effecti-
veness of anti-colonial movements, but due to a growing pressure and 
dissatisfaction of the public opinion in Portugal. In fact, the process of 
decolonization was a direct result of the April 1974 military coup which 
overthrew the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal. As the Portugue-
se power grip over Angola was decreasing, sporadic violence broke out 
across the country. During the turmoil the armies of MPLA, FNLA 
and UNTA jointly patrolled the country with the aim of preserving 
peace (Meijer and Birmingham 2004). In January 1975, thanks to a 
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strong international pressure, the Portuguese authorities and the three 
movements signed the Alvor Accords which prescribed the establis-
hment of a transitional government, a new constitution, elections and 
independence for Angola. The accords however soon collapsed, creating 
a pretext for the power struggle between three factions.    
 At the same time, although in exile, SWAPO was challenging the 
South African rule in Namibia. Over time the movement opened offices 
in several cities across Africa, eventually opening one at the UN. Altho-
ugh very active on the diplomatic front, SWAPO received the necessary 
‘push’ to resort to violence only with the rulings of the International 
Court of Justice over the issue of Namibia’s independence. The Court 
started deliberating on the issue due to South African’s refusal to tran-
sfer the territory over to an UN Trusteeship Council. Ethiopia and Li-
beria that had asked for a “contentious judgment” of South West Africa, 
in 1966 received a favorable advisory opinion from the Court. Howe-
ver, this only caused further complications, as months later the Court 
reversed it earlier opinion stating that the two countries had “no locus 
standi” and that the case was inadmissible (Vigne 1987, 89). Although, 
numerous international partners were persuading SWAPO to resort to 
legal means and use the UN system to gain the necessary support for 
independence, at that moment it was clear that SWAPO could secure 
independence only through fighting (Vigne 1987, 90).       
 On July 18, 1966, the same day the ICJ reversed its earlier opini-
on, SWAPO declared its intention to start a military campaign aga-
inst South Africa. The movement was already preparing for this move, 
and in August 1966 the first units entered northern Namibia (Vigne 
1987, 90). The movement was poorly quipped and undertrained to 
confront the South African forces. Nevertheless, they were resolute in 
their aims. In the midst of the early military campaign, SWAPO still 
tried to rally international support. The reversed decision of the ICJ, 
which South Africa proclaimed as its victory, motivated the members 
of the UN General Assembly to pass Resolution 2145 and terminate 
the present Mandate which was conferred by the League of Nations, 
as South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations from the mandate it 
no longer has the right to administer the territory, and that henceforth 
South West Africa would come under the direct responsibility of the 
UN (A/RES/2145, 1996). Bypassing the Security Council, the General 
Assembly also established a ‘de jure’ government of the territory with a 
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Commissioner as its executive, and renamed the territory to Namibia 
(Vigne 1987, 92). This decision was strongly objected by South African 
trading partners from the West. 
 It was an unwritten rule during the Cold War that each liberation 
movement in Africa gets associated with a specific ideological camp (or 
similar). Despite often being labeled as a member of the “Casablanca 
Group” - which included the African National Congress (ANC), Libe-
ration Congress of Mozambique (FRELIMO), MPLA and Zimbabwe’s 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) - SWAPO tried to establish a dis-
tinctive and non-aligned position. According to Vigne there were two 
reasons for this: first of all, due to a long history of oppression and 
genocide, the Namibians “felt themselves as yet ill-equipped to serve as 
equal partners with the imperial powers of East and West”; secondly, 
while rejected by the US and UK, SWAPO was very hesitant to accept 
the authority of the USSR (Vigne 1987, 92). SWAPO’s initial choi-
ce of assuming a non-aligned stand was aimed at preserving internal 
unity - something that other liberation movements could only aspire to. 
Nevertheless, in the midst of Cold War super-power rivarly, SWAPO’s 
struggle against US’ allies in South Africa, gave enough reason for the 
Soviets to support its cause. Over time, SWAPO’s ties with the Soviets 
improved and strengthened, which made them highly unpopular with 
the US and its western allies. 
 While unable to garner international support from the powerful 
Western states, matters turned to SWAPO’s favor with another ICJ ru-
ling. In 1975, the ICJ passed a new Advisory Opinion, this time stating 
that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal. It 
called the UN member states to recognize the illegality of South Afri-
can presence and refrain from any acts that could imply the legality of 
its administration in Namibia. At the same time South Africa was obli-
ged to withdraw its administration from Namibia (ICJ 1975). Despite 
objections from some western states, the illegality of South African rule 
in Namibia was clearly established. 
 The events in neighboring Angola, where the Portuguese were 
agreeing on a transfer of power and accepting the independence of its 
former colony, inspired SWAPO to continue its struggle against the 
South African regime. However, the situation in Angola soon beca-
me more complicated. Following the collapse of the Alvor Accords, the 
power struggle between three main factions became extremely violent. 
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Thanks to an external support from the Soviet block, on 11 November 
1975, the MPLA declared Angola’s independence and installed Ago-
stinho Neto as its first President (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 10; 
Pycroft 1994, 242). The FNLA and UNITA were excluded from the 
newly established government, which in fact was a socialist one-par-
ty regime. Gradually the new system, which was organized along the 
Marxist-Leninist lines, received international recognition, however not 
from the US (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 13). 
 By the end of the 1970s FNLA followers were integrated into the 
system, thanks to a rapprochement between the MPLA and Zaire’s Pre-
sident Mobutu Sese Seko, who was very close to FNLA’s leader Holden 
Roberto. The FNLA army, which at one point represented a foreign-
armed force with thousands of recruits, “disintegrated without being 
formally disarmed or demobilized” (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 15). 
This left UNITA as the main contender for power in Angola. With the 
collapse of the Alvor Accords, UNITA started receiving support from 
South Africa, at first in a clandestine form. By 1983, the partnership 
with UNITA became an official policy of the government in Pretoria 
(Accords 2004, 82). At the same time, the fact that UNITA was fighting 
a Marxist-Leninist regime was enough reason for the US to directly 
support the movement.     
 The turmoil that followed saw a simultaneous unfolding of three 
different armed conflicts. The first one was the bush war along the Na-
mibian border with Angola between the South African Defense Force 
(SADF) and the SWAPO. The second and third conflict saw the SADF 
involved in the Angolan civil war, where it assisted the UNITA fight 
the MPLA, which enjoyed Cuba’s unequivocal support. The US me-
diation efforts tackled the problem of mainly resolving conflicts invol-
ving South African and Cuban military presence both in Namibia and 
Angola and concentrated on a settlement that would see withdrawal 
of foreign forces from both countries. By then, as far the Angolan civil 
war was concerned, “no external party had the standing or legitimacy to 
force it mediation on the Angolan parties, still less to create yet another 
linkage of the external to the internal Angolan issues” (Crocker 1999, 
224).
 As the conflict in Vietnam was approaching an end, Angola and 
Namibia became a fertile ground for another super-power proxy war. 
In fact, as Pycroft notes “the influence of super-power rivalry became 
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one the defining characteristics of southern African regional politics” 
(Pycroft 1994, 242). According to Meijer and Birmingham, “each side 
was not so much defending a specific interest in Angola as playing out 
geo-political rivalry” (Meijer and Birmingham 2004, 15).
5.2 Involvement of International Actors and Their  
 Interests in the Conflict
 The unfolding situation in the region gave enough reason for the 
Soviet Union to advance its ambition of implementing the ‘Brezhnev 
Doctrine’ in southern Africa. Under that doctrine, the détente and pea-
ceful coexistence with the ‘imperialist camp’ were a result of a favorable 
shift in balance of power and as a form of struggle between the two 
systems. For Moscow the agreements between the two global powers 
were a reflection of the Soviet success in the “diplomatic struggle of the 
two worlds” (Mitchell 1978, 381). Brezhnev even stated that “détente by 
no means annuls the battle of ideas” (Brezhnev cited in Mitchell 1987, 
381). According to Mitchell, under the Brezhnev doctrine “the Sovi-
et support for national liberation movements, particularly in southern 
Africa, is presumably based upon the assumption that the general crisis 
of capitalism makes the West more vulnerable to pressure” (Mitchell 
1978, 381). In other words, the success of the liberation movements was 
perceived as a means to an end, which was the increasing weight of the 
socialist system in world politics (idem). 
 Following the rationale of the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviets used 
the turmoil and instability that emerged during the collapse of the 
Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, in order to advance their role on 
the global level. Pycroft noted that “the victory of the Soviet-backed 
MPLA over the South African and United States assisted UNITA and 
FNLA forces in the first round of the Angolan civil war in 1975 and 
1976 provided the Soviet Union with a foothold in southern Africa, 
which it improved through support for the MPLA in Angola, SWAPO 
in Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, 
and Frelimo after independence in Mozambique” (Pycroft 1994, 242). 
The Soviet (and Cuban) support for the MPLA started already in the 
1960s, but was initially quite insufficient to allow the MPLA to chall-
enge the Portuguese colonial rule. Over time the Soviet support become 
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fundamental for the MPLA’s cause. The heavy armaments that were 
provided to the movement in the most delicate moments of the civil 
war in 1975 were of crucial importance for MPLA’s success in obtaining 
control of the capital and declaring Angola and independent country. 
In 1976, the USSR established even closer relations with the MPLA by 
signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Meijer 2004, 86). At 
its first congress in December 1977, the movement transformed itself 
into a Marxist-Leninist party signaling its unquestioned affiliation with 
the Soviet block.
 Cuba was another close ally of the MPLA. Cuban interest in the re-
gion started with Che Guevarra’s visit to Central Africa in 1964. During 
the 1975 civil war, Cuba assisted the MPLA, by first sending military 
advisors, and eventually dispatching troops in response to South Afri-
can intervention in support of UNITA. By February 1976, Cuba had 
dispatched around 14,000 troops to support the MPLA, with a clear 
intention of consolidating Soviet influence in the region (Accords 2004, 
87). After the independence of Angola, Cuba continued to provide the 
much needed military support but it also assisted the government in 
rebuilding the country by providing it with engineers, teachers, doctors, 
and civil servants (idem). 
 American interests to intervene in the conflict were also primarily 
political and evolved around the ‘Reagan Doctrine’. The doctrine had 
anti-communism as its raison d’être and promoted the idea of suppor-
ting anti-communist resistance around the world (Oye et al. 1987). Thus, 
not surprisingly during the Angolan civil war in 1975 and 1976 the 
US assisted the anti-communist movements. In principle, in southern 
Africa the Reagan administration tried to promote the policies of ‘con-
structive engagement’ - which were introduced by Assistant Secretary 
Chester Crocker in 1981 - with the primary aim of countering the So-
viet presence in the region (Crocker 1992; Davies 2007). Under this 
policy, “any leader that was opposed to Soviet ideology and expansion 
was courted by America” (Pycroft 1994, 243). The US found a close ally 
in South Africa’s Prime Minister P.W. Botha (who would alter become 
the President), who was engaged in a struggle with a Soviet-backed 
SWAPO in Namibia. The policies of constructive engagement for the 
South Africa government had a dual impact: on the one side it was an 
opportunity for South Africa to regain the lost western support, and on 
the other it offered a clout of legitimacy for the government’s disruptive 
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actions both domestically and in the region.                
 According to Pycroft, “for Angola, the most significant component 
of constructive engagement was the US’s introduction, in 1982, of ‘lin-
kage’ into negotiation for Namibia’s independence” (Pycroft 1994, 243). 
In a nutshell, the linkage meant that an independent Namibia could not 
be achieved without the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, thus 
tying together the faith of two countries.  In principle, the US was inte-
rested in achieving a smooth, peaceful and stable transition from coloni-
al rule to self-government (Zartman 1989, 182). The main dilemma the 
US had was to choose between a continued apartheid South African so-
vereignty over Namibia, strongly opposed by the international commu-
nity, or an UN endorsed independence for the territory, which would 
most likely also entail a pro-Marxist SWAPO government in Namibia. 
By the mid-1970s, as South African policies became incompatible with 
principles cherished by the US administration, policy makers in Was-
hington realized that any further resistance to Namibian nationalism, 
which had the UN backing, would only backfire on the long run. Thus 
the key concern of the US was to prevent a war from escalating even 
more. The US feared that any further intensification of fighting would 
only draw in their Soviet rivals into the conflict, making it necessary for 
the US to align with apartheid South Africa, a scenario they absolutely 
wanted to avoid.
 With the help of partner western states in the Security Council – 
France, the United Kingdom, Canada and West Germany – in Sep-
tember 1978 the US managed to pass UN Security Council Resolution 
345 that prescribed a “set of complex arrangements for the territory’s 
transition to independence under South African administrative con-
trol with simultaneous UN monitoring and supervision” (Crocker 1999, 
214). Once the framework for upcoming peacemaking activities was set 
up, in 1981 the new Reagan administration took on the task to reesta-
blish “coordinated working relations among the Western Five” or the 
Western Contact Group, whose global leverage and reputation would 
became useful for the upcoming peace making efforts (Zartman 1989; 
Iji 2011). 
 South Africa was very skeptical about intentions of the US and its 
allies in Southern Africa, given the apparent UN advocacy for Namibia’s 
independence and a growing support for SWAPO on the East River. 
However what mostly affected Pretoria’s uneasiness was a lack of reacti-
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on by the US and its allies to the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. 
Until then, the West hesitated to include the Angola question into the 
peacemaking equation of Namibia’s final status. It was deemed as rather 
dangerous to address the issue of Cuban presence in Angola, and con-
sequently lose Angola’s assistance in Namibia negotiations, as it was 
feared that the rest of the international community might see this as 
western countries’ prioritization of the communist question over the 
one of decolonization in Africa. From a practical angle, the West was 
aware that addressing the Cuban presence in Angola would necessarily 
provoke Moscow to react, at least on a diplomatic level. 
 However, despite these concerns, it became quite clear to the new 
US administration (under President George H. W. Bush) that perpetu-
ating this logic would only keep the peace process in deadlock, as South 
Africa made it quite clear that its cooperation in the process directly 
depended on the extent of Cuban presence in the region. Even An-
golan leaders recognized the connection between Namibian and An-
golan events when they stated that “Cubans could leave Angola after 
Namibia’s independence under Resolution 435” (Crocker 1999, 216). 
So the US chose to risk and decided to restructure negotiations in or-
der to include the Angolan factor as well. According to Crocker the 
‘linkage strategy’ had two advantages: “a far better chance to nail Preto-
ria down to a firm commitment on Resolution 435 and an appropriate 
US response to Soviet extension of the Brezhnev doctrine to the Third 
World, including Africa” (Crocker 1999, 216). The US hoped that a well 
coordinated mediation effort, which put diplomatic pressure on the So-
viet-Cuban-Angolan group, would weaken the current Soviet martial 
policies in Africa. Therefore, as hypothesized in H1 and H11c, while 
the stage for mediation was set, the US still needed some type of com-
pliance, even tacit, from the Soviets. In other words, potential success 
of mediation efforts was directly related to the ability of the Soviets to 
use their bias position in order to leverage their partners in conflict to 
change strategies and opt for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. At 
the same time, the willingness to leverage both Cubans and Angolans 
toward an agreement would indicate that the US and the USSR have 
managed to establish a common idea of resolving the conflict through 
mediation and thus indicate Soviet willingness to participate in US led 
and coordinated mediation activities.    
 In reality, Moscow had quite limited interests in Namibia, or as Za-
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rtman puts it, “no interests to lose or defend and everything to gain” 
(Zartman 1989, 183). Its involvement in the conflict was incomparable 
to the levels achieved in Angola; it was based on arming SWAPO forces 
and providing modest amounts of training for them. In principle, the 
USSR was unconvinced that South African acquiescence to a nego-
tiated independence for Namibia was actually achievable. Neverthele-
ss, the Soviet Union has been more appreciative of conflict resolution 
on the issue - as it was unwilling to take the costs of maintaining the 
conflict – than one would expect, with its objections giving way to ac-
tive support (Zartman 1989, 184). In fact, Moscow’s stand on the issue 
drastically changed over the span of eight years, departing from stra-
ightforward obstructionism of every Western effort to find a solution 
to fundamental cooperation with the US which eventually helped steer 
the parties toward a peace agreement.  
 This shift in policy was a direct result a drastic change that occurred 
with Gorbachev’s accession to power and his new ‘perestroika’ polici-
es (Shearman 1987). Although the US-led mediation attempts were 
never formally objected by the Soviets - as a result of the détente and 
coexistence prescribed by the Brezhnev doctrine - the mediation pro-
cess was unable to produce any success as the mediators did not have 
sufficient leverage over the warring parties. Soviets had an obvious le-
verage over the MPLA and Cuba, but in light of the Cold War power 
rivalry with the US, they were unwilling to use it to assist the US in 
mediating the conflict. In fact, under the Brezhnev doctrine Soviets saw 
the US’s inability to mediate the conflict as a reflection of the ‘imperia-
list block’s’ decreasing global power and - since the bipolar dynamics of 
the Cold War were a zero sum game - an indication of the increasing 
Soviet influence in international relations. The rapprochement between 
the USSR and US that happened during the Gorbachev’s mandate was 
more a result of a larger geo-political shift in Soviet policies toward the 
US and its allies, than anything else.       
5.3 Multiparty Mediation Process
5.3.1 Initial lack of cooperation between third parties
 The unequivocal tendency to hamper any western initiative Moscow 
had exercised already during the preparation of the Resolution 435. In 
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face of a clear support by SWAPO and frontline states for the propo-
sed text, Soviets backed off and abstained from vetoing the text in the 
Security Council. However, once the resolution was adopted, Moscow 
became its strongest promoter, now opposing any modification of the 
text. Thus, the US intention to link questions of Namibia and Angola, 
was strongly opposed as it represented “nothing less than an attempt to 
block Resolution 435, to force capitulations of Angola and its depar-
ture from the socialist camp, to join forces with Pretoria in creating a 
pro-Western security zone, and reverse the tide of history in Southern 
Africa” (Crocker 1999, 234). 
 The Soviet position was rapidly transposed on to the Angolan-Cu-
ban joint communiqué in February 1982, a statement which officially 
proclaimed that Angolans and Cubans would decide upon a timeframe 
of Cuban withdrawal from the country only after Namibia was gran-
ted independence. Angola wanted to be assured that Cuban withdrawal 
would not allow for invasion by South African troops, as it had already 
occurred on two occasions, in 1976 and 1979, when withdrawal was 
interrupted by South African attacks on Angola (Zartman 1989, 212). 
The US was aware that the linkage strategy was introducing the nece-
ssity to accommodate Moscow in the process, as its leverage over the 
Angolans and Cubans might turn out to be instrumental for a succe-
ssful outcome. 
 Increased UNITA military activities amplified Angola’s need for a 
stronger backing by its allies. By 1982 the number of Cuban troops 
increased to about 25 000, and the government in Luanda signed arms 
supplies agreements with the Soviet Union in mid-May 1983 and early 
January 1984 (Zartman 1989, 219). As the MPLA was strongly de-
pendent on Soviet and Cuban support, the US administration assumed 
that any Angolan position and proposal had been ‘cleared’ in Havana 
and Moscow (Crocker 1999, 235). Since the Soviets were refusing any 
direct negotiation with the US, officials in Washington opted for a more 
cautious approach. Crocker points out that during these years, US and 
Soviet officials held a series of ‘informal exchanges’ on Southern Africa, 
where the US aimed to “avoid surprises, to probe for constructive ope-
nings and offer Moscow a chance to bid and to explain to US purposes 
and indicate how they might serve the interests of both sides” (Crocker 
1999, 234). However, the initial exchanges did not produce any results 
as Moscow was insistent on bringing up legalistic issues and unwilling 
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to suggest any alternatives emphasizing their support for the latest An-
golan positions.
 In the meantime, various US attempts to promote the linkage stra-
tegy did not find any success in Pretoria and Luanda. Both sides were 
unwilling to compromise as any such move was perceived as dangerous 
for the national interest and the weakening of positions on the battle-
ground. It was a clear ‘game of chicken’ between the parties, as they were 
unwilling to make the first move fearing the reaction of the other side. 
The US became fully aware that the conflict was still not ‘ripe’ for reso-
lution and that on their own they were unable to achieve a settlement 
(Zartman 1989, 214-225). Quite problematic for the US was its lack of 
leverage, especially of ‘sticks’ over authorities in Pretoria, necessary to 
induce them to compromise. Unsatisfied with the South African une-
asiness to cooperate, in 1985, the US adopted limited sanctions against 
Pretoria as a reaction to their apartheid policies, and started considering 
the option of clandestine support of the UNITA forces. Until then the 
US had limited ability to support UNITA, because of the Clark Amen-
dment to the US Arms Export Control Act from 1976, which banned 
the US to aid any paramilitary activity in Angola (Berridge 1989).   The 
intention was to put pressure on Pretoria and make it realize that the 
linkage-strategy was a good alternative to a complete isolation. The 
Amendment was repealed in July 1985, and already in 1986 the US 
provided UNITA with 10 million dollars in direct military aid. The assi-
stance progressively increased to 80 million dollars under the Bush ad-
ministration (Pycroft 1994, 245). According to Pycroft, “the increased 
US commitment to UNITA came as South Africa began reassessing its 
commitment to retaining control over Namibia, and therefore questi-
oning its need to maintain UNITA as a bargaining chip in the linkage 
equation” (Pycroft 1994, 245). Nevertheless, South Africa, motivated 
by success on the battlefield in 1985, still did not see this as a plausible 
alternative. Two important events, one on the global level and one on 
the battleground, changed things dramatically.
5.3.2 Convergence of Interests between Third Parties
 With the arrival of Gorbachev to power in 1985, the Soviet Union 
started an important transition in its relations to regional policies. The 
new Soviet leadership began publicly calling for ‘political solutions’ to 
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regional conflicts (Shearman 1987, 1111). The articulation of the new 
post-Brezhnev foreign policy of the Soviet Union was secondary to 
the need to concentrate on reforming the Soviet economy and society. 
According to Pycroft, the expensive foreign adventures in places such 
as Afghanistan and Angola had to be reduced as they were producing 
unbearable costs to the crippling Soviet economy, while at the same 
time the Soviet Union was quite willing to achieve “a limited rappro-
chement with the US to facilitate access to Western finance and tech-
nology” (Pycroft 1994, 244). In should be noted that these were only 
initial steps which did not immediately imply a reduction in opposing 
the US proposals (Crocker 1999, 235). In fact, publically the Soviet 
Union kept challenging the US led initiatives, asking for the process to 
be conferred to the UN, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Mo-
vement. More importantly, the Soviet Union still kept discouraging any 
Angolan cooperation with Washington and “criticized UN Secretariat 
officials for undertaking quiet probes of Luanda’s latest thinking on a 
linkage-based settlement” (Crocker 1999, 235). As hypothesized in H2, 
mediators’ inability to reach convergence of interests was leading the 
process into a deadlock. For the US this meant that a bigger obstacle 
to a smooth mediation process was not in Luanda’s positions but in 
Moscow’s lack of cooperation. In March 1987, after consulting its allies 
Angola decided to resume direct talks with the US. In order to make its 
negotiating position stronger, Moscow advised Luanda to undertake a 
massive offensive against UNITA (Crocker 1999, 236), using violence 
as an off-the-table tactic in order to improve ones negotiating position 
(Sisk 2009). As hypothesized in H4, defecting strategies of one of the 
mediators induced a party in conflict that was supported by the defec-
ting mediator to defect from the peace process as well.
 However, the strategy proposed by the Soviets actually backfired. 
The Soviet-Angolan assault in late 1987 was a fiasco, with thousands of 
Angolan troops killed and a large portion of Soviet military hardware 
either destroyed or captured. As the costs of supporting the conflict were 
increasing, Moscow started arguing for a political settlement, while still 
maintaining a hard line on US led endeavors. One of the crucial impli-
cations of the Gorbachev shift in foreign policy was that the MPLA 
could no longer depend upon “unqualified support” from the USSR 
and Cuba. A deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union in-
duced officials in Moscow to reconsider overstretching their military 
Siniša Vuković
122
involvement around the globe. Pycroft notes that “although there was a 
commitment from the Soviet leadership to maintain the military pre-
sence in Angola to counter UNITA and South Africa, pressure began 
to mount on the MPLA to find a negotiated settlement” (Pycroft 1994, 
244). While the Soviet military support was quite substantial, it came 
with a high cost. The MPLA had to finance this military support with 
oil and diamond revenue, and this was imposing a severe debt on the 
country’s economy. Almost 65% of Angola’s debt was with the USSR, 
and the presence of Cuban troops was costing the country 250 million 
dollars a year (Pycroft 1994, 244). 
 On the other hand, the MPLA had enough reason to believe that 
it could find partners in the West. First of all, the US was the largest 
importer of Angolan goods - especially oil - with a trade worth more 
than 2 billion dollars in 1990 (Pycroft 1994, 244). Secondly, despite 
the fact that the regime in Luanda was not recognized by the US, this 
did not prevent close contacts between the State Department and the 
MPLA (Berridge 1989, 470). In fact, Crocker was quite interested to 
have the MPLA at the negotiation table, and for this reason he initially 
even opposed the repeal of the Clark Amendment as he feared that 
this would drive the MPLA away from the talks (Berridge 1989, 470). 
Nevertheless, US unyielding support for UNITA’s cause was a direct 
indication to MPLA that a military victory was quite impossible, and 
that a negotiated settlement should be sought (Pycroft 1994, 245).  
 While acknowledging Cuba’s decision that its forces would have to 
leave Angola, Soviets maintained a firm position that Angola would not 
be “thrown to wolves” (Crocker 1999, 237). Despite these affirmations, 
the Soviet Union still did not propose any viable alternative to the lin-
kage strategy. It was the Cubans who did not participate in the latest 
military debacle that made two crucial choices. First of all, Havana de-
cided to shift the unfavorable balance of power created with the latest 
SADF-UNITA victory over their allies, and sent 15 000 fresh troops 
to Angola’s border with Namibia. It was a clear signal to South Africa 
that celebration time was over, and that a military solution to the con-
flict was far from being attainable for Pretoria (Berridge 1989; Pycroft 
1994).
 Ultimately, the US produced the necessary stick which induced 
South Africa to engage in negotiations. As the Soviet influence in 
Southern Africa was decreasing, the need of having South Africa as 
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an anti-communist ally was put to question. This induced the US to 
gradually start reconsidering its policy of constructive engagement with 
South Africa. Especially problematic were the apartheid policies of the 
Botha administration. In October 1986, the US Congress passed the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which imposed a strict set of eco-
nomic and trade sanctions on South Africa. These policies caused severe 
complications to the South African economy, plunging the country into 
recession (Pycroft 1994, 245). Amounting problems, both on the battle-
field and domestically, induced the officials in Pretoria to find a way to 
“re-establish favorable relations with the international community and 
stave off further sanctions” (idem).  Thus, South Africa started signaling 
readiness to join the negotiations with the US and together with An-
gola started drafting a proposal on the timetable for the withdrawal. In 
other words, Pretoria was looking for an ‘honorable exit’. The situation 
was slowly becoming ripe for resolution: the parties were entering a 
hurting stalemate as it was clear that a military solution to the conflict 
was unattainable to any of the parties, thus they started perceiving a 
‘way out’ through negotiations (Zartman 1989).
 An important impact of the linkage strategy was the gradual exclu-
sion of SWAPO and UNITA from the peace process. The isolation of 
the two movements was not done because of their predisposition to 
spoil the process, but was a calculated decision by Crocker to design a 
proper ‘party arithmetic’ which would include all the parties relevant 
for the achievement of a negotiated settlement, and exclude those who-
se presence could be problematic and disputed. According to Berridge, 
“the South Africans pressed for SWAPO’s exclusion because of their 
hatred of it, and found the United States receptive because this would 
make it easier to reconcile UNITA - which had a vital interest in deve-
lopments in Namibia as well as in Angola - to being excluded as well” 
(Berridge 1989, 472).       
 Having both Cuba and Angola willing to talk to South Africa, the 
US decided to accommodate the Soviets in the peace process, while 
hoping to “neutralize residual obstructionism” and hopefully obtain “va-
luable insights and even help” (Crocker 1999, 237). In present circum-
stances, with the new policy outlook of the Gorbachev administration 
which was voicing out the need for policy solutions and was coupled 
with Moscow’s unwillingness to assume any more military costs in the 
region, the US opted for a careful approach. In April 1988 three in-
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depth US-Soviet consultations were held, and as a final result for the 
first time the Soviet Union decided to publicly support a US led media-
tion process. In return the US bestowed them with an ‘observer’ status 
which was never fully defined. Meetings with the Soviets continued 
throughout the tripartite negotiations mediated by the US. It was tri-
partite (Angola-Cuba-South Africa) because Cuba explicitly asked to 
be included in the talks as a part of the Angola team. As underlined 
by Crocker, US-Soviet meetings soon moved from “debates about the 
shape of an acceptable settlement” to more practical issues of “how the 
two sides might advance those points agreed on and how current ob-
stacles could be handled” (Crocker 1999, 237).
 Full exploratory meetings between three sides and the US started 
in the beginning of May 1988 in London. The first meeting saw an 
immediate Angolan offer for a four-year Cuban withdrawal from An-
gola and a one-year withdrawal of SADF from Namibia. Before the 
troop withdrawal, however, the proposal called for a previous stop to US 
and South African support for UNITA. The South African delegation 
responded with a counterproposal asking for a Cuban withdrawal befo-
re Namibian independence and at the same time reconciliation between 
MPLA and UNITA (Zartman 1989, 230). Fortunately parties agreed 
to evaluate each others’ proposals so they decided to meet again in Cairo 
at the end of June 1988. In the meantime, a series of US-Soviet consul-
tations intensified, bearing more fruits then ever before. During their 
meetings both sides explored the options of strengthening cooperation 
of the three parties in the peace process. According to the Soviet sour-
ces, the US guaranteed South African implementation of Resolution 
435 if in return the Cubans withdrew their forces from Angola within 
three years. During a Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Moscow in May, 
the two sides agreed to deliver a peace settlement within four months – 
in order to celebrate it at the tenth anniversary of Resolution 435. The 
two global powers, each backing a particular side in the conflict, had 
achieved necessary convergence of interests which allowed for a coordi-
nated mediation process to take place (Zartman 1999, 230), providing 
support for what was previously hypothesized in H1 and H11c.  
 This coordination was best demonstrated during the talks in Cairo, 
which almost broke down due to an unexpected Cuban and Angolan 
‘ideological tirade’ regarding apartheid policies of South Africa. The So-
viet delegation immediately exercised necessary pressure on its allies 
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and brought them back to the point of negotiation (Zartman 1989, 
231). Thanks to this unprecedented move by the Soviets, the next talks 
in New York saw all the parties work on the actual text of the settle-
ment. The three sides started increasing levels of cooperation, and opted 
to neglect the timetable of withdrawal in favor of “indispensable prin-
ciples” for the final settlement. These included: “aspects of cooperation 
(aid) for development, right to peace, right to self-determination, non-
aggression, non-interference, non-use of force, and respect for territorial 
integrity and inviolability of frontiers, as well as recognition of roles – 
the United States as mediator and permanent members of the Security 
Council as guarantors” (Zartman 1989, 231). The principles were later 
ratified by all three sides and by SWAPO. After this, negotiations focu-
sed on developing details about the timetable for the withdrawal. 
 Also as a sign of willingness to elevate cooperation to the highest 
level, US officials continuously briefed Soviet colleagues about the 
“mediator’s priorities and game plans” (Crocker 1999, 238). The US ho-
ped that by providing essential information, Soviets would play their 
part and induce Angola and Cuba to reach an agreement with South 
Africa about the timetable. At the same time Moscow also intensifi-
ed communication with South Africa, and contributed to the overall 
super-power encouragement for authorities in Pretoria. Ultimately, 
through their consultations, US representatives convinced the Soviets 
to terminate their requests for a suspension of US support on UNITA, 
and encouraged them to put pressure on Angola for achieving national 
reconciliation with UNITA. This closed the circle, as all the issues were 
covered by the peace process. Shortly after, following a very painsta-
king negotiation on the details of withdrawal, on 22 December 22 1988 
Cuba, Angola and South Africa signed a peace agreement at the UN 
headquarters in New York.
 Just as in the case of Tajikistan, the US and USSR acted as biased 
mediators in the sense of the game theoretical model presented earlier. 
The case shows sufficient support for hypotheses H3 and H4, indica-
ting that when the mediators manage to achieve convergence of policy 
objectives among them, there are bigger chances that the peace process 
will be successful. In other words, as long as the US and the Soviet 
Union were unable to achieve convergence of interests in managing the 
conflict, any attempt at finding a peaceful solution was unsuccessful as 
a mediator’s defection was perceived as a sufficient reason for the con-
Siniša Vuković
126
flicting parties not to commit to the peace process. At the same time, as 
was hypothesized earlier (H1), biased mediators are useful of the effec-
tiveness to the process, as long as they maintain cooperative behavior 
with other mediators,  as they can use their special relationship with one 
conflicting side to influence its behavior, positions and perceptions and 
consequently move it toward an agreement. However, the process also 
witnessed a considerably different dynamic of multiparty mediation 
from the one that took place in Tajikistan. The crucial difference betwe-
en the two cases concerns the leadership role of coordinating mediation 
activities. While in Tajikistan this role was filled by the Special Envoys 
of the UN, in the case of Namibia, the leadership role was assumed by 
the US. 
 Although the US as a powerful state had a clear set of interests to 
promote in the conflict, and undeniably a biased attitude toward parti-
cular conflicting sides (UNITA and South Africa, as it will be explained 
later), it managed to be an effective coordinator for two reasons. First of 
all, over time its mediation activities were recognized as ‘indispensible’ 
even by the disputants with whom it had no special relations (MPLA 
and Cuba). This generated the necessary level of legitimacy to prescribe 
behavior, as was hypothesized by H10. In fact this status was publicly 
and explicitly accepted by all the parties in conflict, which considered 
the US-led mediation to be one of the 14 principles that were crucial 
to a peaceful settlement of their conflict (Berridge 1989, 469). At the 
same time, as hypothesized in H11c, it acquired the necessary degree 
of consent and convergence of interests with the USSR (which was the 
key patron state of both the Angolan MPLA and Cuba). This (causal 
link) permitted for the coordination to be effective even though it was 
conduced by a biased powerful state.
 The convergence of interests was induced by a larger geo-political 
shift that occurred once (the new) leadership in the Soviet Union rea-
lized that past geo-political preferences were not generating sufficient 
returns in the conflict: the conflict was too costly and the parties were 
not gaining any results from the mediation process. Such a change in 
perceptions was further strengthened by the reached stalemate betwe-
en Cuban and South African forces, and their partners in Angola and 
Namibia. It was an unequivocal indication that a military victory in the 
conflict is unfeasible and that the present non-cooperative strategy in 
the peace process was not producing any substantial results that wo-
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uld outweigh the military stalemate. Such dynamics provide sufficient 
support for causal links that were hypothesized in H5, H6 and H7.

caMbodia
CHAPTER 
VI 
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CHAPTER VI: Cambodia
 Civil war in Cambodia saw involved four different Khmer factions 
and each one had an outside sponsor state (Solomon 1999). Despite its 
reputation from the war in Vietnam and the bipolar constraints of the 
Cold War, the US was seen as the most ‘neutral’ member of the Security 
Council, “with the political influence and resources to help structure 
the settlement” (Solomon 2000, 4). At the moment the US-led peace 
talks took place in the last months of 1989, the government in Phnom 
Penh was headed by Hun Sen, whose faction assumed power thanks 
to a Vietnamese military incursion into Cambodia in December 1978 
which overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime (Hampson and Zartman 
2012, 4). The pro-Vietnamese government, named People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK), was backed only by the USSR and its allies and 
did not enjoy support of the West. Also, it was certainly not in good 
relations with the authorities in Beijing. China was concerned with Vi-
etnamese expansionist policies interpreting them as Soviet efforts to 
contain Chinese influence in South-East Asia. Once dethroned, Khmer 
Rouge fled to the jungles along the border with Thailand and thanks to 
the Chinese support, started an insurgency campaign against Vietnam’s 
client regime (Solomon 1999, 284). 
 Given its experience with Vietnam, and the positioning of the So-
viet Union in the matter, the United States chose China for a partner. 
It was clear to the US that China was interested to improve its inter-
national reputation after the June 1989 events on Tiananmen Square, 
and thus be more willing to cooperate with the US even at a cost of 
distancing themselves from the Khmer Rouge (Hampson and Zartman 
2012, 6). The two sides managed to reach initial convergence of interests 
in supporting a future coalition government led by Prince Sihanouk, 
who governed the Cambodia in its first decade as an independent state, 
only to be toppled by Khmer Rouge forces in 1963. Ironically, Chinese 
acceptance of Sihanouk was coupled with a request to allow for Khmer 
Rouge to be included in the future power-sharing arrangement. The 
US did not object to this, as it wanted to keep Khmer Rouge engaged 
in the peace process, fearing that otherwise they might act as spoilers. 
At the same time, the US was confident that if Khmer Rouge accepted 
to participate in the future political life of Cambodia, its unpopularity 
with local people would certainly not allow them to gain power through 
elections.
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6.1 Nature of the conflict
6.1.1 Sources of Intractability
 During the French colonial rule, Cambodia was a relatively peaceful 
area. The majority of its population was ethnic Khmers, with Buddhism 
as the most dominant religion. At the same time almost a fifth of the 
country’s inhabitants were ethnic and religious minorities. Interestingly, 
these minorities also had a distinct work related role in the society. As 
Kiernan points out, “Vietnamese, Chinese, and Muslim Chams worked 
mostly in rubber plantations or as clerks, shopkeepers, and fisherfolk, 
while a score of small ethnolingusitc groups, such as the Jarai, Tampu-
an, and Kreung, populated the upland northeast” (Kiernan 2002, 483). 
After World War II, the colonial rule was gradually challenged and 
resisted by organized independence movements of Vietnamese (Viet 
Minh) and nationalist Khmer Issarak (independence) forces. Over time 
the lengthy anti-colonial struggle produced a Vietnamese-sponsored 
Cambodian communist movement, the Khmer People’s Revolutionary 
Party (KPRP), which received an “increasing though not unchallenged” 
support from the Issarak nationalists (Kiernan 1985; Kiernan 2002). 
As the KPPR slowly gained leadership over the Issarak membership, 
several anti-communist movements started emerging. By 1952 these 
anti-KPRP movements started campaigns of massacres targeting ethnic 
Vietnamese and Cham populations (Kiernan 1985).  
 Cambodia became independent in 1953, as a result of the French 
defeat in the First Indochina War. King Norodom Sihanouk, who 
according to Hampson and Zartman (2012) was a mercurial figure, 
immediately assumed a foreign policy of neutrality. This was a carefully 
calculated decision in the midst of the Cold War dynamics. As Kiernan 
points out, on the one side he tried to accommodate the communist 
forces and acknowledge their role in Cambodia’s struggle for indepen-
dence, while at the same time fearful of their potential disruptive beha-
vior if the country was to assume a more pro-western stand (Kiernan 
2002, 484). The policy of neutrality was also aimed at keeping a peaceful 
relationship with the neighboring Vietnam.  
 In the first decade of independent Cambodia, Sihanouk’s policies of 
neutrality managed to appease both the moderate nationalist and vete-
ran communists, transforming the country into a one-party kingdom 
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(Kiernan 2002, 484). Dissatisfied forces - both from the left and from 
the right - either found exile in Vietnam or headed for the hills deep in 
the country-side waiting for an opportune moment to return. Veteran 
leaders of the demobilized KPRP - who generally came from a rural, 
Buddhist and pro-Vietnamese background - were gradually replaced 
by a group of younger, urban, Paris-trained, anti-Vietnamese militants 
headed by Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary and Son Sen. According to Kiernan’s 
accounts, “from the jungles of remote northeast, the new party lea-
dership planned an armed rebellion against Sihanouk’s regime, ignoring 
his independent nationalism and labeling him a U.S. puppet” (Kiernan 
2002, 484). Fearful for its survival, Sihanouk’s regime started employing 
harsh policies against all leftist forces pushing the moderate communist 
veterans to join the new young leaders of KPRP.
6.1.2 Development of Deep Feelings of Distrust  
and Employment of Repressive Measures
 However, the biggest threat for Cambodia’s stability in the mid 
1960s came with the intensification of the US campaign in Vietnam. 
The border between the two countries was over flooded by Khmer and 
Vietnamese-communist refugees escaping Saigon’s and US’ advance-
ment. By 1967 the communist forces - now renamed Communist Party 
of Kampuchea (CPK) - under Saloth Sar’s leadership started a small 
scale insurgency which provoked a disproportionate reaction of the 
government. The Cambodia countryside was dragged into a civil war. 
Unable to cope with the challenges provoked by the war in Vietnam 
and CPK’s rebellion, on 18 March 1970 Sihanouk’s government was 
toppled in a military coup led by General Lon Nol.
 Finding refuge in Beijing, Sihanouk found allies in the CPK and its 
leader Saloth Sar who started using his name ‘code name’ Pol Pot - or 
Brother Number One (Kiernan 2002, 485). The country was immedia-
tely renamed into the Khmer Republic, and Lon Nol became its first 
President. Under his directive, the army started a campaign of massa-
cres of ethnic Vietnamese, forcing around 300,000 to flea across border 
to Vietnam. According to Kiernan, this set a precedent for intensified 
“ethnic cleansing” by the Khmer Rouge - a colloquial term used for the 
CPK (Kiernan 2002, 485).
 In fact, although assisted by the Vietnamese army as a reaction to 
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the US’ support for the Republican forces in their anti-communist 
campaign when the Vietnamese conflict spilled over to Cambodia, “the 
Khmer Rouge central leadership attacked its Vietnamese allies as early 
as 1970, killed a thousand Khmer communist returnees from Hanoi, 
and in 1973-74, stepped up violence against ethnic Vietnamese civili-
ans, purged and killed ethnic Thai and other minority members of CPK 
regional committees, banned an allied group of ethnic Cham Muslim 
revolutionaries, and instigated severe repression of Muslim communi-
ties” (Kiernan 2002, 485). In the meantime Lon Nol’s government was 
loosing credibility and support, as its policies were tainted with nume-
rous cases of corruption and a repressive military regime. Continuous 
fighting with the communist culminated in 1975, when the Khmer Ro-
uge forces seized the capital Phnom Phen - one of the bastions of Lon 
Nol’s power - deported its two million residents to the country side 
and established a new state of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) (Kiernan 
2002, 485). 
 The new regime immediately started applying severe policies of 
mass deportations of people from urban areas into agricultural labor 
camps in the northwester part of the country, eventually doubling the 
population of that area. Unbearable living conditions caused the death 
of tens of thousands of people. At the same time the Khmer Rouge 
started purging the former Khmer Republic officials, army officers, civil 
servants, and even the peasants from the northwest who were related 
to the officials from the former regime. By 1979, more than a million 
people had died due to starvation, poor living conditions and extreme 
repression (Gordon 1986). Under attack were also numerous minorities. 
Between 1975 and 1979 more than a half of the ethnic Chinese popula-
tion - around 250,000 people - had perished, more than 100,000 Cham 
Muslims were killed or starved to death, and more than 10.000 Vietna-
mese were killed and the remaining 100,000 Vietnamese expelled from 
the country (Kiernan 1985).
 The Khmer Rouge also conducted sporadic incursions into the Vi-
etnamese territory. The cross-border attacks motivated Vietnam to in-
tervene, invading Cambodia on 25 December, 1978 and taking over 
Phnom Penh on 9 January, 1979 (Gordon 1986). Officials and forces 
loyal to the Khmer Rouge once again fled to the mountains, leaving 
the country in the hands of Heng Samrin and his rebels supported by 
150,000 Vietnamese troops. The country was again renamed, this time 
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to the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Finding refuge in the 
sanctuaries mostly along the country’s northern and western borders 
with Thailand, for more than a decade the Khmer Rouge continued to 
challenge the new government and the Vietnamese military (Gordon 
1986, 66).  
6.1.3 Internal Characteristics of the Conflicting Sides  
and Creation of Irreconcilable Positions
 The new governing elite consisted primarily of former Khmer Ro-
uge officials - such as Hun Sen and Chea Sim - that defected to Viet-
nam in 1978 (Berquist 1998, 93). Their policies largely avoided “to stress 
Cambodian grandeur at the expense of Vietnamese intentions and took 
a more realistic view of power relations between the two states” (Ashley 
1998, 17). Due to its dependency on Vietnamese support, throughout 
the 1980s Cambodia remained quite isolated from the international 
community. 
 In fact, while ejected from power, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge 
managed to maintain a strong international backing from China and 
the US. By 1982 together with the royalist National United Front for 
an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUN-
CINPEC) led by the exiled Prince Sihanounk, who had a strong bac-
king of both China and the US, and a non-communist movement the 
Khmer People’s National Liberation Front led by Son Sann, the Khmer 
Rouge successfully formed an exiled Coalition Government of De-
mocratic Kampuchea (CGDK) (Solomon 2000, 15; Ashley 17). They 
were joined by a shared hatred toward Vietnam and dependence on 
foreign support. 
       
6.2 Involvement of International Actors    
 and Their Interests in the Conflict
 The irreconcilable positions of various Cambodian actors cannot be 
properly understood without a careful assessment of diverging interests 
and standpoints of major international and regional powers. In fact, the 
years that followed actually saw a conflict on three levels which not only 
included the overthrown Khmer Rouge and the new Heng Samrin re-
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gime, but also Vietnam, China, the USSR, the US and their numerous 
allies. Solomon pointed out that already in 1970s “Indochina became 
a cockpit of the global rivalry between the Soviet Union and China 
that developed after the breakdown of their alliance in 1960” (Solo-
mon 2000, 10). Thus the first two levels of conflict are what Gordon 
refers to as ‘East-East’ struggle, as they personalized a clash within the 
communist ideological camp. On the one side there was the obvious 
struggle between two communist groups in Cambodia - the Khmer 
Rouge and Heng Samrin’s PRK. This struggle had a second, more regi-
onal level, which saw the conflict between China and Vietnam - again 
two members of the communist block. According to Gordon, already 
in February 1979, as “punishment” for Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia, 
China launched a brief attack on several northern provinces of Vietnam 
(Gordon 1986, 66). The tension between two regional powers increased 
over time, resulting in Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s public threat of 
a second invasion of Vietnam unless Hanoi withdraws its forces from 
Cambodia (Gordon 1986, 67; Solomon 2002, 11). 
 China and Vietnam have had a long lasting rivalry in the region. As 
Gordon points out, this has always been an uneasy relationship, as “the 
Vietnamese have never doubted that the long-term challenge to the-
ir independence emanates from Beijing, and the Chinese have always 
regarded Vietnam and Indochina as their nation’s ‘soft underbelly’” 
(Gordon 1986, 67). The name Vietnam comes from the Chinese term 
‘An nam’ which means ‘Pacified South’ (Gordon 1986, 68). Vietnam’s 
regional expansionist ambition to unify all of Indochina was strongly 
opposed by China. Beijing perceived this scenario to be a direct threat 
to its national stability - in fact, almost all the French colonial advance-
ments toward China throughout centuries have been conducted from 
the south. Therefore, in 1954 during the Geneva conference, which was 
convened as the French were defeated by Viet Minh, the Chinese ‘consi-
stently opposed’ a unified Indochina and instead “strongly endorsed the 
concept of separate Indochinese states” (Gordon 1986, 67). During the 
conference China’s position was well in line with the positions of other 
major powers: for the French tried to preserve as much influence as 
possible, thus conceding to an independent Vietnam only the northern 
territories; the US followed its French allies; and so did the Soviet Uni-
on hoping to gain French support on banning a German rearmament in 
Europe. Facing pressure from all sides Vietnam accepted the creation of 
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Cambodia and Laos. As Gordon points out, “Prince Sihanouk knew at 
that time, the legitimacy given to Cambodia’s independence at Geneva 
(as well as that accorded Laos) owed much to China’s support” (Gordon 
1986, 68).
 Hoping to establish a strong and lasting influence in Cambodia, 
Vietnam trained and supported a vast number of high ranking mem-
bers of the Khmer Rouge during their unrest against the republican 
regime. However, as soon as he got to power, Pol Pot, quite suspicious 
of Vietnam’s plans, commanded a series of purges to be executed with 
the aim of ousting the ‘Hanoi Khmers’, and on several occasions tried 
to alter the border with Vietnam. More importantly, “he had Chinese 
support from the outset” (Gordon 1986, 69). These provocations even-
tually resulted in a Vietnamese intervention which put an end to the 
Khmer Rouge regime. 
 In its regional power-struggle with China, as a result of the 1960 
Sino-Soviet, Vietnam managed to find a strong ally in the Soviet Uni-
on. Moscow has been Hanoi’s strongest ally since the war with the US. 
Thanks to the Soviet financial assistance - which amounted to about 2 
billion dollar per year - Vietnam was able to keep its economy afloat and 
sustain the Cambodian occupation. In return the Soviets could use the 
strategically highly important Vietnamese naval and air bases in Cam 
Ranh Bay and Da Nang (Gordon 1986, 67). The tensions between two 
communist super-powers lasted until the end of the 1980s. As recor-
ded by Solomon, “as late as 1989, Deng Xiaoping told President Bush 
that Moscow’s relationship with Vietnam and Cambodia were a threat 
to China because they represented a continuation of Soviet efforts to 
‘encircle’ his country going back to the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras” 
(Solomon 2002, 11, fn 4). 
 In order to counter the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, China 
openly supported the Khmer Rouge. In 1984, Xiaoping stated “I do not 
understand why some people want to remove Pol Pot… it is true that he 
made some mistakes in the past but now he is leading the fight against 
the Vietnamese aggressors” (cited in Kiernan 2002, 488). Throughout 
the 1980s, on a yearly base, China supplied the Khmer Rouge with 100 
million dollars in weapons (Kiernan 2002, 488).  
 The US involvement in Indochina during the Sino-Soviet alliance 
in the 1950s was aimed at containing the spread of influence of commu-
nism. In the 1960s this policy resulted in a lengthy, costly and most 
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importantly unsuccessful attempt to hamper revolutionary nationali-
sm under the communist banner in Vietnam and Cambodia. Between 
1969 and 1973 the US extensively bombed Cambodia, hoping to cut off 
the North Vietnamese supply routes and contain the expansion of the 
Khmer communist forces (Bergquist 1998, 100). The US also provided 
‘active support’ to Lon Nol in overthrowing Sihanouk, whose foreign 
policy of neutrality the US perceived as “insufficiently supportive of US 
interests” (Berquist 1998, 100). However, after the Sino-Soviet split, in 
1972 Washington found “a common cause with China in shared oppo-
sition to the expansionist Soviet Union and its allies” (Solomon 2002, 
12). In 1975, during a visit to Indonesia, President Ford announced that 
“despite the severe setback of Vietnam… the United States intends to 
continue a strong interest in and influence in the Pacific, South East 
Asia and Asia. As a whole we hope to expand this influence” (cited in 
Kernan 2002, 487). This claim was not aimed at China, because during 
the same visit Kissinger added, “we believe that China does not have 
expansionist aims now… Their first concern is the Soviet Union and 
their second Vietnam… the Chinese want to use Cambodia to balance 
off Vietnam… we don’t like Cambodia, for the government in many 
ways is worse than Vietnam, but we would like it to be independent. 
We don’t discourage Thailand and China from drawing closer to Cam-
bodia” (cited in Kiernan 2002, 487). The US ‘winked semipublicly’ (to 
use Brezinski’s term) at the Chinese to aid the Khmer Rouge. In 1979 
Kissinger revealed, “I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. Pol 
Pot was an abomination. We could never support him, but China could” 
(cited in Kiernan 2002, 487).   
 According to Kiernan, it was for “geopolitical reasons, while the 
Cambodian genocide progressed, [that] Washington, Beijing and Ban-
gkok all supported the continued independent existence of the Khmer 
Rouge regime” (Kiernan 2002, 487). This common cause with China 
induced the US to promote the policies which internationally isola-
ted the PRK after the overthrow of Pol Pot in 1979. They held on to 
Cambodia’s seat in the UN, assigning it to the Coalition Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea - thus absolving the Khmer Rouge for their 
genocidal regime (Ashley 1998, 17; Kiernan 2002, 488). Throughout the 
1980s the US strongly opposed any effort to investigate the Khmer Ro-
uge for their genocidal regime. The US Secretary of State Schultz even 
called “stupid” the Australian initiative for a dialogue over Cambodia, 
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and declined to support Australian Foreign Minister Hayden’s proposal 
for an international tribunal (Kiernan 2002, 489). He even stressed his 
opposition of conducting peace talks which would include Vietnam, 
warning the neighboring states “to be extremely cautious in formulating 
peace proposals for Kampuchea because Vietnam might one day accept 
them” (cited in Kiernan 2002, 489). Even the new administration, under 
President Bush, had no problems with the Khmer Rouge, and actually 
proposed that they get included in the future government of Cambodia 
(Kiernan 2002, 489). Together with China, the US sponsored the two 
smaller anti-Vietnamese Khmer resistance movements led by Prince 
Sihanouk and Son Sann. At the same time, it did not object Beijing’s 
support of the Khmer Rouge, as both countries were “determined to 
prevent Hanoi from consolidating its client government in Phnom 
Penh led by a former Khmer Rouge commander Hun Sen” (Solomon 
2012, 12).
 The combination of such different positions resulted in a clear sta-
lemate. On the one side China, supported by the US, insisted that Vi-
etnam immediately had to evacuate from Cambodia, on the other Vi-
etnam, supported by the Soviet Union, asked for clear guarantees that 
Khmer Rouge play no role in the future governmental arrangements 
and that China abandons the policy of threats toward Hanoi. As noted 
by Gordon, “the involvement of the outside major powers, introduces 
to the Indochina conflict the classic formula for explosive international 
politics, in which external states often have a greater impact on deve-
lopments than those directly involved” (Gordon 1986, 67). It was clear 
that the powerful outside power had both the leverage to guide the 
belligerents towards a mutually acceptable solution (as was hypothesi-
zed in H1) and a strong interest to achieve an outcome compatible with 
their strategic goals (as was hypothesized in H9). 
6.3 Multiparty Mediation Process
6.3.1 Initial Lack of Cooperation Between Third Parties
  
 Early contacts between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen took place 
already in December1987. They met in Paris to discuss the possibility 
of formulating a power-sharing arrangement between the two non-
communist movements and the Hun Sen regime. Although this had 
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a potential of ending the war, it was rejected by the US and China “on 
the ground that it excluded the Khmer Rouge and legitimized Viet-
namese-backed regime already in power” (Chandler 1998, 19). It was 
obvious that any solution to the conflict would have to include all four 
Khmer factions. More importantly, any future negotiations had to tackle 
a number of questions that had to be compatible with major powers’ 
interests. These issues were: the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops 
from Cambodia, demobilization of paramilitary forces, establishment 
of measures that would prevent potential retaliatory activities, and a 
formula for organizing the elections which would produce a legitimate 
and internationally recognized government (Chandler 1998, 19).   
 The importance of powerful outside actors was immediately evident 
during the first regional forum on Cambodia held in Jakarta in 1988. 
The meeting was attended by all Southeast Asian states, and only mana-
ged to produce the necessary guidelines for any future settlement (Rat-
ner 1993, 5). The new talks were scheduled to take place in Paris, in a 
year, but this time with a direct involvement of major powers. As Meijer 
points out, from the beginning, the Paris agreements were worked out 
by foreign powers who exercised tight control over the factions and the 
form the final settlement would take (Chandler 1998, 19). 
 As previously explained, the US and China had a shared goal in 
opposing Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, while at the same time 
openly supporting different anti-Vietnamese factions in the country. 
The new Bush administration knew that an open support for the Khmer 
Rouge was a liability, so in an attempt to block the recognition of the 
Vietnamese installed government of Hun Sen, the US adopted a po-
licy of supporting the Coalition Government (Sihanouk - Son Sann 
- Khmer Rouge) as the legitimate incumbent government in Cambodia 
(Solomon 2000, 20). As noted by Solomon, who was Assistant Secre-
tary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and was to be appointed 
as an US envoy in the peace process, “the evolution of great power coo-
peration on a Cambodia settlement was complicated in early June 1989 
by the violent events at Tiananmen Square… overnight our official con-
tacts with China became a domestic political liability” (Solomon 2000, 
20). These events sparked a vast amount of criticism of the Chinese 
government. In the days that followed, in an attempt to improve their 
international reputation, the Chinese became extremely sensitive about 
their continuing support for the Khmer Rouge. As Solomon points out, 
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“the criticism increased Beijing’s interest in a political settlement of the 
Cambodia conflict in a way that would distance China from Pol Pot 
and his movement. Nonetheless, China’s strategic objective remained 
consonant with that of the United States: to prevent Vietnam from 
establishing hegemony over all of Indochina” (Solomon 2000, 20-21). 
The looming convergence of interests between the US and China was 
pushing the mediation process to a direction which was unacceptable 
for Vietnam and its partners in Phnom Penh. Reflecting on the game 
theoretical model the peace process was at point b. Cooperative behavior 
- as illustrated in the model - was producing much higher payoffs to the 
Chinese, as all of their priorities and interests were promoted through 
the process. 
 The Paris Peace Conference was held in August 1989, and was 
attended by 18 countries and four Cambodian factions (Chandler 1998, 
19). According to Solomon, the US “was not inclined to take the lead 
on Indochina issues”, it was rather inclined to support the French and 
Indonesians (that organized the conference) in their preparations (So-
lomon 2000, 21). For the Paris conference the US had a list of five goals 
that had to be included in the peace settlement: “an immediate ceasefire 
and the eventual termination of all foreign military assistance to the 
Khmer factions; the formation of an interim administration headed by 
Prince Sihanouk; the establishment of a process that would culminate 
in the internationally supervised election of a new constitutional go-
vernment the voluntary return of the large Khmer refugee population 
in Thailand; and the creation of an international control mechanism to 
implement a settlement process monitored by the UN” (Solomon 2000, 
24).
 The Vietnamese were aiming at a much different solution. Solomon 
refers to this position as “a partial solution” to the Cambodian Con-
flict. The Vietnamese wanted “to limit the international involvement in 
a settlement to verification of the withdrawal of their troops, perhaps 
some oversight of an election, but no arrangement that would weaken 
the authority of their client regime” (Solomon 2000. 24).
 The US and China proposed a ‘quadripartite’ government, which 
unequivocally meant a transfer of a quarter of Hun Sen’s power to the 
Khmer Rouge. Vietnam expressed its strong opposition to the inclusion 
of Khmer Rouge not only in the future governmental arrangement, but 
in the peace process itself. They were concerned that in case the Khmer 
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Rouge would get a role in the future power-sharing arrangement this 
could create a possibility for them to return to power and subsequently 
retaliate. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, stuck to the 
idea that “only Hun Sen government, intact had the power to prevent 
the dreaded Khmer Rouge from fighting their way back to power” 
(Solomon 2000. 25). In other words, Vietnam was quite opposed to 
the ‘quadripartite government’. Solomon points out that this position 
had “little resonance among the conference participants, who generally 
supported the view that the best way to constrain the Khmer Rouge was 
to give them some stake in a political process subject to international 
supervision” (Solomon 2000, 25). As Vietnam was not showing signs of 
cooperation, Hun Sen’s delegation continued requesting that the poten-
tial Vietnamese withdrawal be “linked to the guarantees of a non-return 
to power of the Khmer Rouge” (Chandler 1998, 19). As Chandler po-
ints out, “this was simply interpreted as political maneuvering on the 
part of the SoC [abbreviation for State of Cambodia] to stall the peace 
process” (Chandler 1998, 19). 
 According to Bert, China was not enthusiastic about the return to 
power of the Khmer Rouge however it used them as a bargaining chip, 
recognizing that “the Khmer Rouge was the only force in Cambodia 
capable of standing up to the government militarily, and it used the KR 
to achieve its objectives, either encouraging them with arms support or 
pressuring them to participate in negotiations” (Bert 1993, 329). Thus 
the main Chinese strategic interest was to have Cambodia free of Vi-
etnamese influence, which was quite in line with US interests and tho-
se of the ASEAN countries (Bert 1993, 330).  As noted by Kiernan, 
“China’s involvement brought Khmer Rouge protégés to center stage” 
(Kiernan 2002, 489). It was obvious that any agreement would require 
unanimity. With a veto power in their hands, the Khmer Rouge could 
both obstruct any compromise, and while stalling the negotiation, rearm 
and improve their military power. Kiernan shows Pol Pot’s briefings to 
his generals, where he indicated his intention to delay elections (which 
were one of the issues that were discussed in Paris) until his forces con-
trolled the countryside: “the outside world keeps demanding a political 
end to the war in Kampuchea, I could end the war now if I wanted, be-
cause the outside world is waiting for me. But I am buying time to give 
you, comrades, the opportunity to carry out all the tasks. If it doesn’t 
end politically and ends militarily, that is good” (cited in Kiernan 2002, 
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489). Thus during the Paris talks, representatives of the Khmer Rouge 
insisted that their rule was not characterized by genocide, and indicated 
their support for a coalition government under Sihanouk as the only 
way for Cambodia to regain its sovereignty lost in a Vietnamese “colo-
nial” rule through Hun Sen (Hampson and Zartman 2012, 6). Althou-
gh, Vietnam was experiencing noticeable pressure, it still did not percei-
ve any utility in accepting the terms proposed by the US and China. At 
the same time, the uncompromising position of China led the Khmer 
Rouge to assume also an uncompromising position. The unyielding po-
sitions between main sponsor states led the peace conference into fa-
ilure as each of their client movements was unwilling to compromise. 
Such dynamics are in line with what was previously hypothesized in 
H4 - namely that in case mediators are unable to reach convergence of 
interests, the conflicting sides will be induced to defect from negotiati-
ons, making it more likely for the peace process to fail. In fact, in light 
of the imminent failure of the peace talks “on the ground in Cambo-
dia, the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front 
(KPNLF), and Hun Sen’s State of Cambodia were launching new tests 
of military strength” (Solomon 2000, 31). Especially symptomatic was 
the lack of Vietnam’s convergence of interests with the rest of the me-
diating coalition - especially the US and China - which was driving the 
process into a deadlock (Solomon 2000, 84), as hypothesized in H2. At 
the same time, the Vietnamese unyielding position was creating lower 
payoffs for the Hun Sen government, as they were experiencing stron-
ger pressure from the rest of the conference to accept the ‘quadripartite 
government’, which induced them to defect from the process, end soon 
after engage in belligerent activities against other Khmer factions, as 
hypothesized in H4.  
 However, a significant change took place when Moscow “delivered 
a secret warning to the Vietnamese that it would no longer subsidi-
ze Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia and its tug-of-war with China” 
(Hampson and Zartman 2012, 5). Soon after that, Vietnam announ-
ced that it would withdraw its troops from Cambodia. This significant 
change in conflict dynamics was strongly related to an earlier larger 
geo-political shift in Moscow’s foreign policy that saw the advent of 
Gorbachev to power. Similar to the previously described case of Nami-
bia, the new Gorbachev doctrine saw the developments in Southeast 
Asia as a chance in strengthening relations with China. 
Analysis of Multiparty Mediation Processes / Doctoral Dissertation
143
 During a speech in Vladivostok in 1986, primarily aimed at the 
Chinese audience, Gorbachev pointed out that the Soviet Union should 
abandon the policy objective of being as strong as any possible coalition 
of states opposing it. It was an indication that the Soviet Union eco-
nomically could not sustain the strategy of maintaining parity with the 
US, Europe, China and Japan combined (Nguyen 1993, 285). Thus he 
suggested a pact between two continental powers, united by their real 
or imagined grievances against the West, which Nguyen calls “Eastern 
Rapallo” (Nguyen 1993, 286). Gorbachev emphasized that both coun-
tries had similar priorities in improving their domestic economies and 
thus it would be of mutual benefit to mend their differences and engage 
in constructive economic relations (Shearman 1987, 1101). Knowing 
that the Soviet support of Vietnam had been perceived as a direct threat 
to Chinese interests, already in 1985 Gorbachev informed the General 
Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Le Duan that Moscow 
wished to see an improvement in Vietnam’s relations with China. Two 
years later, Duan’s replacement, Nguyen Van Linh, was informed that 
Moscow believed a solution to the Cambodian question rested in “nati-
onal reconciliation and unification of all patriotic forces in Kampuchea” 
(Shearman 1987, 1101). Although important and novel, these early 
changes in Soviet positions did not generate sufficient pressure which 
in turn would provoke a change in Vietnam’s position. Nevertheless, 
Vietnam was slowly feeling isolated from the international community. 
The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops - promised to the Soviet Union 
- only aggravated the conflict between the government and insurgent 
forces. The resistance forces slowly gained ground from Hun Sen’s tro-
ops, putting significant pressure on the Vietnamese and Hun Sen to 
explore possibilities of a peaceful settlement. Vietnam announced its 
plans to withdraw troops from Cambodia already in April 1989. Howe-
ver the withdrawal was conducted in stages, as the last troops left the 
country only after the first Paris talks, in September 1989 (Ratner 1993, 
5). However, in light of a waning Soviet willingness to support the Vi-
etnamese policies in the region, and the high costs that the occupation 
was producing, the withdrawal paved the way for more substantial talks 
(Bert 1993). Such developments might provide important evidence 
in support of what was previously hypothesized in H6, as an increase 
in costs supporting the war might induce the defecting third-party to 
change its strategy and engage in a cooperative mediation effort to ma-
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nage the conflict. This will be further analyzed in the rest of the case.  
6.3.2 Convergence of Interests Between Third Parties
 The United States became aware that a good way to detach vario-
us Khmer factions from their outside sources of dependence was by 
transferring the problem to an in-tune Security Council P-5 that could 
induce the warring parties to compromise. Solomon points out that “the 
Paris Conference had had an ambiguous outcome regarding a role for 
the United Nations in a peace process, some proposed it, a few opposed 
it” (Solomon 2000, 34). According to Hampson and Zartman (2012) 
the US had two reasons for transferring the problem to the UN. First 
of all, in case the peace process succeeded the US wanted to avoid being 
the sole responsible of Cambodia’s post-conflict reconstruction, so it 
wanted to see the financial burden shared with other countries. More 
importantly, “the only way to wean the various Cambodian fractions 
from their regional and great power backers was through a concerted 
P5 team-based effort that would, in effect, force Cambodia’s factions to 
compromise and make concessions at the negotiating table” (Hampson 
and Zartman 2012, 6). The strongest opponents to this US position 
were Vietnam and the Hun Sen regime. In their eyes, a strong invol-
vement of the UN would undermine Cambodian sovereignty. The only 
way to prevent the Khmer Rouge from retaliating, they argued, was to 
preserve the integrity and military capabilities of the current Hun Sen 
government.  
 The US initiated creating momentum among the five permanent 
members of the Security Council (P-5), and a framework for the future 
UN involvement in Cambodia was emerging. From January until Au-
gust 1990, the P-5 held six rounds of talks. During the first session that 
took place in Paris, all participants unanimously accepted the US draft 
which indicated a need for an enhanced UN involvement, especially 
regarding the verification of the withdrawal of Vietnam’s forces, mo-
nitoring of the elections, assistance in the protection of human rights 
and a smooth repatriation of refugees (Solomon 2000, 40).   However, 
this early convergence of interest also pointed out major obstacles for 
achieving a settlement. Among the most complex ones were the issues 
of security, in light of continuous fighting between various Khmer facti-
ons; transitional government until the elections could be organized; and 
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Cambodian sovereignty. 
 On the issue of security, the P-5 concurred “to stabilize a cease-fire, 
contending military factions should be put under the UN control in 
cantonments where they would be disarmed and eventually reorganized 
into a national army under the authority of the Cambodian government 
that would emerge from the elections” (Solomon 2000, 42). The pro-
blem of a provisional administration for the country was solved with the 
establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC). On this matter 
the Chinese insisted that they would not support any settlement which 
would not prescribe an active role for the Khmer Rouge. The US was 
quite apprehensive of the future role of the Khmer Rouge - especially in 
light of an increasing public outrage of the US’s indirect support for the 
Khmer Rouge - as this would legitimize their past doings. The solution 
was in assigning “individuals representing the full range of Cambodian 
public opinion and deprived of any operational authority” to the SNC 
instead of organizations and movements (Solomon 2000, 42). Thus, 
while the Khmer Rouge would not be presented as a separate body, it 
would still have one of their officials as a full member of the Council. 
According to Solomon, “this gave the Chinese sufficient political le-
verage to “deliver” their client to the settlement” (Solomon 2000, 42). 
However, as the negotiations between the P-5 progressed, it became 
quite obvious that the Soviet Union and China were unable to find a 
mutually acceptable formula regarding the degree of UN involvement 
in implementing the peace agreement. On one side, the Soviets refused 
to accept any significant role for the UN, indicating respect for Cam-
bodian sovereignty, which was an euphemism for the concern that a 
strong involvement could endanger government’s chances in the upco-
ming elections. On the other, the Chinese were asking for a complete 
disarmament of the government, claiming that such a move would serve 
the purpose of creating equal chances for everyone in the elections, whi-
le in reality Beijing was trying to weaken Hun Sen’s chances (Hampson 
and Zartman 2012, 7; Solomon 1999; Solomon 2000). 
 While the Soviet Union and China were struggling to find an agree-
ment, the United States was experiencing a serious challenge on the do-
mestic front. Solomon recounts that “during the fall of 1989, and into 
the spring of 1990, domestic political pressure in the United States had 
been building against any agreement that would seem to legitimize the 
Khmer Rouge by including their leadership in a settlement plan, much 
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less increase the party’s chance of returning to power by some combi-
nation of military and political maneuvering” (Solomon 2000, 44). The 
strongest hit to the US position came in April 1990. Following a scree-
ning of a documentary on ABC news, which claimed that the US finan-
cial support intended for Prince Sihanouk was ending up in the hands 
of the Khmer Rouge, a bi-partisan group of US Congressmen wrote to 
the Secretary of State James Baker asking for a radical change in US 
foreign policy. They asked for an immediate termination of support for 
Prince Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge and a subsequent sift in preferen-
ce towards Hun Sen and his pro-Vietnamese government. The letter 
stated that “China is the problem, not the solution in Cambodia” and 
that US policy “should be based, first and foremost, upon preventing 
the return to power of the Khmer Rouge” (Solomon 2000, 44-45). The 
Congressmen threatened that in case “the administration did not shift 
its approach to a Cambodian settlement away from Sihanouk’s coaliti-
on, Congress would cut off all financial support for the noncommunist 
resistance - FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF” (Solomon 2000, 45).   
 This radical shift - also known as ‘the Baker shift’ - in the US’ posi-
tion was first announced to Soviets during the fifth P-5 session in Paris 
in July 1990. Baker stated that the US intended to withdraw its reco-
gnition of the representatives of Cambodia’s coalition (that included 
Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge) in the UN (Hampson and Zartman 
2012, 8). He also indicated that the US was considering initiating con-
sultations with the Vietnamese government and their partners in Cam-
bodia (Solomon 2000, 46). The shift represented a ‘political bombshell’ 
for the negotiation process. It was clear that the US was about to switch 
sides and have policies much closer to the positions of Vietnam and the 
USSR. 
 China was very concerned that this change would cement Hun Sen’s 
position and jeopardize the momentum that was already created in the 
peace process. Privately they even admitted that the ‘Baker shift’ caused 
grave confusion in Chinese leadership (Solomon 2000, 46). Thus the 
Chinese decided to push stronger for the achievement of an agreement 
within the P-5, as a way of keeping the Khmer Rouge involved in the 
political settlement (Solomon 2000, 46). Interestingly, reflecting on the 
game theoretical model, the Chinese choice to stay in the mediation 
process permitted the process to avoid a potential myopic equilibrium, 
and consequently move the mediation efforts into NME.  Vietnam on 
Analysis of Multiparty Mediation Processes / Doctoral Dissertation
147
its part, apprehensive of the Soviet decision to improve its relations with 
China and stop supporting its cause in Cambodia, saw this as a chance 
to achieve a greater convergence of interests with the US. In light of the 
new policy priorities, the US officials openly indicated their readiness 
to improve bilateral relations with Hanoi, under the condition that they 
would accept an UN-managed settlement for Cambodia. Isolated Ha-
noi was also well aware that it had to “give up on Ho Chi Minh’s dream 
of an Indochina Federation… and to normalize relations with China on 
Beijing’s terms” (Solomon 2000, 78). As a result Hanoi became more 
inclined to compromise and to explore constructive ways to engage all 
of the Khmer factions in the future political processes. At the same 
time, China was careful not to make a move which would shift the bla-
me of spoiling the process to them. For this reason authorities in Beijing 
decided to put pressure on the Khmer Rouge telling them to “stay on 
the course and reach a political settlement” (Hampson and Zartman 
2012, 8). 
 On August 1990, at their sixth and last meeting in New York, all 
the members of the Security Council accepted a framework agreement 
that “formally recognized that there could not be a settlement without 
the participation of all factions and that the Khmer Rouge had to be 
included to avoid the continuation of the civil war” (Hampson and Za-
rtman 2012, 8); that the UN would take over the role of a transitional 
government until the elections are organized; that Cambodia’s soverei-
gnty would be ‘embodied’ in a Supreme National Council composed out 
of individuals, and that this body would not have any authority before 
the UN monitored elections would take place (Solomon 2000, 47). It 
was an unequivocal indication that all the major powers - the US, China 
and Russia (that represented Vietnam’s interests) - managed to achieve 
convergence of interests in solving the conflict. The process was now 
in point c, as each party evidently achieved less than what it initially 
aimed at, but more than what was gaining from non cooperative beha-
vior.  As Solomon pointed out, now the challenge was to “convince the 
conflicting parties to accept the settlement” (idem). These developments 
provide support for what was previously hypothesized in H3 and H4, as 
the mediators’ ability to achieve convergence of policy objectives among 
them, improved the chances of achieving success through mediation. 
Thus, as long as the mediators were unable to reach a convergence of 
interests, the peace process could not yield any results.
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 Once the P-5 plan became public, the Chinese Vice Foreign Mi-
nister visited Hanoi to convince Vietnamese colleagues to support the 
framework. According to Solomon, the initiative failed because the 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach “gratuitously insulted the visiting 
Chinese envoy in an effort to keep the diplomacy deadlocked” (Solo-
mon 2000, 74). After this incident, in September 1990, Chinese and Vi-
etnamese officials started a series of secret bilateral negotiations in order 
to resolve their differences. As a result of these consultations, “extremely 
nationalistic” Thach was retired from his position in June 1991. Soon 
after that, Sino-Vietnamese relations “were fully normalized” (Solomon 
2000, 75). Unfortunately, there are no public records of these meetings. 
However their frequency in a short period of time - according to Solo-
mon (2000, 74, fn 53) there were four secret meetings from September 
1990 until the spring of 1991 - was a clear indication of the two sides’ 
readiness to exit the lingering quagmire of their bilateral relations. Once 
reconciled, both sides exercised “irresistible pressure” on their Cambo-
dian partners – Hun Sen for the Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge for 
the Chinese - to accept the compromises in the interest of the settle-
ment (Solomon 2000, 78).  In August 1991, it was clear that all parties 
accepted the proposed framework, moving the process to point (c) as 
indicated in the game theoretical model. As all major regional and glo-
bal actors that were involved in the peace process showed intention of 
resolving their differences and exiting Indochina, the signing of a final 
settlement plan was a matter of days. In two months, specific details of 
the plan were discussed and the agreement was ratified in Paris on 23 
October 1991.    
 As a direct participant in the peace process, Solomon points out 
that “it is clear that the parallel and mutually reinforcing reconciliations 
of 1991 between Beijing and Moscow, and Beijing and Hanoi, made 
possible the fundamental political deals that enabled the Perm Five’s 
peace plan for Cambodia to fall into place” (Solomon 2000, 78). Such 
developments provide support for H8, as the evident convergence of 
interests was a direct result of mediators’ ability to negotiate a solution 
amongst themselves. At the same time, as hypothesized in H1, the con-
structive role of China, Soviet Union and Vietnam in the multiparty 
mediation process was best observed in their ability to influence their 
client Khmer factions, and move them towards a mutually acceptable 
solution. However, this role was only fulfilled once the parties managed 
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to reach a convergence of interests, as hypothesized in H3. On the one 
side, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement that culminated with a P-5 agree-
ment was a result of a major geo-political shift which was the advent of 
Gorbachev to power, indicating evidence to support hypothesis H5. On 
the other, the Soviet decision to stop financing the Vietnamese “tug of 
war” with China and change the strategies toward Beijing, offer eviden-
ce in support for H6. Similarly, the Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement 
was also a result of a geo-political change - Soviet waning influence 
induced Vietnam to seek partners in the US and China - and awareness 
that the costs of supporting the war through occupation were becoming 
too high, especially as the Soviets cut their financial support, which is 
evidence in support for H7. 
 The intra-P-5 negotiations that generated the convergence of inte-
rests, while conducted under the US leadership, benefited greatly from 
the legitimacy of the UN. In fact, the US used the legitimacy of the UN 
to guide the conflicting communist super-powers to an agreement. This 
was strongly in line with the effects hypothesized in H10. As hypothe-
sized in H11c, the US was able to take the leadership role only once its 
goals were not jeopardizing those of the other P-5. In fact, the com-
promise solution that was achieved within the P-5 indicates that each 
side had to accept less than what they initially aimed, confirming the 
dynamics described in the model that a cooperative solution will still 
produce some costs.
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CHAPTER VII: Kosovo
 Contemporary conflict management scholarship describes the si-
tuation in Kosovo as an undeniable case of intractable conflict (Burg 
2005). It is characterized by contending requests to the rights of se-
lf-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity. It persisted over 
time developing psychological manifestations of deep feelings of dis-
trust and mutual hatred, conducted through the employment of de-
structive means and violence and refused to yield to endeavors aimed 
at reaching a political settlement, indicating its undeniable intractable 
nature. The case of Kosovo offers a unique opportunity to explore two 
distinct phases of the peace process within the same conflict, which 
despite the inevitable change of actors (vis-à-vis their leadership) still 
did not produce any success. 
7.1 The Nature of Conflict
7.1.1 Sources of Intractability
 As Burg notices, “the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be attributed to 
the effects of several mutually reinforcing conflicts” (Burg 2005, 184). 
The focal feature of all these conflicts can be found in mounting ethno-
nationalism among the various peoples of Yugoslavia which was indu-
ced by unresolved historical disputes and by contemporary conflicts on 
political and economic issues. Mounting claims to self-determination in 
Kosovo were directly linked with both territory and ethnic identity. A 
territorially compact Albanian ethnic majority was defying domination 
by the Serb minority and the existing political regime in Belgrade.
The easiness with which justifiable economic and political issues were 
able to inflame temporarily subdued ethno-nationalism and provo-
ke internal conflict was undoubtedly proven in 1968 when frustration 
over the economic situation in the province agitated nationalistic strife 
between the Albanian population in Kosovo and Serbian authorities in 
Belgrade. In fact, by the late 1960s the situation in Kosovo was quite 
dire – it was the most undeveloped part of Yugoslavia in all socioe-
conomic features with the highest rate of illiteracy – 36 percent were 
officially illiterate, while a much larger number was not working literate 
(Ramet 1992, 189).
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 In 1974, Yugoslav federal authorities managed to appease the claims 
for self-determination in Kosovo, by granting the province an extensive 
level of autonomy and a status of a federal unit, although formally still 
a province within the republic of Serbia. Gradually the Albanian popu-
lation was emancipated and assigned to high administrative positions. 
According to Ramet, it was at this moment that “the Albanians were 
becoming restless … when the slow beginnings of reform had become 
unmistakable – a confirmation of Machiavelli and Crane Brinton’s pro-
position that repression becomes intolerable once reforms are begun” 
(1992, 190). In fact, the level of underdevelopment in Kosovo was con-
tinuing to fuel popular restlessness. Again socio-economic issues were 
easily translated into political agitation which culminated in a series of 
riots, subversive activities and use of violence in 1981 across the enti-
re province. Such demonstrations resulted in more than one thousand 
deaths and much more injured (Ramet 1992, 196). The protestors were 
now publicly echoing revolutionary tones that were flirting with sepa-
ratist tendencies: Kosovo reconstituted as a republic or utter secession 
(Troebst 1998). The federal authorities reacted without delay, tightening 
the grip over the province. 
7.1.2 The Development of Deep Feelings of Distrust  
and Mutual Hatred 
 
 In the upcoming years, the anti-Albanian sentiment was hitting 
every pore of society. The authorities expanded their list of potential 
suspects, so several thousands of Kosovo Albanians were prosecuted for 
separatism between 1981 and 1987. Fueled by the stories of exiled Serbs 
from Kosovo, Belgrade, media started publishing articles of Albanian 
atrocities which genuinely contributed to the development of irrevoca-
ble stereotypes of Kosovo Albanians in the eyes of the Serbian audience. 
The exaggerations in storytelling went so far that Belgrade newspapers 
started labeling the crisis in Kosovo as ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Serbs (Banac 
2001). By 1986, Serbia was inflamed with nationalism, peaking with the 
infamous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts 
that lamented over Serbia’s faith in the Yugoslavian community, and 
echoed a direct warning over the imminent loss of Kosovo. The hatred 
was inflamed so much that Serbs stated boycotting shops and trade with 
Albanians, which cut down their sales by as mush as 85 % (Ramet 1992, 
199).
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7.1.3 The Employment of Repressive Measures
 The constant demographic decline of the Slavic population in the 
province was invigorating nationalistic rhetoric and policies of the new 
party elite in Belgrade. The underlying aim of Serbian nationalists that 
assumed highest ranks in the party (on the republican level), was the 
implementation of a program that would reduce the number of Alba-
nians in Kosovo (Banac 2001). The accession of Slobodan Milošević 
to power in 1987 signaled a new and more dramatic escalation of the 
conflict in Kosovo. He intervened in Kosovo with heavy security for-
ces and revoked the province’s autonomy. Under ‘emergency measures’, 
ethnic Albanians were forced out from public institutions (Ramet 1992, 
Troebst 1998). Serbian authorities intensified the policy of dismissal 
of Albanians from jobs in public enterprises. According to statistics 
from that time, more than “100 000 Albanians were fired from factories, 
mines, schools, hospitals, judiciary, cultural institutions, media public 
services, municipal and regional authorities, etc. and replaced by Serbs, 
Montenegrins, or pro-Serbian Albanians” (Troebst 1998). Serbian 
authorities issued orders for outlawing all Albanian political, cultural, 
sport and media organizations and associations. Albanian students were 
expelled from universities and a new curriculum in Serbian language 
and with Serbian textbooks was imposed. Albanians were not allowed 
to make any transaction on real-estate markets without a special permi-
ssion from the authorities (Caplan 1998, 751). Repressive measures and 
violence, exercised by the security forces, distinguished Kosovo as the 
region with some of the worst human rights records in Europe of that 
time (Nizich 1992).
7.1.4 The Creation of Irreconcilable Positions 
 The expelled Albanian political elite started developing new forms 
of organization and resistance. The Albanian political leaders in Kosovo 
developed a strategy of non-violent resistance, and established ‘parallel’ 
state structures in the province. In 1991 an underground referendum 
was organized, where almost 100 percent of participants – all of them 
Albanians – voted in favor of an independent Kosovo. This motivated 
the elites to proclaim the Republic of Kosovo as an independent and so-
vereign state. At the same time, emboldened by the referendum, mem-
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bers of this ‘parallel government’ organized both parliamentary elections 
where the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won an absolute ma-
jority (89 percent) and presidential elections which confirmed LDK’s 
leader Ibrahim Rugova as the undisputable leader. 
 From then on, Kosovo was a clear example of apartheid in Europe 
(Banac 2001). On the one hand, there was the official Serbian regime 
of occupation which excluded the Albanians from every aspect of so-
ciety, and a ‘shadow state’ established by ethnic Albanians. The Serbian 
authorities ‘tolerated’ this clandestine state which signified the definite 
separation of two ethnic communities and absolute exclusion of Albani-
ans as citizens of Serbia. The non-violent approach of Albanian elites to 
resist Serbian policies was the only option, given the tremendous power 
disparity between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian authorities. This 
Ghandian approach collected large sympathy in the West which was 
very slow (if not reluctant) to start pressuring Belgrade to change its 
policies in the province.
 The situation at this moment was clear. The zero-sum issues that 
divided both sides made compromising very difficult. Thus the early 
attempts of international involvement in the crisis were faced with a 
serious challenge of formulating effective approaches in order to create 
a non-zero-sum outcome. 
 Despite the apparent pattern of neglect on behalf of the internati-
onal community, the biggest disappointment for Albanians in Kosovo 
originated with the Dayton agreements in 1995 that ended the civil 
war in Bosnia. For several years the low degree of inter-ethnic friction 
and the illusion of stability in Kosovo – due to repressive policies which 
excluded Albanians from participating in the system on one side and 
shadow state structures established by the same Albanians on the other 
– indirectly motivated the international community to overlook the real 
situation on the ground. According to Caplan it was the absence of war 
in Kosovo that made foreign countries believe that there was no urgent 
need to deal with the question (1998, 751). It seemed as if non-violent 
resistance which developed sympathies in the West was the ‘victim of 
its own success’ (Caplan 1998, 751). Despite Western sympathies, the 
Albanian leadership was lacking a strong ally for their cause. In fact, 
at that time Milošević was identified as ‘the factor of stability’, who-
se collaboration was essential for bringing and maintaining peace in 
ex-Yugoslav countries. So not surprisingly, until March 1998, both the 
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American administration and its European colleagues were reluctant to 
accept any claim of independence from the Kosovo Albanian elites.  
 For Albanians in Kosovo, Dayton was an obvious signal that eth-
nic territories have legitimacy (given the fact that the Republika Srpska 
was established) and that international attention can only be obtained 
through war (Surroi 1996). The disappointment culminated with the 
increasing support of the Albanian population for the radical separatist 
Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). Their militant activities against Serb 
forces in the province soon brought them control over almost 30% of 
Kosovo’s territory. Gradually even some members of the political elite 
started supporting the guerilla warfare of the UCK, claiming that the 
“path of nonviolence has gotten (them) nowhere… the Kosovo Libe-
ration Army is fighting for (their) freedom” (Caplan 1998, 752). It was 
obvious that Dayton represented the turning point for Kosovo Albani-
ans and their future demands. Demands for extended autonomy and a 
return to the situation prescribed by the Constitution from 1974 were 
now overruled. The only political aim at that point was an independent 
Kosovo.   
7.1.5 Internal Characteristics of the Conflicting Sides 
 The radicalization of the Kosovo Albanian separatist tendencies was 
rapidly restricting the space for any compromise solution. The interna-
tional community was resolute only to achieve a mutually acceptable 
compromise solution. Given the fact that already in 1991, the overwhel-
ming majority of Kosovo Albanians voted in favor of independence, it 
was unlikely that the population would settle for restoration of auto-
nomy which the international community was trying to sponsor as a 
compromise. In fact, after seven years of frozen and intractable conflict, 
which was marked by the establishment of an apartheid system, Al-
banians in Kosovo had less reason now to accept any form of political 
autonomy within Serbia. As a direct consequence of the conflict’s in-
tractability, there was no trust in Serbian authorities that they would 
guarantee their autonomy, given the fact that it was the same authorities 
that had abolished it. 
 As the mediation literature suggests (e.g. Bercovitch 2005), in case 
of intractable conflicts, one of the main goals for successful mediation 
would be actor transformation. In the case of Kosovo, a stable settle-
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ment would seem to be attainable only through the establishment of a 
truly democratic regime in Belgrade. However, at that time, opposition 
forces in Serbia were considerably silent to what was happening in Ko-
sovo, while the strongest opposition parties were even defending Milo-
šević for his policies in the province (Caplan 1998, Troebst 1998). Even 
public opinion seemed to be complacent. According to a survey done by 
the Helsinki Committee for the Human Rights Office in Belgrade:
“An independent Kosovo, or the Republic of Kosovo within the FRY, is 
admissible in the view of only a negligible number of our respondents. 
Likewise, very few respondents would accept a division of Kosovo. A 
vast percentage (41.8%) believes that the solution is to be looked for in 
the forcible or ‘peaceful’ expulsion of the Albanians. On the other hand, 
27.2% of those manifesting ‘democratic tolerance’ would be willing, at 
best, to grant the Albanians their cultural autonomy. […] In other wor-
ds, in the case of Kosovo is the Serbian public opinion neither willing to 
search for a compromise nor even for a minimum democratic solution” 
(Troebst 1998, 21-22)
 Problematic was also the situation in the Kosovo Albanian politi-
cal elite. The non-violent tactics of Rugova and his LDK were loosing 
public support due to increasing popularity of warring methods of ra-
dicals from the UCK. At the same time, other political parties were less 
inclined to negotiate with Belgrade about autonomy. The Parliamentary 
Party of Kosovo (PPK), the biggest opposition party in Priština, headed 
by Adem Demaci, promoted as a compromise – less was not an option 
-  a reconstruction of Yugoslavia as a confederation or association of 
independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia, better known 
as ‘project Balkania’. Clearly this option was even less acceptable for 
Serbia, and thus not even considered by policy makers in Belgrade.
 The deep radicalization of political elites on both sides was a di-
rect obstacle to a long lasting solution. To rise above the deadlock, the 
international community - that wanted to resolve the crisis through 
negotiations – was challenged by two conflicting principles that they 
had to reconcile: autonomy for Kosovo and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. 
The latter principle was mirrored in the fact that Belgrade was reluctant 
to accept any foreign third party intervention, claiming that the situ-
ation in Kosovo was an internal affair. The principle of inviolability of 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity was something that the inter-
national community was not trying to jeopardize, given the new dyna-
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mics in the region and globally. There was a fear that recklessness in 
approaching the situation might serve as a signal for other states to 
intervene elsewhere according to their own judgments (i.e. there was a 
direct apprehension that Russia might use this as a clout for intervening 
in ex-Soviet states) (Caplan 1998). For this reason, any form of direct 
intervention was put aside, especially the use of force unless authorized 
by the UN Security Council. 
 The surfacing of the UCK was putting extreme pressure on the LDK 
leadership to show determination in achieving independence. Since the 
LDK was insistent on non-violent methods, it understood UCK’s pre-
ssure as an additional motive for trying to find some compromise with 
Belgrade, otherwise large-scale violence would be unavoidable. Along 
with the intra-Albanian power-struggle, the regime in Belgrade was 
also subjected to internal pressures from the emerging democratically 
oriented opposition, headed by Democratic Party (Demokratska stran-
ka, DS) forces in 1996. The DS were compelling Milošević to seek to 
achieve some progress towards finding a settlement that would pacify 
the situation in Kosovo. A result of this ‘convergence of interest’ between 
Rugova and Milošević was the negotiated settlement in September of 
1996 on normalization of the education system facilitated by mediation 
activities of an international non-governmental organization, Comunità 
di Sant’Egidio (Troebst 1998). Already successful in mediating the con-
flict in Mozambique, involvement of this NGO was accepted because 
its interests were not suspicious to either side, but perceived as mainly 
motivated to contribute in de-escalating the conflict.  Clearly, given the 
fact that there was no true international guarantor ready to exercise pre-
ssure on both sides for the realization of the agreement, the sides were 
unwilling to implement the negotiated agreement. So it merely resul-
ted in a demonstration of good will - mainly towards the international 
community - to achieve some results in bridging the differences, but 
nothing further as clear incentives were missing.  As in all intractable 
conflicts, conflicting parties felt that “at best they may reach temporary 
cessations of violence and that they cannot reach a fundamental and 
genuine resolution of their issues” (Bercovitch 2005, 100).  
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7.2 Involvement of International Actors    
 and their Interests in the Conflict
 During the 1980s, initial steps to encourage dialogue between Ko-
sovo Albanians and Serbs were taken by governmental and non-go-
vernmental third parties, but none of them made any significant pro-
gress. In fact while the Serbs were resisting any third-party involvement, 
especially from abroad - both from foreign governments and non-go-
vernmental organizations - Albanians were of the opposite opinion. 
Both sides were well aware of the repercussions of such third-party in-
volvement – it would internationalize their conflict. 
 During the Cold War period, the Western countries were well aware 
of the nationalist tensions in Yugoslavia, so for this reason they suppor-
ted Tito’s firm regime, which was able to keep ethnic tensions under 
control. Soon after Tito’s death in 1980, these projections proved to 
be right, as was shown by the 1981 violent clashes between Albanians 
and Serbs in Kosovo. With the end of the Cold War, the American and 
European stand toward issues in Yugoslavia started to change radically. 
The geopolitical relevance of Yugoslavia was fading away, and the co-
untry became just one of the many communist countries that needed 
to democratize its system and liberalize its economy. In this respect, 
the situation in Kosovo appeared to be the perfect lens through which 
Yugoslavia was viewed. 
 Severe abuses of human rights in Kosovo represented the main con-
cern for American diplomats of that time. However, this concern was 
more superficial than what was needed for Americans to be more ac-
tively engaged in managing the crisis. In fact, the limits of American 
policy were best described by Zimmerman who assumed the Ambassa-
dorial post in Belgrade in 1989: “I was to reassert the traditional mantra 
of US support for Yugoslavia’s unity, independence and territorial inte-
grity. But I would add that the United States could only support unity 
in the context of democracy; it would strongly oppose unity imposed or 
preserved by force” (Zimmermann 1995, 3). At the same time, for the 
US, the situation in Kosovo represented only a component of the overall 
crisis Yugoslavia was going through. 
 American unwillingness to take action was made easier by West Eu-
ropeans’ argument that Europe should be the one dealing with issues 
in Yugoslavia. The logic behind this claim derived from the fact that 
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almost half of Yugoslav foreign trade was with the countries from the 
European Community (EC), while only a fraction went to the US. Alt-
hough there was apparent motivation to act, Western European coun-
tries lacked a common perception of the situation in the country. Touval 
argues that “their divergent attitudes stemmed largely from cultural-
historical preconceptions existing in their respective societies” (Touval 
1996, 410). Despite the fact that the EC tended to send a comprehen-
sive signal of its position in the matter, EC member states were sending 
contradictory signals. On the one side the United Kingdom and France 
were insisting that the primary concern should be given to the preser-
vation of Yugoslav unity and territorial integrity, while Italy and newly 
unified Germany were much more inclined to emphasize the necessity 
of promoting primarily human rights and democratic standards which 
for them represented euphemisms for the principle of self-determinati-
on. Such ambiguity in the European position was further complicated 
by the fact that their main interest was oriented towards the evolving 
situation in the rich northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia that 
were looking for allies in their separatist tendencies. Kosovo was largely 
ignored.  
 In fact, the politically powerful European states were willing to act 
with determination, but only through unofficial channels, because they 
wanted to avoid being criticized that they were “violating the norma-
tive and legal injunction against interference in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state” (Touval 1996, 413). Any attempt of direct involvement, 
namely mediation, would have entailed exhaustive participation in 
Yugoslavia’s internal politics, which Western countries wanted to avoid. 
But this had no effect on the crisis in Kosovo. Even when Western co-
untries eliminated their stand on the necessary preservation of Yugoslav 
unity, the right to secession was recognized only to those entities that 
had the status of a republic in the federation which Kosovo never ma-
naged to obtain. This happened once the wars in Slovenia and Croatia 
started and the EC rushed to establish an arbitration commission better 
known as Badinter Commission (after Robert Badinter, chief jurist and 
president of the French Constitutional Court), which was supposed to 
resolve discrepancies between parties in the Yugoslav crisis. More im-
portantly, this commission issued several crucial opinions that rapidly 
became pillars around which the international community’s future ac-
tivities revolved. For Kosovo, one finding of the Badinter Commission 
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was essential: in the process of dissolution, the international community 
was in fact recognizing the right of secession for those entities that had 
the status of a federal unit, i.e. republics, but not for the autonomous 
provinces. Despite the fact that Kosovo requested recognition as a so-
vereign state, along with other republics, and following the results of a 
clandestine referendum on independence, the EC refused to consider it 
(Caplan 1998). In a nutshell, by the 1990s, efforts of preventive diplo-
macy regarding the crisis in Kosovo were both weak and ineffective – 
because of the reluctance of outside actors to be engaged more directly 
and their holistic approach to the situation in Yugoslavia in general.  
 Along with the radicalization of Albanians in Kosovo, the interna-
tional community also gave Milošević large space for maneuvering in 
the province. Soon after the Dayton agreement was signed, Western 
countries started lifting previously imposed sanctions from Serbia and 
Montenegro (then known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY). 
Initially sanctions were supposed to be lifted only in case the FRY im-
plemented a set of laws that would improve minority rights, especi-
ally regarding Albanians in Kosovo. This matter was neglected due to 
the constructive work of Milošević in Dayton. On 23 February 1998, 
the US envoy to the region, Richard Gelbard, labeled the UCK as a 
terrorist group whose activities were strongly condemned by the US. 
Milošević interpreted this as a clear signal to launch several large-scale 
attacks against the Albanian population in Kosovo under the clout of 
anti-terrorist activities.
 The upsurge of conflict in Kosovo did not draw synchronized atten-
tion from the international community to mediate a settlement, until 
KLA activities became a serious challenge to Serb dominance in Ko-
sovo, which resulted in a disproportionate retaliation by Serb forces 
and subsequent humanitarian crisis. As Burg notes, “it was the onset of 
fighting between Serbian (formally Yugoslav) military and police units 
and the KLA, and especially the use of disproportionate force by Serbs 
against civilians in Kosovo, in early 1998 that prompted US and inter-
national efforts to mediate the conflict” (Burg 2005, 202). 
 The initial efforts were showing signs of ‘continual equivocation’ 
(Caplan 1998). The Contact Group, composed of six nations (the US, 
U.K., France, Germany, Italy and Russia), often threatened to reesta-
blish sanctions unless authorities in Belgrade withdrew their special 
forces from the province and begun a process of dialogue with the Ko-
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sovo Albanian leaders. Despite the fact that Milošević was not com-
plying with its demands, the Contact Group was reluctant to impose 
and strengthen sanctions and chose to be rather more flexible with de-
adlines. The hesitancy of the international community in this period 
can be traced in various factors, but there are two which deserve special 
attention. First of all, for the first time, a non-Western country was 
included in the coalition of international actors that was active in ma-
naging the conflict – Russia. Emerging from the ashes of the dissolved 
USSR, Russia was now assuming a much more active role in internati-
onal politics. Its absence from previous conflict management activities 
in Yugoslavia was to change. Perceived as a country that had a particular 
influence over authorities in Belgrade, Western countries had a strate-
gic interest to include Russia as a partner in their coalition, because it 
would allow them to create necessary incentives to encourage Belgrade 
to collaborate and move toward a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, 
as a member of the Contact Group, Russia was the most insistent in 
refusing to support many of the sanctions suggested by other states. On 
the other hand, Western countries were ever so more willing to apply 
more radical measures if the fighting in Kosovo continued – especially 
compared to previous conflicts in Yugoslavia. For Caplan these divisions 
have prevented the Contact Group “from acting with greater determi-
nation” (1998, 754).
 The second matter which contributed to the hesitance of the in-
ternational community was the fact that it shared a common interest 
in preventing the independence of Kosovo, as a possible precedent for 
separatist aspirations across the globe. Despite the fact that internatio-
nal actors differed on the means to get engaged, they were all reluctant 
to use measures that would weaken the Serbian repressive regime in 
Kosovo. Especially when reports of growing strength of the UCK were 
starting to come in, the Contact Group stopped insisting so vocifero-
usly that Belgrade should reduce its special forces in the province. The 
Group started demanding only a suspension of attacks on the civilian 
population in Kosovo. 
 However, the crisis in Kosovo was dramatically deteriorating. By 
the end of March, Serbian security forces launched large scale military 
attacks against civilian communities in Kosovo which resulted in the 
displacement of approximately 200,000 Albanians from their homes. 
Faced with an alarming humanitarian situation, the UN Security Co-
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uncil immediately responded; on 31 of March 1998 it adopted reso-
lution 1160 under Chapter VII which imposed an arms embargo on 
Yugoslavia. The resolution also called for a substantive and meaningful 
dialogue on political status issues between Belgrade and Kosovo Alba-
nian authorities, and recognized the willingness of the Contact Group 
to facilitate the talks. The resolution concluded that the outcome of such 
talks should be founded on the principle of Yugoslav territorial inte-
grity, respect for the OSCE standards and the Charter of the UN, and 
should promote an “enhanced status for Kosovo” which would imply 
a larger degree of autonomy and “meaningful” self-administration (S/
RES/1160, 1998). The implications of this resolution went even further, 
considering that the document in fact labeled the situation in Kosovo 
as a threat to international peace and security. Even so, authorities in 
Belgrade were reluctant to accept any foreign involvement in the case, 
claiming that the issue was purely internal.      
 Despite the reluctance of the authorities in Belgrade to accept third 
party involvement while the situation in Kosovo was further deteriora-
ting, the Serbian government was gradually experiencing considerable 
pressure from abroad. It first started communicating about the issue 
with US diplomats. At that time, as a clear sign of a unipolar power-
balance in the world, the American administration was demonstrating 
the biggest determination to manage the conflict and if necessary to 
exert the use of force Despite the fact that the US was orchestrating the 
whole process, it had to rely on the assistance by other members of the 
Contact Group. It was Russia who managed to extract a very important 
concession from authorities in Belgrade, who agreed to restart nego-
tiations with Kosovo leaders in June 1998, “to the extent that terrorist 
activities are halted” (Crawford 2002, 508). This time Kosovo leaders 
were not collaborating, due to extreme pressure imposed on them by 
the UCK not to accept anything but full independence for the province. 
Slowly, US officials using facilitator strategies were able to start indi-
rect negotiations with Belgrade and Priština, using a distinct form of 
shuttle diplomacy mixed with sporadic threats of military intervention, 
since the two sides did not want to negotiate directly. The lack of direct 
communication was a sign that compromise was far from being attai-
nable, especially since the authorities from both sides were very limited 
in their bargaining power. This time, both sides had considerably less 
space to maneuver, just as in 1996 when they signed the (never imple-
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mented) agreement on education in Kosovo. It was virtually impossible 
to reconcile the claims of independence and reaffirmation of Kosovo as 
an integral part of Serbia. From June until October, several attempts of 
shuttle diplomacy by US officials failed because Kosovo leaders could 
not accept proposals from the international community, saying that Ko-
sovo would stay an integral and unalienable part of Serbia. 
 Given the futile results, belligerent activities between the UCK and 
Serbian forces again escalated, resulting in another UN Security Co-
uncil resolution which condemned all acts of violence in Kosovo, in 
particular the “indiscriminate use of force by Serb security forces” and 
again urged both parties to cease fire and seek a political solution (S/
RES/1199, 1998). It is also noteworthy to observe that by that time, US 
officials gradually stopped labeling the UCK strictly as a terrorist group. 
In fact, already in July 1998, James Rubin, the spokesperson of the State 
Department said that “not all activities of UCK should be considered 
as terrorism”. From that moment on, the UCK was getting more legiti-
macy in the eyes of the international community (B92, 2008). In a short 
while, the position of the UCK would change from a terrorist group 
into a partner in the mediation process, enabling the third parties to 
engage them more directly in the preace process.  
 During this process, the US officials were loosing leverage towards 
the LDK and Milošević, while they had no leverage whatsoever over the 
UCK (Burg 2005, Crawford 2002). After mixing diplomacy with thre-
ats of using military force to impose a settlement, an agreement conclu-
ded between Richard Holbrooke and Milošević in October 1998 that 
called for the reduction of Serbian security forces and their withdrawal 
from Kosovo fell apart because this was used by the UCK to expand its 
power in the province. Not surprisingly, by the end of 1998, the nego-
tiations became completely ineffective. 
 While the futility of negotiation efforts was becoming more evi-
dent, the situation in Kosovo was becoming more unstable. The level of 
violence was drastically increasing; the conflict was demonstrating all 
elements of intractability. By the end of 1998, Serbian forces responded 
to the UCK’s expansion of power in the province with a systematic 
campaign across all municipalities forcing more than 300,000 ethnic 
Albanians to leave their homes, accompanied with countless civilian ca-
sualties. Serbia claimed that their actions were legitimate and directed 
towards terrorists in Kosovo. However, soon the international commu-
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nity would discover that attacks were directed against the Albanian ci-
vil community as a whole, rather than terrorist cells of the UCK. The 
turning point was in January 1999, when the foreign press released a 
story of mass murder of 45 ethnic Albanian civilians in Račak, executed 
at a close range by Serbian forces (Weller 1999). Confronted with an 
unprecedented level of hostilities, the Contact Group swiftly reacted. 
 Since conflict intensity was high, with elevated levels of violence and 
distrust between the parties, tactics of communication and formulation 
were not enough. The Contact Group ministers immediately met in 
London and assumed a more decisive role using a directive-manipula-
tor strategy. The ministers “unreservedly condemned” what happened 
in Račak, stressing that the situation in Kosovo which “remains a threat 
to peace and security in the region, [was] raising the prospect of a hu-
manitarian catastrophe” (Chairman’s conclusions, 1999). Blaming both 
the Belgrade authorities and the UCK for perpetuating conflict and 
violence in the province, they called them to end their belligerent acti-
vities and commit themselves to a process of negotiation which would 
lead to a political settlement. The negotiations needed to reestablish 
‘substantial autonomy of Kosovo’ in a form agreed by both sides. Parties 
should gather in Rambouillet by the 6th of February, and proceed ne-
gotiating with direct involvement of the Contact Group. The statement 
concluded that “the Contact Group will hold both sides accountable if 
they fail to take the opportunity now offered to them, just as the Group 
stands ready to work with both sides to realize the benefits for them of 
a peaceful solution” (Chairman’s conclusions 1999).
 Despite the fact that the Rambouillet conference was mainly about 
the fate of Kosovo, it became an exceptional opportunity to become an 
arena where most of the friction lingering in the post Cold-War tran-
sformation process, surfaced out. According to Weller (1999), it was an 
excellent opportunity for a “fundamental change in the roles of interna-
tional actors”. It was also an undeniable statement against the materia-
lization of a unipolar system dominated by the US. 
 First of all, the steady emergence of Russia as the new-old global 
power was most emblematically represented by its membership in the 
Contact Group and presence at the Rambouillet conference in parti-
cular. Moscow developed a firm foreign policy stand which aimed to 
deject the concept of an imposed settlement upon Yugoslav authorities, 
especially if enforced by NATO. In case that would turn out to be un-
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feasible, Russia’s priority was to maintain a managing role for itself in 
the future administration of the situation. At that time, the best way to 
achieve such aspirations was to promote the involvement in the crisis of 
collective bodies where Russia could block decisions requiring consen-
sus (Weller 1999). Along with the Contact Group, these bodies were 
also the OSCE - which provides an additional layer of institutional 
authority in conflict management and where decisions are made using 
consensus – and more importantly, the United Nations Security Coun-
cil where Russia is invested with veto powers. 
 As Levitin (2000) explains, the Russian interest in the situation in 
Kosovo was marginal during the early 1990s. The first reported talks 
with Belgrade regarding the crisis took place only in 1996. For far too 
long Moscow was ignoring the information about the allocation of 
Serbian security forces in the province especially in the period when 
violence was culminating (1997-1998). Such laxity deprived policy ma-
kers in Moscow from the possibility to acknowledge the importance of 
moderate forces in Kosovo – namely the non-violent resistance move-
ment – and thus indirectly contributed to the consequential upsurge of 
radical forces in the province. The first contacts with leaders from Pri-
ština were established only in July 1998. Undoubtedly, by then, Russia 
assumed a role of a passive bystander in the crisis settlement. Finally, 
this lack of interest was best observed in the Russian ‘withdrawal’ of its 
veto in discussions on Kosovo, both in the Contact Group and the UN 
Security Council throughout the years. The first concrete involvement 
of Russian diplomats was in the second part of 1998, when Moscow 
exercised its relative leverage over Belgrade, given the traditionally close 
relations between the two capitals and shared religious and Slavic heri-
tage. Russia, faced with an imminent realization of a NATO bombing 
campaign in Yugoslavia, managed to pressure Milošević through indi-
rect channels, to accept negotiations with Priština which temporarily 
suspended the use of coercive force. It was a clear signal for the rest of 
the international community that Russia could act as a useful biased 
mediator as it possessed the necessary leverage to create essential incen-
tives for Serbia to cooperate more on solving the conflict.  Despite this 
contribution, it was only in Rambouillet that the Russians actually got 
involved in a more constructive discussion in formulating peace plans 
with Western countries of the Contact Group, which had been active 
in this matter already since mid-1998. According to Levitin, “the real 
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reason for Russia’s reluctance to join in serious discussions concerning 
Kosovo’s legal status stemmed not from a substantive gap between Ru-
ssian and Western positions, but from the Russian habit of inertia, delay 
and fear of decision-making” (Levitin 2005, 136). Such attitude was a 
consequence of “lack of clear vision” of Russian geo-political preferen-
ces in the Balkans that persisted in Moscow during the 1990s (Levitin 
2005). In other words Russia was lacking a clear idea of its interests in 
the region.
 Until mid-1998, Russia had a very rigid position on the issue of 
Kosovo’s legal status. In 1997, when the Contact Group drafted a very 
vague formulation for Kosovo’s autonomy, Russia’s traditional histori-
cal relations with Serbia prompted Moscow to insist that the principle 
of self-governance gets accepted only if the province remained within 
Serbia’s formal jurisdiction (Levitin 2005, 136). With the outbreak of 
hostilities in the second half of 1998, Moscow started contemplating 
the idea of a special status for Kosovo, always within the Yugoslav fe-
deration. Despite this change of attitude, Russia was very slow to adapt 
to group dynamics within the Contact Group. During the shuttle di-
plomacy episode, conducted by US envoys in late 1998, Russia in prin-
ciple did not oppose any of the formulations proposed for a settlement. 
However, lack of vision and inertia in the conduct of foreign affairs 
made Russia assume a “kind of slack resistance” (Levitin 2005, 136).          
 France was also aspiring to advance its role as a global power and 
tried to challenge the US position to delegate future decision-making 
mechanisms towards NATO and away from the UN Security Council, 
where France was enjoying the same leverage as Russia. Germany and 
Italy were also more inclined to strengthen the role of the UN, and 
initially even indicating that they would not support any use of coercive 
means by NATO unless approved by a Security Council resolution. The 
choice of Rambouillet for negotiation talks (instead of an American 
air base, e.g. Dayton, Ohio where the Bosnian war was settled) was an 
implicit signal to the US that their European partners were resolute to 
approach the crisis in Kosovo with more determination. 
 The only European country that was differing from this position 
was the United Kingdom. In fact, policy makers in London were much 
more inclined towards US policies in this matter and shared the idea 
that NATO should maintain the dominant role in the future admini-
stration of the conflict. However, both countries were well aware that 
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a forceful action by NATO, without a clear mandate from the Security 
Council, would only increase friction within the Contact Group during 
the Rambouillet talks. The fact that there was an undeniable humanita-
rian crisis in the province, gave much more room to consider a coercive 
action and promote it to partners in the Contact Group. Even the UN 
officials backed this vision. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in 
his visit to NATO headquarters, stressed the importance of ‘contempla-
ting’ the use of force to halt internal conflict, despite the reluctance of 
the host government, especially bearing in mind the Bosnian experience 
(Anan 1999).
 In order to have everyone on board and create internal coherence, the 
US strengthened diplomatic contacts with all members of the Contact 
Group. Despite the initial differences, all European countries eventu-
ally agreed to employ coercive power through NATO as a necessary 
incentive in the upcoming talks. The NATO Secretary-General Javier 
Solana publicly announced full support for a political settlement under 
mediation of the Contact Group, which would reaffirm sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and completely protect human and 
other rights of all ethnic groups. At the same time, NATO called both 
sides to end the violence and pursue their goals through peaceful means; 
Yugoslav authorities were asked to start reducing the number of security 
forces in the province while Kosovo Albanians were told to immedia-
tely cease hostilities and provocative actions (Weller 1999, 221). Shortly 
after, NATO officials directly threatened Yugoslav officials with air stri-
kes, despite the continuous acknowledgement of Yugoslav territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, in case they failed to commit to achieve a 
settlement. They also threatened that they would take all appropriate 
measures against the Kosovo Albanian leaders, in case they failed to 
comply with the demands of the international community. The threat of 
use of force was justified as a forcible humanitarian action (Weller 1999, 
223).
 At this point, the stage was set for ‘mediation with muscle’. By the 
end of January 1999, the foreign ministers of the US and Russia met and 
jointly declared that they were determined to “maintain close contact in 
order to coordinate US and Russian support for a resolution of the crisis” 
(emphasis added, Weller 1999, 221). For the US, the only acceptable 
strategy for tackling the situation in Kosovo would be a combination 
of “diplomacy with a credible threat of force”, for which they already 
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had support of their allies and it would be promoted through Contact 
Group (Weller 1999, 221). Even though policy makers in Washington 
were showing the highest level of commitment to resolve the conflict 
in Kosovo, they were aware that they needed partners in order to make 
indispensable inducements for both sides to sit at the negotiation table. 
7.3 Multiparty Mediation Process
7.3.1 The Contact Group’s Mediation Strategy
 Despite the initial internal struggle for power, the Contact Group 
managed to find coherence and shared the idea that the conflict in Ko-
sovo needed to be managed as promptly as possible. The Contact Group 
immediately stepped in with a directive-manipulator strategy and pre-
sented to the parties a document containing “non-negotiable principles/
basic elements” for a settlement. Principles were divided into four gro-
ups: a) general elements, including the necessity of an immediate end 
of violence and respect of ceasefire; peaceful solution through dialogue; 
an interim agreement - a mechanism for a mutual settlement after an 
interim period of three years; no unilateral change of the interim sta-
tus; and international involvement and full cooperation by the parties 
on implementation; b) governance in Kosovo, including a high level of 
self-governance for Kosovo through own institutions; harmonization of 
Serbian and federal laws with the interim agreement; and members of 
all national communities to be fairly represented at all levels of admini-
stration; c) protection of human rights including judicial protection of 
human rights guaranteed by international conventions, establishment 
of an ombudsman office, and a considerable role for international bo-
dies such as the OSCE in the implementation process (Weller 1999, 
225-226). The general principles also included preservation of territorial 
integrity of the FRY and neighboring countries; protection of rights of 
the members of all national communities within the FRY; protection 
of rights for members of all national communities in FRY; free and fair 
elections in Kosovo; amnesty and release of prisoners (idem).
 It was mandatory for the parties to take notice of these non-nego-
tiable principles. The mediators did not require a formal consent on the 
principles, since they were considering the decision of the parties to 
participate in negotiations as an implicit acceptance. Most of the prin-
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ciples were a compilation of proposed suggestions by the US envoys in 
the shuttle diplomacy period. The crucial addition was the mechanism 
of an interim agreement that implied a transitional phase of three years, 
after which a final settlement should be achieved. 
7.3.2 Party Arithmetic 
 The Serbian delegation was composed of three groups. First of all, 
there were prominent political figures from Belgrade that were directly 
mandated by Milošević. Along with them, the delegation included indi-
viduals that were acting as representatives of several non-Albanian eth-
nic groups from Kosovo. However, from the beginning, their represen-
tativeness was put under serious doubt, when numerous communities in 
Kosovo learned about their presence in Rambouillet. As it turned out, 
during the conference, their role was considerably marginal, and they 
were included by Belgrade authorities only as a demonstration of alle-
ged coherence of non-Albanian constituencies in Kosovo. Most impor-
tantly, the delegation consisted of professional negotiators and experts 
that assumed leading roles once the process started.
 The Kosovo delegation was also controversial: members of the le-
ading party LDK composed only one third of the overall delegation. 
The rest of the delegation grouped representatives of opposition parties 
in Kosovo, whose stands on the issues were far less flexible and more 
inclined towards the UCK. And more importantly, there were a consi-
derable number of representatives from the UCK itself. The UCK not 
only became a negotiating partner, but its leader Hashim Thaci was also 
assigned to head the tripartite presidency of the Kosovo delegation. The 
delegation was primarily broadened due to extreme pressure coming 
from Kosovo. This was viewed as acceptable also by the mediators, be-
cause they realized that by excluding the UCK (and other opposition 
parties) from all previous negotiations, they were only losing leverage 
over them. Considering that the UCK became an important actor in 
the conflict, mediators used a particular form of party arithmetic. It im-
plied inclusiveness of additional players that might be constructive for 
the implementation phase once the settlement had been achieved.   
 The mediation was conducted by three key negotiators – Christo-
pher Hill (US), Wolfgang Petritsch (representing the European Union), 
and Boris Mayorski (Russian Federation), all appointed by the Contact 
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Group, and were expected to represent the interest of the entire coaliti-
on and not of their state of origin. Since the Contact Group on previous 
occasions, had declared a shared commitment to resolve the conflict, 
had ‘muscle’ at its disposal, and support from very relevant international 
organizations (such as the UN and the OSCE), the mediators imme-
diately assumed both formulator and manipulator strategies. 
7.3.3 The Mediation Process 
 At the beginning of the conference, both sides received a draft ver-
sion of the political settlement which consisted of a framework agree-
ment and three annexes (on the Constitution of Kosovo, elections and 
an ombudsman). The mediators also formulated a very strict procedure 
for the process of negotiations. Namely, the parties were not expected 
to engage in direct talks, but rather supposed to submit comments on 
the drafts. In case both sides agreed on a modification of the text, that 
change would immediately be included; in case there was no consensus, 
the alteration of the text would not take place and the draft would stay 
unchanged. Modifications were not allowed to diverge from the non-
negotiable principles (Weller 1999).
 From the beginning, the Kosovo delegation assumed a very con-
structive strategy, and immediately submitted written comments on the 
draft, claiming that in principle the document was acceptable and that 
they would suggest some changes in order to improve it. On the other 
side, the Serbian delegation was much less constructive, as it did not 
produce any comments for some time, but engaged in several attempts 
to downplay the position of the Kosovo delegation, but with no success 
(Weller 1999). 
 The Kosovo delegation hoped that its constructive role would be 
rewarded by the mediators, but that never happened. In fact, the me-
diators were much more occupied with urging the Serbian delegation 
to submit some comments and suggestions on the first draft. The first 
proposal from the Serbian block was in absolute collision with non-
negotiable principles, so the mediators “then proceeded to engage the 
FRY/Serb delegation in an intensive dialogue, so as to whittle down 
the wide-raging comments in to a more limited number of submissions 
which might be discussed” (Weller 1999, 229). In such circumstances, 
the Kosovo delegation and its comments were largely ignored by the 
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mediators, until some progress with the other side was made. The revi-
sed draft by mediators came as a shock to the Kosovo delegation, be-
cause it included almost all demands from the Serbian side (such as the 
legal status of Kosovo to be placed into the constitutional settlement, 
veto powers for all community leaders in Kosovo were introduced, and 
a limiting of the authority of Kosovar institutions), while suggestions 
from the Kosovo delegation were largely ignored and only few were 
included (Weller 1999).
 Once the revised draft was presented, mediators suggested to both 
parties to consider it as a final version of political settlement. Both si-
des declined this offer. The Kosovo delegation refused to receive the 
document, considering it as a direct result of talks between mediators 
and the Serbian delegation, which represented a breach of faith that 
they had in the process. In other words, the presentation of the draft 
developed a feeling of distrust and betrayal which seriously jeopardized 
further constructive participation from the Kosovo delegation. Howe-
ver, the mediators were insistent on the matter. Since there was no going 
back to the original draft, the Kosovo delegation presented a statement 
containing a list of necessary changes that needed to be considered if 
negotiations were to succeed. The Serbian delegation was also insisting 
on further changes. Realizing that neither side was willing to accept the 
document, mediators extended the deadline and took into considerati-
on positions from both sides. 
 This time the procedure was somewhat different. Negotiations were 
actually conducted in a form of genuine proximity talks (Weller 1999, 
232). It meant that substantive suggestions from one side were channe-
led through a body of legal experts to the other side. In case the other 
side refused to accept suggested changes, the mediators would aim to 
reduce the scope of alterations and refine them through negotiations 
with both sides until they would concur. Using this method, in a very 
short lap of time, mediators were able to produce a new draft that mer-
ged all previous annexes into a comprehensive document which was 
entitled Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Koso-
vo (S/1999/648, 1999). In sum, the agreement prescribed that Kosovo 
would not be an independent state but a component part of Yugoslavia 
with a status somewhere between an autonomous province and a federal 
unit. Federal laws were supposed to remain in force in Kosovo as long 
as they were compatible with the agreement. The proposed constitution 
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of Kosovo was deeply rooted in the Yugoslav federal tradition, and pres-
cribed ‘sovereign rights at the level of the autonomous sub-state entities’ 
(Stahn 2001, 538). The status of Kosovo within Yugoslavia was to be 
safeguarded by an international supervisory institution with binding de-
cision-making powers. It meant that Kosovo would become a sub-state 
entity under international guarantee and supervision, without assuming 
characteristics of an international protectorate or international territory. 
Despite the international military presence of Kosovo Forces (KFOR), 
Kosovo still remained under the overall external protection of Belgrade 
(Stahn 2001, 538).     
 In the meantime, the mediators also had to put additional pressure 
on both sides, especially on the UCK, which was still reluctant to accept 
anything below independence and was very reluctant to accept the pro-
cess of demilitarization, given the high level of distrust and animosity 
towards Serbian security forces. Thus through a coordinated activity, re-
presentatives of military staffs from all western countries in the Contact 
Group discussed issues of demilitarization in practice, and mechanisms 
of international guarantees that the security in the province would be 
under strict control. From that moment, it was implicit that the KFOR 
would be a NATO-led mission. Ultimately, a very important concessi-
on was given to the Kosovo delegation, which consisted of inclusion 
of the phrase “will of the people” in the part referring to the interim 
period of three years. It meant that implicitly, the people of Kosovo 
were granted a mechanism and a possibility to achieve independence 
after this period. At this point, the Kosovo delegation was persuaded 
by mediators (especially the representative from the US) to accept the 
agreement. The initial response was that the delegation needed time to 
consult the constituencies in Kosovo, but after a short while, the Kosovo 
delegation issued a declaration which “noted that in order to facilitate 
such consultations, the delegation had voted in favor of the agreement 
as presented in the negotiations on 23 February” (Stahn 2001, 233). 
According to Ker-Lindsay, they were aware that unless they accepted 
the proposed agreement they would inevitably loose any form of inter-
national support (Ker-Lindsay 2009, 14).         
 The position of the Serbian delegation was somewhat more con-
fusing. While it was evident that the opposite side was not willing to 
accept the agreement, Serbs were issuing statements containing deman-
ds for further concessions. However, once it was clear that the Koso-
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vo delegation was going to sign the document, the Serbian delegation 
stepped forward with a declaration which emphasized the considerable 
progress towards commonly acceptable solutions that was made during 
the negotiations. At the same time, it asked for further clarifications on 
the issues of Kosovo’s self-government, and on international presence 
in Kosovo during the implementation of the agreement. Thus, for the 
Serbian delegation, the reasons for talks were still not exhausted, and 
negotiations were far from being concluded. 
 The Contact Group, faced with firm stands on both sides, issued a 
joint statement that was a clear sign of a directive strategy. The state-
ment was echoing an ultimatum for both sides. The statement noted 
that “important efforts of the parties and the unstinting commitment of 
our negotiators Ambassadors Hill, Petritsch and Mayorsky, have led to a 
consensus” on substantial issues regarding self-governance and autonomy 
of Kosovo and established a “political framework … and groundwork… 
for finalizing the implementation… including” [emphasis added] (Con-
tact Group Statement, 1999). The mediators indicated that the docu-
ment needed to be completed and signed as a whole by both sides, in 
the upcoming conference on 15 March in Paris, which would cover all 
aspects of implementation. The future conference was not intended to 
be a place where talks on the political settlement could be reopened, but 
only discussions on the issues of implementation of the agreement.  
 In Paris, the Kosovo delegation immediately submitted a letter in 
which it indicated its full acceptance of the interim agreement from 
23 February. The mediators were reluctant to pressure the Kosovo de-
legation to immediately sign, and advised them to postpone this act 
until the Serbian delegation was on board. The Serbian side still had 
its reservations toward the document. In direct communication with 
Serbian delegates, the mediators indicated “the unanimous view of 
the Contact Group that only technical adjustments can be considered 
which, of course, must be accepted as such and approved by the other 
delegation” [emphasis added] (Weller 1999, 234). It was a clear signal 
for the Serbian delegation that possibilities for further concessions were 
completely exhausted at this point. However, the Serbs did not accept 
this, and instead issued a counter-draft which was undoubtedly to re-
open discussions on the political settlement from the beginning. The 
draft was asking for a formal subordination of Kosovo to the federal 
and republican system and complete marginalization of provincial in-
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stitutions. According to some observers, such a proposal was aiming 
to formalize an “institutional system of apartheid” (Weller 1999, 235). 
Ultimately, the draft completely struck out the part regarding outside 
military and civilian presence for the implementation phase. For the 
Serbian delegation it was absolutely unacceptable that NATO forces 
assumed any control in Kosovo (Black, 1999). In those days, Milošević, 
in presence of Russian officials, stepped out and determinedly announ-
ced that Serbia would never accept to withdraw its forces from Kosovo 
and allow the presence of foreign troops on its own soil (B92, 2008). 
On 18 March, the Kosovo delegation signed the agreement, in a formal 
ceremony that was not attended by the Russian delegate Mayorski. It 
showed that coherence and coordination within the Contact Group was 
falling short. For the first time, one of the mediators was not acting as a 
representative of the entire coalition, but rather of a particular country. 
      
7.3.4  Emergence of Diverging Interests between  
the Mediators 
 According to Levitin (2000), Serbia was insisting on the matter of 
not accepting a NATO-led international military presence in Koso-
vo, believing that it would have support from the Russian delegation. 
During the conference, Russian officials were constantly trying to find 
reasons to cast doubt over the Kosovo delegation, labeling it as ‘illegi-
timate’ and inappropriately composed due to the presence of the UCK. 
However, these were not real concerns, but rather tactical feints, without 
any strategic purpose, that were sending false signals to the Serbian 
delegation.  Russian officials were well aware that the agreement was 
not feasible without an outside military that would implement it. Yet 
they avoided to discuss a mutually acceptable arrangement and declined 
to offer any sensible alternative to Western plans to use NATO forces, 
which contributed to the lack of coordination within mediators. As Le-
vitin claims, “the Russian habit of procrastination, especially with regard 
to the military annex of the agreement, contributed to Rambouillet’s 
collapse” (Levitin 2000, 137). Notwithstanding these hard accusations, 
it was obvious that Russia was not sharing the same vision about the 
common solution to the conflict anymore. Its interests were now di-
verging from the rest of the coalition, which contributed to the lack 
of coordination between mediators. It meant that the mediators were 
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unable to coordinate their leverages on both sides: while one group was 
exercising pressure creating required incentives on the Kosovo delega-
tion to accept the agreement, Russians were abstaining from exercising 
indispensable leverage on the Serbian delegation to do the same. As a 
consequence, the Serbian delegation perceived these mixed signals as an 
inducement to assume a much more unyielding position that eventually 
stopped them from signing the agreement.  
 The emerging division within the Contact Group did not surface 
out immediately. In fact, the mediators tried once more to convince 
the Serbian delegation to accept the agreement, reminding them that 
they were mediating with muscle. Once this attempt failed, the Con-
tact Group issued a statement with which it indicated that the Ram-
bouillet Accords were the only peaceful solution to the crisis in Koso-
vo, acknowledged the opportunity taken by the Kosovo delegation to 
accept the Interim Agreement, and blaming the Serbian delegation in 
its attempt to unravel the conference. For all members of the Contact 
Group, there was no purpose to extend the talks. Negotiations were 
adjourned until Serbs expressed their acceptance of the final document. 
The Contact Group was resolute to engage in consultations with other 
international partners that should be ready to act. They earnestly war-
ned authorities in Belgrade to uphold any military activity in Kosovo, 
because “such violations would have the gravest consequences” (Weller 
1999, 236). As hypothesized in H2, Russian lack of cooperation with 
the rest of the Contact Group directly guided the process into a dead-
lock.  
 Despite these warnings, Serbian authorities were continuing their 
initial strategy of deploring troops to Kosovo. At the same time when 
the Contact Group was issuing the last statement, Serbian security for-
ces strengthened the grip over Kosovo, using extremely violent mea-
sures managed to displace around 200,000 of ethnic Albanians outside 
of the province. This was a crucial error in their strategy (Posen 2000). 
These developments represent clear evidence in support of the previo-
usly hypothesized H4 dynamic, where in case mediators do not reach 
such convergence, the conflicting sides will be induced to defect from 
negotiations, making it more likely for the peace process to fail. Vio-
lent measures in Kosovo accompanied by open reluctance to accept the 
Agreement (the final attempt by Holbrooke on March 23 to persuade 
Milošević ended in failure) were a signal for the Western countries that 
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‘muscle’ at their disposal (i.e. NATO) needed to be deployed. On the 24 
March 1999, NATO air forces started a bombing campaign of Serbia, 
which ended after 11 weeks, with numerous civilian and military casu-
alties and extreme material damage.
 The start of the NATO campaign provoked a particularly harsh 
rhetoric on the part of Russia. Officials in Moscow immediately con-
demned the use of force without authorization of the UN Security Co-
uncil, and made symbolic gestures to seize cooperation with NATO 
(Smith and Plater-Zyberk, 1999). According to Antonenko (2000), 
Russia’s reaction to the bombing campaign had little to do with the 
situation regarding Kosovo, but was a direct materialization of a larger 
anti-NATO sentiment and an escape route for post-Soviet frustrati-
ons. For Levitin “the deterioration has to be understood in the context 
of more general and long standing trends in Russian foreign policy” 
(Levitin 2000, 138). Moscow was also continuing to send very mixed 
signals regarding the issue. For instance on March 25, the Russian Fo-
reign Minister Ivanov emphasized that Belgrade should be aware of its 
responsibility for resolving the problem in Kosovo and opt to accept the 
political settlement drafted in Rambouillet. The day after, he declared 
that the Rambouillet peace documents are “practically null and void” 
(Smith and Plater-Zyberk 1999, 4). Nevertheless, in his speech at the 
Duma, Russian President Yel’tzin highlighted that “the tragic mistake of 
the American leadership should not result in a prolonged crisis of US-
Russian partnership” (Smith and Plater-Zyberk 1999, 4). Such mixed 
signals were a clear indication of Russia’s persistent inability to formu-
late a clear set of preferences regarding the issue, as on the one side it 
wanted to maintain its influence in Serbia while on the other side in was 
eager to improve its relations with the rest of the Contact Group. 
 Looking back at the model, despite initial confidence that the me-
diators were able to find internal coherence within the Contact Group 
and aimed at successfully coordinating the multiparty mediation efforts, 
the process never moved from point b. On the one side, initial readiness 
by Russia to work together with the rest of the Contact Group initially 
guided both sides to accept a peace conference and negotiate together, 
which represents an important step toward success. This offers impor-
tant support for what was hypothesized in H3, as apparent convergence 
of interests was guiding the process toward the path of success. Howe-
ver, on the other side, Russia’s initial readiness proved to be a façade as it 
Siniša Vuković
178
was unwilling to employ the necessary leverage to induce their partners 
in conflict (in this case Serbian government) to accept a compromi-
sed solution that was drafted in Rambouillet. As hypothesized in H1 
biased mediators are useful for the process as long as they can extract 
concessions from their partners in conflict. While the Western states 
were able to induce the Kosovo delegation to compromise (thus provi-
ding important evidence for the causal mechanism hypothesized in H1) 
the Russians were unwilling to exercise the needed amount of leverage 
which would “deliver” the Serbian government to an agreement. Finally, 
the lack of success could be associated to Russia’s lack of a clear formu-
lation of preferences, which did not permit an adequate coordination of 
mediators and their leverages, as was hypothesized in H9. 
7.3.5 Inclusion of the UN into the Process
 Russian readiness to be still treated as a partner in the West was best 
demonstrated in June 1999, when the NATO campaign was about to 
turn into a ground operation. Despite the open opposition to NATO 
intervention, Russia extracted a very important concession from Belgra-
de. Using necessary leverage through informal channels and backdoor 
communication, Russian officials persuaded Milošević to accept a cea-
se-fire which would allow an international NATO-led military presen-
ce in Kosovo. Russians acted in the name of the entire Contact Group, 
offering to Milošević that the international military presence would be 
under the UN flag, and thus reduce the possibility of Serbia loosing 
face domestically and abroad. More importantly, Serbia and Russia had 
converging interests to include the UN as a new actor in future con-
flict management activities. In Serbia, Milošević publicly stated that by 
transferring future management of the problems in Kosovo to the UN, 
Serbia would preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity that were 
guaranteed by the UN Charter. He claimed that problems from Ko-
sovo would finally be dealt within the body whose responsibility is to 
preserve global peace and security, and thus reduce the impact of the 
coalition that used muscle to manage the conflict. This was a direct in-
dication that for Serbian authorities, the UN was invested with essential 
legitimacy to act as a new player whose legitimacy was derived from 
norms and values that were inherent to the organization. On the other 
side, Russia managed to transfer future management activities to a body 
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where it had more mechanisms of control. Such developments had a 
potential of providing useful evidence in line with what was hypothe-
sized in 11a, as potential future success was directly related to the fact 
that upcoming UN-led (coordinated) mediation activities were initially 
compatible with interests of powerful states as Russia was in this case.    
In order to create necessary legitimacy for this move, Russia assured 
officials in Belgrade that the UN Security Council would pass a resolu-
tion that would formalize this presence. Given the fact that for Serbia 
the UN involvement was crucial at this point, the official presentation 
of the document was done by special envoy Martti Ahtisaari, which was 
adopted by the Serb parliament on June 3. It meant that the mediation 
process was now joined by a new actor, this time an international or-
ganization. Until then, UN involvement was somewhat sporadic, and 
largely conditioned by power-politics on the international level. It was 
mostly based on the occasional issuing of a resolution, but it was lacking 
any direct involvement in the process.
7.4 The new reality in Kosovo
7.4.1 The Kumanovo Agreement and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244
 The ceasefire was signed on the 9th of June in Kumanovo, a Ma-
cedonian town on the border with Serbia. The Kumanovo Agreement 
reaffirmed the document presented by Ahtisaari to include deployment 
in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and secu-
rity presences. It was noted that the UN Security Council was set to 
adopt a resolution regarding the deployment of an international security 
force (KFOR), that would ‘operate without hindrance within Kosovo 
and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and ma-
intain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise 
carry out its mission’ (Kumanovo Agreement 1999). The following day, 
the UN Security Council passed resolution 1244, which set the foun-
dations for a new reality in Kosovo. The resolution was an evident proof 
of compromise within the Contact Group which was transposed in the 
Security Council. It undeniably refrained from recognizing Kosovo as 
an independent state which reflected the Russian stand, but also absta-
ined from delivering any binding statements regarding Kosovo’s final 
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status that was in line with the Western countries’ position. The conci-
liatory formula was endorsing sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
FRY, while assigning the interim UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
with the task of ‘facilitating a political process designed to determi-
ne Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords’ 
(S/RES/1244, cl.11, 1999). As Stahn (2001) noted, this vague formula 
allowed a variety of scenarios. Evidently, the allusion to the sovereignty 
of the FRY seemed to signify that in any potential future scenario regar-
ding Kosovo, this province would remain part of the FRY. Nevertheless, 
by mentioning the Rambouillet Agreement which prescribed that the 
future status would be determined by the ‘will of people’, the resolution 
seemed to be more open to interpretations concerning Kosovo’s final 
status. 
 Pending final settlement of Kosovo’s status, the resolution charged 
UNMIK (headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General) 
with the administration of the province. Its mandate was to promote the 
establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, 
perform basic civilian administrative functions, organize elections and 
maintain law and order with all means necessary (Stahn 2001). Despite 
the fact that the resolution did not lay down a strict deadline for the 
establishment of necessary institutions, once they were established, they 
had to be transferred to the people of Kosovo in anticipation of a final 
settlement (Stahn 2001). In practice, the Mission was bestowed with 
classical powers of a state: the Mission introduced a different currency, 
established its own legal system and signed international agreements on 
behalf of the province. In other words, in practice, from the beginning, 
the FRY was dispossessed of its sovereign rights over Kosovo under 
the United Nations interim administration (Stahn 2001). As the Se-
cretary-General pointed out, UNMIK became “the only legitimate aut-
hority in Kosovo” (S/1999/1250, par.35). According to several authors 
(Stahn 2001, Stahn 2001a, Ruffert 2001, Kreilkamp 2003, Perritt Jr. 
2005, Knoll 2005, Knoll 2006; van Willigen 2009), Kosovo was tran-
sformed into an ‘internationalized territory’. This neutral term indica-
ted that the FRY was prohibited from exercising any form of power in 
Kosovo, while the UN administration was “pre-empted from disposing 
over the territory” (Stahn 2001, 540). In legal terms, the UN would act 
as a trustee that had absolute administering power over the province for 
a limited time without acting as a new sovereign (Ruffert 2001, Stahn 
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2001). Once the task of preparing the province for self-governance was 
complete, UNMIK had to transfer its authority to a different entity that, 
according to the resolution, should be found under a political settlement 
(Stahn 2001a).
7.4.2 UNMIK Regulations and the Constitutional Framework 
for Provisional Self-Government  
 From the beginning of its mission, the Special Representative issued 
various regulations which contained basic ‘constitutional’ rules. Accor-
ding to these regulations, all powers (legislative, executive and judi-
ciary) were vested in UNMIK and had to be exercised by the Special 
Representative. Institutions that were gradually being established (the 
Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo, the Independent Media 
Commission, the Housing and Property Directorate, the Housing Cla-
ims Commission, etc.) were characterized by joint administration – a 
Kosovar and an UNMIK representative - and were based on the idea of 
good governance and other democratic principles. As Ruffert noted, the 
UN were “furnishing Kosovo … with governmental and administrative 
institutions to bestow upon the respective populations the opportunity 
to exercise their rights of self-determination” (2001, 626).  
 In May 2001, the Special Representative promulgated the Consti-
tutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government (Constitutional 
Framework) which was intended to be a major step towards the esta-
blishment of provisional self-government in Kosovo, beginning with 
the election of a constituent assembly in November 2001 (Regulation 
2001/9, Kreilkamp 2003). Under this document, the Provisional Insti-
tutions of Self-Government (PISG) were to be: the Kosovo Assem-
bly, the President of Kosovo, the Kosovo Government, and the Kosovo 
courts – institutions that would “normally be associated with a state of 
the sub-entities of federation” (Stahn 2001a, 151). It is very important 
to note the latter fact, because such a scenario – Kosovo enjoying the 
status of a de facto equal federal entity in Yugoslavia while de jure still 
part of Serbia - was prescribed by the Rambouillet Accords, which were 
turned down by FRY at that time. 
 Again the document was a result of a political compromise which 
was reflected in (again) ambiguous language. Despite the fact that the 
term ‘constitutional’ might have provoked high expectations among Ko-
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sovo Albanians, the document did not have any direct reference to the 
achievement of independence for the province and in fact thoroughly 
avoided any term directly associated with it. At the same time, the FRY 
was not mentioned at all in the entire document. In laymen terms, Ko-
sovo was not explicitly confirmed to be part of either the FRY or Serbia, 
which implicitly meant total suspension of their administrative control 
in Kosovo. This document initiated a slow devolution of power from 
UNMIK to local authorities. Significant aspects of legislative, executi-
ve, and judicial power were to be transferred to local institutions (both 
of the central and municipal administration). Soon after the adopti-
on of the Constitutional Framework, both the Special Representati-
ve and UNMIK were facing severe criticism: internally, from Belgrade 
and from the international community. According to the report by the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, “under UNMIK 
constitutional provisions … the UN administration retains … vice re-
gal powers, appropriate to colonial dependency, rather than to a self-
governing people” (Kreilkamp 2003, 648). The report emphasized that 
the international administrators had “pervasive distrust of the admini-
strative and political capacity of the population” which seems to clarify 
the reasons behind constitutional provisions adopted in the Framework 
(idem). The report that was published in 2001 called the international 
community to grant Kosovo with “conditional independence” which is 
“quite distinct from limited self-rule under UNMIK” (Kreilkamp 2003, 
651). 
 Serbian authorities in Belgrade were not pleased with the Fra-
mework, claiming that it was violating the spirit of Resolution 1244 
which “enshrines their right to carry out certain state functions in what 
they still view as Serbian province” (Knoll 2005, fn. 16). Based on this 
position, the Serbian government encouraged the Serbian minority 
living in Kosovo to boycott the provisional institutions, and for this 
reason established parallel structures of government in municipalities 
where Serbs were the majority, especially in the areas of education, ju-
stice and health care. By not participating in provisional institutions, the 
Serbian side implicitly acknowledged the fact that provisional instituti-
ons that were being established were to be exclusively Kosovar and out 
of Belgrade’s control. This made it possible for the Kosovo Albanians to 
feel absolutely detached from Serbian presence in the province. Given 
the fact that UNMIK was mandated with an interim assignment, it 
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was part of its task to strengthen the established institutions in order 
to accomplish “the setting-up and development of meaningful self-go-
vernment in Kosovo pending a final settlement” (Regulation 2001/9, 
par. 2). Gradually, Kosovo was establishing all the institutions that were 
necessary to have a functioning independent state.
 In such an environment, the province awaited the signal from the 
Security Council that the talks on future status might begin. On 23 
May 2005, the UN Secretary General appointed Ambassador Kai Eide 
to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Kosovo in 
order to appraise if the conditions were suitable to permit political dis-
cussion on final status. On 7 October 2005, Eide concluded that “while 
the standards implementation in Kosovo had been uneven, the time was 
ripe to enter the final-status negotiation process” (D’Aspremont 2007, 
650). His remarks were immediately approved by the UN Security Co-
uncil, which a few days later decided to initiate “a political process desi-
gned to determine Kosovo’s future status” (S/PRST/2005/51). The Co-
uncil appointed Martti Ahtisaari as a Secretary General’s Special Envoy 
for Kosovo (UNOSEK), who on 14 November 2005 officially begun 
consultations and talks with Kosovo Albanians and Serbian authorities.
7.5 Multiparty Mediation by the UN
7.5.1 The Initial Coherence in the Contact Group 
 From the beginning, Ahtisaari has been given ‘considerable room 
to maneuver’ by the Contact Group (ICG, 2006). The Contact Group 
provided him with a working framework, through Ten Guiding Princi-
ples. He was instructed that once started, the process cannot be blocked 
and must be brought to conclusion, that the result may be determi-
ned by who quits the table first rather than by compromise (Idem, 1). 
The settlement needs to include and promote elements such as regional 
stability, sustainable multi-ethnicity, preservation of international civil 
presence in the province, dismissal of partitioning Kosovo, and highli-
ght that any unilateral moves or acts of violence would not be tolerated. 
From that moment it was evident that the new process of mediation 
was a particular combination of formulator and directive strategies. On 
the one hand, the Contact Group was again prescribing non-negotiable 
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principles and setting up the expected spirit of the agreement, while 
Ahtisaari was supposed to explore, formulate and offer best solutions to 
both sides. Despite the fact that the ten principles were non-negotiable, 
it was already questionable whether they were prescribing a very clear 
mandate for Ahtisaari as to where the process should lead. 
 Privately, all Contact Group countries saw monitored, conditional 
independence as the only viable outcome. According to a British di-
plomat, during the December 2005 meeting in Paris, “the taboo on the 
outcome had completely gone … everyone was talking about indepen-
dence, and in front of Russians… they did not object”  (ICG 2006, 
11). Indeed, on several occasions, Russian diplomats had indicated their 
acceptance that full independence was the only viable outcome (ICGa 
2006, 2). It appeared that Russia perceived the new reality in Kosovo in 
the same way as other members of the Contact Group. The developing 
consensus in the Contact Group was translated in London, in January 
2006, into the joint Ministerial Statement, where it indicated that the 
settlement had to be “acceptable to the people of Kosovo”, and that the-
re was no going back to the status prior to 1999 (Contact Group Lon-
don Statement, 2006). However, the real concern whether and when to 
publicly announce the Contact Group’s view of the outcome remained. 
There was a fear that expressing their support for the independence 
of Kosovo too soon, Priština - satisfied with the outcome – might not 
be willing to give any concessions afterwards, while dissatisfied Ser-
bia would leave the negotiations. The Contact Group’s goal was “to get 
sufficient acquiescence from both sides so a settlement can be written 
into a new Security Council resolution to supersede 1244” (ICG 2006, 
13). Indeed, none of the Contact Group’s members was inclined to im-
pose a solution without at least Belgrade’s implicit consent. For this 
reason, the Contact Group and Ahtisaari’s team insisted that Kosovo 
Albanians would need to deserve their independence through tangible 
initiatives and concessions in order to accommodate Serbian requests. 
As Ahtisaari’s deputy Rohan immediately indicated “their aspirations 
and status will not come automatically… much work has to be done” 
(Rohan 2005).
7.5.2 Actor Transformation and UN Legitimacy
 From the beginning of his mandate, Ahtisaari assumed a very con-
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structive procedural-formulator strategy. He first explored the positions 
of both sides for a period of three months, through informal talks in 
Belgrade and Priština. It is noteworthy to highlight that in the interim 
period, the two sides went through a phase of actor transformation, 
which is commonly identified as a very valuable feature in managing 
intractable conflicts (Bercovitch 2005). In Serbia, Milošević was ousted 
by a more democratic government. In Kosovo, Rugova died in January 
2006 (just before the first official round of talks begun) and the poli-
tical party of the demilitarized UCK took over. Despite the fact that 
there were new actors on both sides, neither one changed its previous 
position. In Belgrade, the new government was ready to negotiate with 
Priština, thereby indicating its detachment from pre-1999 politics of 
stubbornness; but it remained resolute that Kosovo was an integral part 
of Serbia, as resolution 1244 prescribed. For the Serbian authorities, the 
UN-led mediation process was supposed to provide sufficient assuran-
ce that Kosovo could not secede from Serbia, because it would violate 
resolution 1244 which directly described Kosovo as an integral part of 
Serbia. They also warned that any decision made by the UN envoy had 
to be in line with the UN Charter that undoubtedly guaranteed invi-
olability of borders of a sovereign state. Thus for the Serbian side, the 
UN was invested with an essential level of legitimacy to prescribe future 
behavior deriving from norms (i.e. the UN Charter and the resolution 
1244) that officials in Belgrade viewed as essential in the upcoming 
process. 
 On the other side, transformed UCK leaders were expecting forma-
lization of the actual situation on the ground, where Kosovo was already 
developing all necessary institutions for a functioning independent state 
and where Serbia did not have any influence since 1999. Thus authorities 
in Kosovo also perceived the UN involvement as a mechanism through 
which the mediation process would gain more legitimacy, because the 
new contextual factors that were conditioning the ongoing mediation 
process were a direct normative product of the UN and its specialized 
bodies. They assumed that the UN would not neglect the reality on 
the ground which was directly set up by the UN administration of the 
province. It was clear that both sides maintained unyielding positions 
from their previous administrations that, again, were extremely difficult 
to reconcile.  
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7.5.3 The Mediation Process 
 Ahtisaari realized that the only way to reduce the gap between the 
two sides, was if he could structure the negotiations in such a way that 
‘technical’ issues, which were causing less friction, were tackled first. This 
way both sides would provide concessions, which would consequently 
pave the road to the last question regarding final status. He set up a ti-
meframe for talks, and stressed his expectancy that negotiations should 
be concluded within 2006. Technical issues that were to be tackled were: 
decentralization, community rights, protection of the Serbian Ortho-
dox Church, claims of state property and debt. The official talks started 
on 20 February 2006 in Vienna, where Ahtisaari and his team (UNO-
SEK) had their headquarters. Once again, the selection of the place for 
the talks was an indication that the issue was of primary concern for 
the European countries of the Contact Group, and that it was expected 
that, through the EU, they would be able to create expected incentives 
for both sides to agree on a negotiated settlement. The EU policies were 
perceived as the main carrot in the process, as both Serbia and Kosovo 
declared their commitment to the EU integration process. 
 The talks were conducted less expediently than what was initially 
expected. In five rounds of talk, substantial differences between the 
two sides surfaced out. The Kosovo delegation was initially extremely 
reluctant to talk about decentralization, unless the issue of status was 
first addressed. On the other side, the Serbian delegation, which was 
getting signals from the Contact Group that Kosovo was going to be 
granted conditional and monitored independence, wanted to stall the 
talks as much as possible and use that time to lobby within the Contact 
Group, especially with the Russian officials, emphasizing their legali-
stic approach towards the issue. Nevertheless, signals that were coming 
from Western capitals and Moscow were not encouraging. France was 
the first member of the Contact Group that indirectly warned Serbia 
that its legalistic approach against Kosovo independence would not find 
support and that it needed to face reality (ICG, 2006). Soon after that, 
Italy advised Serbia to realize that conditional independence would be 
the main topic of the talks in Vienna. Finally, in late 2005, Russia made 
it clear to Serbia that Moscow would not be drawn “into confrontation 
with the West over Kosovo” and that they would not veto a new Secu-
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rity Council resolution that would promote independence, given that 
might be the outcome of the negotiation process (ICG 2006, 11).  
 Under considerable pressure from the outside, the Kosovo delega-
tion started giving out remarkable concessions regarding decentraliza-
tion, protection of minority rights and the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
These concessions, however, were paralleled by increased signaling from 
the Contact Group - on several occasions it was unofficially announced 
that there was consensus within the Contact Group on the final status 
and that the people of Kosovo should be better prepared for indepen-
dence (B92, 2006). And while the Kosovo delegation was complimen-
ted for its efforts to compromise, the Serbian delegation was warned for 
its inflexibility in negotiations. The fact was that the Serbian delegation 
did not even have a platform for negotiations until the end of March, 
so despite the fact that procrastination might have appeared tactical, it 
was primarily unintentional. However, once the platform was presen-
ted, the Serbian delegation demonstrated a certain will for compromise 
by offering a formula, “less than independence more than autonomy”, 
for Kosovo as part of Serbia. According to Serbian Foreign Minister 
Drašković, in light of the new reality on the ground and the change of 
political elites in Belgrade, the Serbian government was ready to accept 
that it did not have authority over Kosovo, and that Kosovo would be 
able to retain 95 percent of control and administration, while only fo-
reign affairs and the military would be in the domain of Serbia or as he 
put it “Kosovo can get everything apart from a separate seat in the UN” 
(Drašković 2006). Ironically, the Serbian delegation was now offering 
the same platform that the Rambouillet accords prescribed, which was 
callously rejected by Milošević. 
 As the time for negotiations was running out, the mediators were 
becoming well aware that it was highly unlikely that they would achie-
ve a negotiated settlement on Kosovo’s final status. It was clear that 
once Kosovo officials were aware of the fact that independence was 
imminent, they would become impatient, less disposed to negotiate, 
and would start to urge the international community to formalize their 
new status. On the other hand, high officials from Serbia, also realizing 
forthcoming independence for Kosovo, stated that recognizing Kosovo 
was not an option and equal to political and national suicide for every 
politician in the country, and that no one is disposed to assume such 
responsibility ( Jeremić, 2006). 
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7.5.4 Emergence of Diverging Interests within   
the Contact Group
 Once the mediators anticipated that all opportunities to achieve a 
mutually acceptable settlement were exhausted, they decided to delegate 
the issue to the UN Security Council to “impose independence” (ICGa, 
2006) through a superseding resolution. At that moment, within the 
Contact Group, initial fractions were surfacing out. The Quint (the in-
formal group of western members of the Contact Group) was well awa-
re that the Serbian side was correct in its reassertions that the Security 
Council could not declare Kosovo independent, because it was against 
the UN Charter to violate a member state’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. For this reason, they were trying to establish a method through 
which using a new Security Council resolution, the settlement might be 
imposed. The most uncertain factor at that moment was Russia’s stand. 
Russia started claiming that it would not support any settlement that 
would be imposed on Serbia, and that the outcome should be accep-
table for both sides. Despite the fact that Russia signed the London 
Ministerial Statement, this dissent was deriving from Moscow’s newly 
formulated foreign policy interests, which were again sending very con-
fusing signals to both Serbia and the rest of the Contact Group. The 
Contact Group members were confident that Russia was inclined to 
benefit from the precedent established by Kosovo’s independence by 
securing international recognition of ‘friendly mini-states’ – Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Transdniestria – which would break away from Ge-
orgia and Moldova using Kosovo as a model (ICGa, 2006). Despite the 
fact that Russia had a large interest in having Kosovo as a negative pre-
cedent, publicly it was renouncing it, stating that “if Kosovo’s indepen-
dence is recognized despite Serbia’s will, this will create a very negative 
precedent in international relations” and that it was ready to use veto 
power in case the Kosovo solution did not conform to Russia’s interests 
(Lavrov quoted in ICGa 2006, 2). Clearly, Serbia understood this as an 
explicit support for its position, and consequently hardened its stand. 
 Given the new developments, the rest of the Contact Group aimed 
to reduce friction and a potential domino effect, by arguing uniqueness 
of the Kosovo case and that it could not provide a blueprint for other 
secessions and self-determination claims (ICGa 2006, 2). The first com-
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promise within the Group was formulated in the New York Statement, 
where ministers looked forward to a “durable solution to the last major 
issue related to the break-up of Yugoslavia” (Contact Group New York 
Statement 2006). Following this statement, and recognizing that the 
opportunities for negotiations had been exhausted, Ahtisaari decided 
to present a comprehensive settlement package to the Contact Group. 
Given the potential discomfort of Russians with the term independen-
ce, he opted for a document that would only in substance imply inde-
pendence, while refraining from using the actual word. The settlement’s 
lack of direct reference to independence was intended to curtail the 
resistance, and improve the chances, of its acceptance by all members 
of the Contact Group and by both conflicting sides, and “postpone any 
discord until a later point in the process” (ICGa 2006, 3).
 The presentation of the document was scheduled for September 
2006, but it was postponed until February 2007 due to parliamentary 
elections in Serbia, and fear of the Contact Group that even implicit 
consideration of Kosovo’s independence would result in yet another ac-
tor transformation in Serbia, but this time a less constructive one. Serbia 
interpreted statements coming from Russia as an indicator of a lack of 
consensus within the coalition. Consequently it represented a possibility 
to stall the process and delayed the formation of government until the 
last moment in May 2007, in order to avoid being blamed for ‘losing’ 
Kosovo and expecting that the Contact Group would be less inclined 
to impose a resolution without an executive authority in Serbia (ICG 
2007, 7). Ahtisaari presented two documents to the Secretary General: 
the Proposal – an outline for state formation that was harmonizing the 
idea of an internationally supervised entity and an independent state – 
and the Report on the reasons behind the proposal. He explained his 
position as follows (S/2007/168, 2007):
 “For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete 
separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and 
judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not 
exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it 
is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the 
overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its autho-
rity without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of 
Serbia — however notional such autonomy may be — is simply not tenable… Upon 
careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and ta-
king into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion 
that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial 
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period by the international community.”
 The UN Security Council held a closed meeting on 19 March 2007, 
where all the diverging interests and perceptions surfaced out. For the 
Western countries of the Contact Group both the proposal and the 
report were supposed to be accepted, because Kosovo urgently needed a 
sustainable solution to its status and any delay would lead to instability. 
The Russian delegation, however, proposed retention of resolution 1244 
with selective implementation of parts of the proposal. It also rejected 
any notion of time running out for Kosovo, and objected to make a 
rushed decision. Most importantly, Russia accused Ahtisaari for con-
ducting shallow and abbreviated negotiations (ICG 2007, 6). 
 Russian refusal to accept the proposal formulated by Ahtisaari indi-
cates that in case the mediation efforts conducted (and coordinated) by 
an international organization are not compatible with a powerful state’s 
interest, the mediation effort is less likely to be successful - a dynamic 
hypothesized in H11a. At the same time, lack of success can be attribu-
ted to a lack of convergence of interests between Russia and the rest of 
the Contact Group, which conferred the needed level of legitimacy to 
the UN envoy to formulate and if needed impose a solution on their be-
half as well. Lack of convergence of interest once again led the process 
to a deadlock, as hypothesized in H2. Finally, while initial indication of 
a convergence of interests within the Contact Group induces Serbia to 
start realizing that the independence of Kosovo was imminent, eventual 
Russian defection from the rest of the Contact Group induced the Ser-
bian government not to accept Ahtisaari’s proposal and to start stalling 
the process - a dynamic which provides (important) evidence in support 
of H4.    
7.6 The Additional Attempt to Mediate by the Troika
7.6.1 Diverging Ideas on the Process between Mediators
 Faced with Russian dissent, the US, UK, and France decided to 
stop drafting a new Security Council resolution. The French president 
Sarkozy proposed another round of talks, this time conducted by the 
Troika – US, Russia and the EU – in order to accommodate Russi-
an demands that negotiations need to continue until both sides find a 
mutually acceptable solution. For the first time in the Kosovo conflict, 
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the EU assumed a role of the actor with the most responsibility in the 
process. The talks took place in Brussels. The role of the EU was to ba-
lance opposite stands of the US and Russia, and using a formulator role, 
thereby trying to ensure that every conceivable solution would be taken 
into consideration. Just as Ahtisaari, the Troika avoided talking about 
status issues, but rather focused on cooperation and future relations 
between Serbia and Kosovo. A fourteen-point document was proposed 
which outlined that special relations between the two sides were ba-
sed on the principles that: a) Belgrade will not govern nor reestablish a 
physical presence in Kosovo; b) it will not interfere in Priština’s relations 
with international financial institutions nor hamper Kosovo’s EU stabi-
lization and association process; and finally, c) that it accepts Kosovo’s 
complete integration in regional bodies, especially economic instituti-
ons (Troika proposal, 2007). Again, the mediators were confronted with 
unyielding positions from both sides. While Belgrade was insisting that 
negotiations should focus on substantial autonomy for Kosovo, Priština 
was considering independence as non-negotiable and wanted to nego-
tiate its post-status relations.  
 However, the lack of consensus on how the negotiations should be 
conducted was not anymore just between Belgrade and Priština. This 
time, mediators had highly opposite views on the format of talks. The 
EU representative, Wolfgang Ischinger, who proposed the fourteen po-
ints, assumed a much more formal role, using the formulator strategy. 
His idea was that the Troika talks should leave ‘no stone unturned’ in 
the search for a compromise agreement “which even if only partial co-
uld have shifted some responsibility from Western capitals to Belgrade 
and Priština” (ICGa, 2007). On the other hand the Russian diplomat 
Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko translated his country’s position of “not 
imposing a settlement” into a communicator strategy, claiming that 
the two sides needed to find a compromise on their own, and that the 
mediators should only facilitate the talks. The differences in positions 
about the format of talks undoubtedly reflected the diverging interests 
between the mediators, who obviously did not share the same idea on 
the common solution to the conflict. The lack of shared ideas between 
mediators directly affected their coordination. During the negotiations, 
mediators were rarely offering joint proposals, rather individual sugge-
stions that were openly rejected during official talks by other mediators.
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7.6.2 Lack of Coordination between Mediators
 Initially, mediators agreed to ‘suggest’ to both parties an ‘Ahtisaari-
plus plan’, which implied a loose association or union between Serbia 
and Kosovo, which aimed to complement the plan for internal gover-
nance from Ahtisaari’s proposal. The ‘suggestion’ was at first informal, 
in order to explore the positions on both sides regarding the proposed 
‘association of states’ model. For Priština, this represented an ‘Ahtisaari 
minus plan’, since it was shrinking political independence in exchange 
for an extremely ‘interdependent’ relationship with Belgrade and access 
to global financial institutions. For Serbian officials, the association of 
states model was absolutely unacceptable as it formulated ‘independen-
ce by another name’ (ICGa 2007, 4). Despite such positions, all Western 
capitals urged Ischinger to present this model officially, because appa-
rently, there was little hope for compromise and mediators needed to 
assume a much more directive role. However, Russia blocked the official 
presentation, and the Troika had to compromise for a vaguer ‘neutral 
status’ proposal, according to which Serbia and Kosovo would concur 
on instruments for stabilizing their relations ‘prior to and regardless of 
the ultimate status decision’ (Idem). It was obvious that mediations were 
not going forward at all. In such conditions, the mediation process be-
came not only a reconciliation process between Belgrade and Priština, 
but also a process of appeasement between the three mediators. The 
difficulty of reconciling US, Russian, and European positions were evi-
dent until the end of talks, which directly hampered the Contact Group 
from giving any clear recommendation to the UN Secretary-General. 
On December 10th, after two years of negotiations and eight years after 
the first international involvement, the Troika officially declared nego-
tiations exhausted without reaching any compromise.
 The failure of the Contact Group to formulate a common platform 
was a direct indication that its member states did not share a common 
interest in reaching a solution to the Kosovo problem. Their inability to 
negotiate an agreement amongst themselves consequently led the peace 
process to a deadlock, as neither party in conflict was willing to compro-
mise any further - providing sufficient support for H2.
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CHAPTER VIII: Sri Lanka
 The civil war in Sri Lanka, an ethnic conflict between the govern-
ment and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), has been one 
of the longest, most intractable intrastate conflicts in Asia. According 
to the International Crisis Group (ICG), more than 70,000 people 
were killed in the north and east from the 1980s to 2006 (ICG 2006). 
Hundreds of thousands have been displaced, many of them more than 
once. Several unmediated and mediated peace talks have taken place, 
but none has ever produced a peace agreement. The last peace attempt, 
which formally lasted from 2002 to 2006, producing the cease-fire 
agreement (CFA), six rounds of peace talks in 2003, and two rounds 
in 2006, became defunct in 2006, when the warring parties once again 
started exploring a military solution to the conflict. This chapter discus-
ses Sri Lanka’s fifth peace process during 2002-2006, for this was the 
duration of the peace talks before hostilities resumed.
 The fifth Sri Lanka peace process was highly internationalized, in-
volving several important world players that had both tactical and stra-
tegic means at their disposal. Also, as Goodhand argues, the case is 
interesting because of “the emergence, more by default than by design, 
of a strategic complementarity between different international actors. . 
. . Each had different approaches, different sets of alliances within Sri 
Lankan society and consequently different points of leverage” (Go-
odhand 2006a, 39-40). 
 The Sri Lanka peace process represents a unique case of a failed 
multiparty mediation effort potentially due to third-parties’ lack of 
strategic interests to manage the conflict in a coordinated effort. The 
case offers an opportunity of exploring the relevance of a lack of third-
parties’ strategic interests to coordinate their mediating activities and 
employ the needed leverage to guide the conflicting parties toward a 
mutually successful solution. While the parties involved in the media-
tion coalition indicated their willingness to work together, their lack of 
strategic interests hampered the possibility of achieving a convergence 
of interests needed for a successful mediation effort. 
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8.1 Nature of the Conflict
8.1.1 Sources of Intractability and Employment   
of Repressive Measures
 The events that developed into the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict star-
ted after the end of the British colonization, with the new constituti-
on of 1948. According to Rotberg, the 1948 constitution “lacked a bill 
of rights like India’s,” or anything that could provide “effective formal 
protection for minorities” (Rotberg 1999, 5). The state’s discriminatory 
policies led to anti-Tamil riots in 1956, followed by the deadlier riots of 
1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983. Since 1983, the country has been entangled 
in a civil war waged between the Sinhalese dominated government and 
the Tamil community, which was primarily represented by the LTTE. 
From 1983 until 2006 the civil war has caused more than 74,000 vic-
tims, and large areas of the country have been “ethnically cleansed” from 
Tamils (Sisk 2009, 148). The infamous 1983 riot caused thousands of 
Tamil refugees to flee to India and Western countries—the beginning 
of the large Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. This diaspora later played a ma-
jor role in financing the war waged against the government (DeVotta 
2007). The full-scale war between the Sri Lankan defense forces and 
the LTTE started in 1983 and ended on May 19, 2009, with the go-
vernment declaring victory over the rebels.
 All these developments led to the further development of Tamil mi-
litant groups, most notably the LTTE, founded in 1976 and led by Ve-
lupillai Prabhakaran. They were created as a reaction to the 1972 consti-
tutional changes, which prescribed Buddhism as the country’s primary 
religion and Sinhalese as the official national language (Stewart 2002; 
Sisk 2009). LTTE was able to successfully formulate the nationalistic 
ideology of the Tamils and develop a parallel economic system within 
the territories it controlled.   The central goal for the LTTE was an in-
dependent country, the Tamil homeland called Eelam. Rotberg argues 
that “by the time the war begun the Sri Lankan society had become 
irredeemably polarized” (Rotberg 1999, 7). As the Tamil frustrations 
grew, periodic episodes of violence aggravated the strained relations 
between two communities. By 1983, violence spread to Colombo, with 
hundreds of Tamils killed by Sinhala mobs “with the tacit tolerance of 
security forces” (Sisk 2009, 152). The riots were provoked by ambiguo-
us reports that around the area of Jaffna the LTTE had killed 13 Sri 
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Lankan army personnel, inducing retaliation by the army in which 44 
Tamils were killed (Sisk 2009, 152). The Human Rights Watch argued 
that the events were an orchestrated event, as “the police and soldiers 
stood by and watched as Tamils were attacked… in some cases they per-
petrated the acts themselves… the violence was well organized and po-
litically supported… high ranking officials, including government mini-
sters were accused of orchestrating the violence” (Human Rights Watch 
1995, 88). Sri Lanka’s civil war has produced five distinguishable roun-
ds of peace talks: The Thimpu talks in 1985, the Indo-Lanka Accord 
in 1987, the Premadasa/LTTE talks in 1989-1990, the Kumaratunga/
LTTE talks in 1994-1995, and the Wickremesinghe/LTTE-Rajapak-
sa/LTTE talks in 2002-2006.
8.1.2 Failed peace processes
 According to Sisk, a history of failed peace processes contributed to 
the conflict’s intractability (Sisk 2009, 153). Significantly, some of the-
se talks avoided the core political issues, instead concentrating on hu-
manitarian, logistical, or military issues (Rupesinghe 2006c). Also, the 
negotiations were occasions for the warring parties to rearm themselves 
and, as Uyangoda puts it, “discover new differences” and “reconstitute 
the conflict” (Uyangoda 2007, viii). Biswas observes, “While the party 
in power tends to adopt a more conciliatory position, the one in oppo-
sition follows a more belligerent and critical path. This, in turn, impacts 
the progress of talks between the government and the Tamil separatists. 
Ultimately, this has created a situation where facilitative intervention 
does create room for talks but no agreement is reached” (Biswas 2006, 
59).
 The significant developments preceding the peace process were the 
economic recession in Sri Lanka, the escalation of the war in 1999-2001, 
which made for a war-weary population, and the post-9/11 atmosphere 
worldwide. Until then, the LTTE, through its strong lobby abroad—
particularly in countries with a large Tamil diaspora—had been able to 
sell itself as an organization of freedom fighters, protecting a Tamil mi-
nority that had been harassed by the majority rule for decades. As Pai-
kiasothy Saravanamuttu, head of the local non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) Centre for Policy Alternatives, points out, “11 September 
impacted on the LTTE’s political psyche and its room for manoeuvre 
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internationally in respect of funds, legitimacy and acquisition of wea-
pons” (Saravanamuttu 2003, 132). In the changed environment, it beca-
me more difficult for the LTTE to keep up its freedom-fighter image 
and thereby ensure the same level of fund-raising from its diaspora and 
NGOs in Western countries. Moreover, several powerful countries had 
already listed the LTTE as a terrorist organization, further limiting its 
ability to operate in these countries: in India since 1992, the United 
States since 1997, and the UK since 2001. All these developments made 
the LTTE revise its tactics and increased its motivation to look for a 
settlement. At the end of 2001, the economic crisis and the escalation 
of the war led to the government’s fall, and a coalition of parties called 
the United National Front (UNF), led by the United National Party 
(UNP), won the elections in December 2001. This coalition was led by 
Ranil Wickremesinghe, Sri Lankan prime minister during 2001-04 and 
the so-called architect of the peace process. Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga, of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), remained pre-
sident, which led to an uneasy cohabitation.
8.1.3 Prelude to the Peace Process
 The UNF government, and Wickremesinghe in particular, made 
very clear from the start that its priorities were the peace process, with 
the inclusion of the international community, and the revival of the 
economy (Bastian 2006). After Wickremesinghe took office, things 
started to move rapidly. The cease-fire agreement, signed in February 
2002, provided for the end of hostilities and the establishment of the 
Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to monitor implementation 
of the cease-fire between the parties. From September 2002 to March 
2003, six rounds of direct negotiations were held between the LTTE 
and the government of Sri Lanka. The SLMM was a monitoring team 
comprising Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland, whose 
role was to be an impartial instrument to monitor the CFA and facilitate 
the resolution of disputes over implementation. With the resumption of 
hostilities, the SLMM became more war monitor than peace monitor. 
Its operations were further complicated in the summer of 2006 when, 
following the EU ban on the LTTE, the LTTE demanded the depar-
ture of all EU countries from the mission. The SLMM remained in Sri 
Lanka until the abrogation of the CFA by the Sri Lankan government 
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in January 2008 (SLMM 2008). Another significant achievement was 
the statement, made by the parties at an Oslo press conference in 2002, 
on their intention to explore the federal option. The parties stated that 
they had agreed “to explore a solution founded on the principle of in-
ternal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-
speaking people based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka” 
(Daily Mirror 2002). This was the first time the parties considered a 
federal solution and the LTTE backed down from its secessionist goal 
(Höglund and Svensson 2006). 
8.2 Multiparty Mediation Process
8.2.1  Involvement of International Actors and their  
Interests in the Conflict
 A conscious effort to create an “international safety net” was one of 
the most important strategies of the UNF. Prime Minister Wickremes-
inghe’s first policy statement, before the CFA was signed, made it clear 
that he considered international opinion a key factor in guaranteeing 
peace in Sri Lanka. As Sunil Bastian points out, this strategy brought 
in the United States, Japan, and the EU as cochairs of the peace pro-
cess, in addition to Norway. “In doing so, the UNF managed to secure 
the involvement of a ‘superpower,’ its major trading partners and Sri 
Lanka’s largest donor, in the peace process” (Bastian 2006, 247). The 
common motivator for the external actors was the perception of the Sri 
Lanka case as an “easy win” (Goodhand 2006b). Goodhand argues that 
in 2002, international actors were willing to “prioritize peacebuilding 
because it appeared to be a low risk-high opportunity situation” (Good-
hand 2006a, 15). And Uyangoda criticized the international community 
for focusing mainly on short-term success and approaching the peace 
talks “as an exercise that should produce an early peace deal” (Uyangoda 
2006, 4). 
 The mediating actors were divided into those that engaged the 
LTTE (Norway, the EU, and Japan) and the United States, which did 
not. However, the United States did signal to the rebels “that a change in 
LTTE behavior could lead to a change in the U.S. approach” (Lunstead 
2007, 16). Donors encouraged the establishment of joint government-
LTTE mechanisms, such as the Post-Tsunami Operational Manage-
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ment Structure, but these initiatives did not succeed.
 Norway, a small country with no specific geopolitical interests or 
colonial past, has had a good record of conflict mediation since the early 
1990s. Until its involvement in Sri Lanka, Norway has played a pro-
minent role in the following peace processes: the Oslo Accords (until 
1993); Guatemala (1996); Haiti, Sudan, Cyprus, and Kosovo (1999); 
and Colombia (2000) (Bullion 2001). There are perhaps three main rea-
sons for Norway’s becoming involved as a mediator in several peace 
processes. First, its political and social culture is considered suitable for 
mediation activities, since it has a tradition of development assistance. 
Second, an image as a peacemaker and a “great moral power” is impor-
tant for Norway’s self-perception (Höglund and Svensson 2009, 179). 
Third, engaging in the peace talks of intrastate wars has enabled Norway, 
a small and distant Nordic country, to be an arbiter between the global 
powers and the developing countries, thereby taking a much more sig-
nificant role on the international arena than it would have otherwise 
(Moolakkattu 2005; Höglund and Svensson 2009). Kelleher and Taul-
bee point out that Norway has a consistent approach to peacemaking, 
the key components being time, patience, secrecy, funding, and activist 
facilitation. By taking a leading role in Sri Lanka, Norway seemed to 
deviate from its preference to hold more of a supportive and low-profile 
role and to “conduct relevant activities under the ‘radar screen’ of public 
scrutiny” (Kelleher and Taulbee 2005, 80). 
 Norway first became involved in Sri Lanka’s peace process in 
1999-2000. Erik Solheim was appointed as a special adviser to the Nor-
wegian Department of Foreign Affairs in March 2000 and took a full 
role as facilitator after the UNF government took office in December 
2001 (Bullion 2001). One of the main reasons the actors chose Norway 
as the mediator was that it had no strategic interests in Sri Lanka. As 
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar stated, Norway was consid-
ered suitable since it is a small, faraway country with no colonial back-
ground and, therefore, was seen as not having an agenda of its own. 
Moreover, it also had experience in peacemaking (Ram 2001). Also in 
Norway’s favor, India accepted it as an external mediator, because India 
did not see this small, remote country as a threat to its own strategic in-
terests in the region (Moolakkattu 2005). Norwegians themselves have 
pointed out that they got involved for a mix of reasons, beginning with 
its long-term development aid projects in Sri Lanka and also including 
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personal contacts through Norwegian NGOs and individuals (Rupes-
inghe 2006b). And Norway’s interest in Sri Lanka may not have been 
related to the conflict itself but rather to the possibility of getting ac-
cess to the highest offices of the global powers (Höglund and Svensson 
2009). Although Norway’s wider reputational concerns may explain 
why it stayed involved in Sri Lanka’s conflict long after the peace pro-
cess became defunct, they were not likely a main reason for Norway’s 
original involvement in the process in 1999-2000. For one thing, at that 
time Norway could not have foreseen a regime change and subsequent 
successful start of the process, which would attract other players. 
 According to the statements made by Norwegian mediators, Nor-
way’s primary role was as a facilitator. Its involvement ranged from facil-
itating communication between the parties to more concrete formulator 
roles in drafting the CFA and the Oslo Declaration. Norway made it 
clear from the beginning that it saw itself as merely a “postman” be-
tween the two sides (Economist 2001). It defined its job as finding the 
common ground that integrated the most important concerns of both 
parties that both might later accept. The Norwegian facilitators stated 
clearly that ownership of the conflict was with the warring parties and 
not with themselves. Erik Solheim stressed that “it has to be remem-
bered that at the end of the day President Mahinda Rajapaksha and 
the LTTE leader Prabhakaran will decide. If they want peace, we are 
here to assist. If they want war, there is nothing we can do” (Rupesinghe 
2006b, 344-45). The Norwegians’ job of postman was also endorsed by 
the Sri Lankan government. In April 2001, Foreign Minister Laksh-
man Kadirgamar said in an interview, “But when it comes to substantive 
negotiation, the Norwegians will have no particular role at all. . . . They 
will have no mandate to propose solutions. They will certainly have no 
mandate to make any judgmental decisions. In that sense, they’re not 
arbitrators, they’re not judges, they’re not mediators” (Ram 2001). This 
strategy of staying out of ownership of the conflict and focusing on 
the “two-party model” has been later criticized as having reduced Nor-
way’s legitimacy, and when the peace process became stalled, Norway 
did have rather limited leverage to stop the escalation of the conflict 
(Höglund and Svensson 2009). It was also suggested that this neutral 
role of low-key facilitator was alien to the collectivist culture of Asia, 
thereby creating confusion (Moolakkattu 2005). 
 Norway’s second tactic was, in cooperation with Prime Minister 
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Wickremesinghe, to widen and strengthen the international safety net. 
As a result of this strategy, the Unites States as the global player, the EU 
as the biggest trading partner, and Japan as the biggest donor became 
the cochairs to the process. Although India was not officially involved in 
the process as a cochair, Norway held regular consultations with India 
throughout the process and considered its consent on the different steps 
of the peace process crucial to progress.
 Third, Norway tried very hard to appear impartial to both parties 
and to the public of Sri Lanka. As the Norwegian facilitators them-
selves put it, “Our only principle is that of not excluding talking to 
anyone” (Martin 2006, 125). Engaging directly with the LTTE, thereby 
giving legitimacy to a group that several powerful countries had already 
listed as a terrorist organization, was not making them many friends 
among Sinhala nationalists. Also, as Harriet Martin states, “In becom-
ing facilitators for the peace process in Sri Lanka, the Norwegians were 
taking on a pariah insurgency group with whom none of their natural 
political allies could even, officially at least, have tea with” (Martin 2006, 
126).
 But this tactic of impartiality failed, partly because the image of im-
partiality is difficult to uphold in asymmetrical conflicts, and thus, right 
at the beginning of the process, Norway (through Erik Solheim) came 
under criticism for being biased in favor of the LTTE (Höglund and 
Svensson 2009). Additionally, wearing a hat of a monitor of the cease-
fire violations by being involved in the SLMM did not help maintain 
Norway’s reputation as a neutral mediator. In their attempt to treat both 
parties as equal, the Norwegians were not helped by the LTTE’s enthu-
siastic comments calling them “the white tigers” (Martin 2006, 113). 
 Fourth, as in previous peace processes, one of Norway’s tactics was 
to be patient and keep focused on long-term goals. During the peace 
talks, Norway demonstrated laudable patience with the warring parties. 
The realities of working under this level of criticism created a survival-
ist attitude in the facilitating team. As one of the facilitators put it, “If 
you want to get involved in this process, you should not expect not to 
get your fingers burned, you should expect to get them electrocuted” 
(Martin 2006, 116). Norway did put up with the fierce attacks from 
Sinhala nationalists, and personal abuse in the local media. During the 
peace process, the Norwegian embassy was picketed by protestors car-
rying coffins with dead bodies inside and burning the Norwegian flag 
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(ICG 2006). Considering all this pressure, Norway’s commitment to 
the peace process was consistent and intrepid. Its mediation activities 
relied primarily on low-key tactical strength. But Norway did seem to 
realize that more strategic strength was needed to keep the parties at 
the negotiating table. To that end, it brought in big powers that had the 
necessary sticks and carrots, as custodians of the process, in the hope 
that they might compensate for Norway’s lack of strategic strength. 
This seemed reasonable because, as discussed earlier, mediations that 
combine strategic and tactical strength tend to be more successful than 
those with only one or the other. The remaining part of the chapter will 
discuss why this strategy did not prove successful.
 The United States has repeatedly demonstrated, in peace processes all 
over the world, that it can and will use its manipulative strength. Strong 
involvement in very visible conflicts has contributed to the perception 
that if the United States is involved, it likely has a strong, even hid-
den, agenda in that particular country and is ready to deploy its strate-
gic strength. But the United States had neither a historical record nor 
strong trade and economic relations with Sri Lanka, and U.S. develop-
ment assistance had already decreased significantly since the end of the 
Cold War and was slated to be cut even further, from around $5 million 
annually in 2001-04 to $2 million in 2005 (USAID 2000). Although 
some Sri Lankan Tamils live in the United States, the diaspora there, 
at 35,000 people, is too small to significantly influence U.S. politics or 
policymaking (Bandarage 2009, 21). It has been argued that the United 
States has military interests regarding Trincomalee Harbor and run-
way facilities in Sri Lanka (Noyahr 2006). But Jeffrey Lunstead, U.S. 
ambassador to Sri Lanka in 2003-06, has stated that the United States 
does not have “significant strategic interests in Sri Lanka” (Lunstead 
2007, 11). Lunstead contrasts Trincomalee with Singapore, where the 
U.S. Navy has a major facility: “Singapore is ideal because of its internal 
stability, its superb facilities and infrastructure, and its position. Trin-
comalee currently lacks all of these, and is unlikely to gain any of them 
in the foreseeable future” (Lunstead 2007, 11). Moreover, even within 
South Asia, U.S. strategic interests are focused on India as a nuclear 
power and a growing economic partner but also, to some extent, a po-
litical partner in the region. The United States also has strategic inter-
ests in Pakistan as a nuclear power and in the tensions between India 
and Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the battle against al-Qaeda 
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(Kronstadt 2004, Lunstead 2007). Also, since India has made clear that 
it demands primacy in its immediate neighborhood and since both po-
litical and military relations between the United States and India have 
been improving significantly over the past few years, the United States 
was not interested in stepping on India’s toes over Sri Lanka. As Lun-
stead argues, the United States shared information and, to lesser extent, 
coordinated its policies with India during its involvement in Sri Lanka’s 
peace process (Lunstead 2007). 
 The only area where the United States had certain strategic interests 
in Sri Lanka was in “political relations and ideological compatibility,” 
namely, the war on terror. But it is important to keep in mind that the 
LTTE was a very localized terrorist organization that carried out its 
activities, especially in recent times, mainly in Sri Lanka. Its ties with 
worldwide terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda are either insignifi-
cant or nonexistent; therefore, its power to threaten U.S. interests is 
minimal compared to that of terrorist groups with worldwide activities 
(Lunstead 2007). 
 So why did the United States get involved in Sri Lanka’s peace pro-
cess in the first place? Lunstead points out that it was not due to any 
dramatic change in U.S. strategic interests, but because regime change 
in Sri Lanka brought to power a pro-West, pro-free-market prime mi-
nister and because of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s per-
sonal interest (Lunstead 2007, 13). In a speech delivered in Washington 
in 2003, Armitage asked, “Why should the United States invest signifi-
cant attention and resources to Sri Lanka, especially at a time when we 
have such overwhelming competing interests?” (Armitage 2003, 89). He 
admitted that self-interest did not truly justify U.S. involvement, yet his 
reply when questioned was nevertheless straightforward: “. . . because it 
can be done. And because it is the right thing to do. Because the parties 
to the conflict appear to be ready to reach a resolution, more so than 
at any other time in the past twenty years.” The most significant part 
of his answer, “because it can be done,” was also supported by Teresita 
Schaffer, another former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka, who also gave as 
one of the reasons for U.S. involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict that 
“there was the real possibility of success” (Noyahr 2006, 373). This per-
ception of an “easy win” was, as Goodhand points out, common for all 
the main international actors in this peace process (Goodhand 2006a, 
2006b). It was the main reason for the United States and others getting 
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engaged in the process and then sneaking away when success proved 
more elusive.
 The U.S. position consisted of three components: “pressuring the 
LTTE, engaging with the government and supporting activities aimed 
at peaceful transformation” (Frerks and Klem 2006, 43). Since the Unit-
ed States had banned the LTTE in 1997, it could not provide mate-
rial assistance, and LTTE officials could not obtain visas to the United 
States. The condition for U.S. engagement with the LTTE was that 
the LTTE give up the violent struggle. It would have been politically 
untenable in the post-9/11 world to meet with terrorist representatives, 
and therefore, the United States had no direct talks with the LTTE. The 
United States was the only cochair to give military aid to the Sri Lan-
kan government. Although military assistance funding never reached 
high levels, it could have contributed to a feeling within the LTTE 
that the international community was reducing its options (Lunstead 
2007). At first, the U.S. policy not to engage with the LTTE seemed to 
work out well enough within the framework of the cochairs, in which 
the United States took the role of “bad cop” while the EU played the 
“good cop,” engaging directly with the LTTE (Höglund and Svensson 
2011). But the LTTE suspended the talks after the U.S. decision not to 
let it attend the Washington Development Conference in April 2003. 
Although some have argued that this occasion was rather a ready excuse 
for the LTTE to get out of the peace process, the U.S. decision provided 
that excuse nonetheless. In response, the United States maintained its 
pressure, stating that the movement’s reasons to withdraw were “not 
convincing” (Asian Tribune 2003). 
 The limited U.S. strategic interest in Sri Lanka showed also in the 
waning U.S. interest in the peace process. According to Lunstead, it was 
first the deterioration of the peace process and then the beginning of a 
second George W. Bush administration, in January 2005, that resulted 
in Deputy Secretary Armitage’s departure (Lunstead 2007, 33). But it is 
also important to note that in March 2003, the United States started its 
military operation in Iraq—an operation that became highly criticized 
and was clearly one of the Bush administration’s main strategic foreign 
policy interests. The stalled peace process in a small, faraway country 
“with minimal strategic interests for the US, with a deteriorating secu-
rity situation based in part on the inability of Sri Lankan political ele-
ments to cooperate,” was not a priority for the United States (Lunstead 
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2007, 33). The United States remained engaged in the peace process 
through the cochairs framework, but its visible involvement did not go 
beyond condemning statements regarding the escalation of the hostili-
ties, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. 
 The European Union has also been called a “reluctant cochair” due to 
its modest involvement in Sri Lanka before and at the beginning of the 
peace process (Noyahr 2006, 387). Similarly to the U.S. involvement, the 
EU’s involvement in Sri Lanka was minimal before the 2002 peace pro-
cess. In 2001, the European Commission downgraded the delegation in 
Colombo), leaving a nonresident head of delegation based in Delhi, and 
only one diplomat based in Colombo. Heavy lobbying from Sri Lankan 
officials brought the EU reluctantly to involve itself in the peace pro-
cess, which led to its role as a cochair (Noyahr 2006). The EU’s main 
strategy seemed to be to “stick with the Norwegians,” and it kept a low 
profile throughout the peace process because of “the absence of major 
direct interests” (Frerks and Klem 2006, 46). Most EU member states 
do not have strong interests in Sri Lanka, and only seven of the twenty-
seven members have diplomatic missions there: the UK, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany, and Romania. The country with 
the closest ties to Sri Lanka is its former colonizer, the UK, which had 
300,000 Sri Lankans living in its territory. Other EU member states do 
have Tamil diasporas, but these are small: some 100,000 Sri Lankan Ta-
mils live in France, 60,000 in Germany, 24,000 in Italy, 7,000 in the Ne-
therlands, 6,000 in Sweden, and 600 in Finland (Bandarage 2009, 21). 
With the EU cast as the “good cop,” in November 2003 EC Commis-
sioner on External Relations Chris Patten met with the LTTE’s leader, 
Prabhakaran, in Kilinochchi (European Commission 2003). Some saw 
this as swimming against the current, since some other top officials, 
such as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, had decided not to visit the 
LTTE (Frerks and Klem 2006). Sri Lankan media heavily criticized 
the EU for the visit, with local newspapers screaming, “Keep Patten out 
of the country,” and accusing him of “bloody European gumption and 
insolence of the highest order” (Martin 2006, 116). The EU was keeping 
to its “stick with the Norwegians” tactics by visiting Kilinochchi after 
the Norwegians’ statement to the diplomatic community in Colombo 
that the LTTE needed to see people in order to grow into the political 
mainstream. But after the visit, the EU issued a strong statement on 
the LTTE’s human rights violations and warned the group that it must 
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comply with international human rights standards if it wished to obtain 
“recognition as a political player in Sri Lanka” (Martin 2006, 128). 
The LTTE lost its “good cop” in May 2006, when the EU used one of 
its sticks and listed the LTTE as a terrorist organization in response to 
the August 2005 assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Kadir-
gamar, and other human rights violations. The Council of the EU’s 
declaration stated that the decision should not come as a surprise to 
anybody. “Several warnings have already been provided to the LTTE, 
which the LTTE has systematically ignored” (Council of the European 
Union 2006). Although the EU did not focus that much on denouncing 
terrorism, it did concentrate on human rights violations such as child 
recruitment and political killings (Frerks and Klem 2006). Therefore, 
although it was ready to engage with the LTTE despite the LTTE’s 
reputation and the overall “war on terror” environment, it was the use 
of specific methods typical of terrorist organisations, such as assassina-
tions of top officials and other grave human rights violations, that made 
Brussels take a strong stance.
 The success of this stick (or carrot, from the perspective of Sri Lan-
ka’s government) regarding the progress of the peace talks was not really 
clear and seemed rather limited. The EU remained committed to the 
process in Sri Lanka to some degree, issuing condemning statements, 
alone and in cooperation with other cochairs, regarding humanitarian 
and human rights concerns. However, during the period of 2002-06, 
the EU did nothing beyond this. Also, it has been argued that the con-
flict got little attention in Brussels—for example, the ICG observed, 
“While fighting raged in August 2006, the situation did not even reach 
the agenda of EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels.” The ICG also 
suggested the “limited geopolitical impact” of Sri Lanka’s conflict as the 
reason for this low interest (ICG 2006, 19).
 Until recent years, Japan, despite being an economic superpower, 
was not active in global politics but remained satisfied in the role of a 
passive donor. Recent years have seen a gradual shift in its international 
positioning, with it emphasizing noneconomic sources of power, such 
as military and diplomatic power. Laurence argues that one of the most 
important reasons for this change is concern over China’s increasing 
influence (Laurence 2007). Japan assumed a prominent role one month 
after the peace talks started, when Yasushi Akashi, a former UN under-
secretary for humanitarian affairs, was appointed special envoy for the 
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Sri Lankan peace process. The Japanese Government hosted the donors’ 
conference in June 2003, to discuss the peace negotiations and inter-
national assistance for development and reconstruction in Sri Lanka 
(Noyahr 2006). Japanese policy in Sri Lanka’s peace process was to po-
sition aid as a major engine of peace. But Japan did not want to resort 
to conditionalities or political pressure. Moreover, Japanese ties with 
Sri Lanka have traditionally been very government focused, and this 
policy continued in the peace process. Although Japan had not banned 
the LTTE, it refrained from making funds available to it. It was not 
that Japan wanted to punish the LTTE as a terrorist organization, but 
rather that Japanese aid in general flowed through governments and, in 
exceptional cases, through UN agencies. According to Frerks and Klem, 
“It was clear that Japan wants to enter the international arena of peace-
building and also wants to keep the money flowing. They were sucked 
into the Tokyo process but were not very happy about it” (Frerks and 
Klem 2006, 45). 
 India was the only country with strong strategic interests in Sri 
Lanka. For decades, India has perceived itself as the regional manager 
of South Asia and has not allowed other external forces’ involvement 
in the region (Rao 1988). “India has always had substantial intelligence 
resources in Sri Lanka, including being involved in counterinsurgency 
initiatives against the LTTE, whose autonomous power India seeks to 
crush” (Philipson and Thangarajah 2005, 47). The Sri Lankan conflict 
has influenced India’s political situation, since already in the 1980s the 
conflict spilled over into the south Indian State of Tamil Nadu, where 
Tamil guerrilla groups set up and where thousands of Sri Lankan Tam-
ils fled following the anti-Tamil riots in 1983 (Samaranayake 2006). 
Several Tamil Nadu political parties used the resulting large-scale sym-
pathy in Tamil Nadu. The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, signed by the 
governments of India and Sri Lanka in 1987, and the subsequent mis-
sion by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka were fail-
ures: The Indian armed forces failed to disarm the LTTE while losing 
some 1,300 troops (Bullion 2001). This was a shock for India, and it 
showed the limits of India’s capacity to deploy strategic strength and 
act as a security manager in South Asia. The peacekeeping saga ended 
for India with the LTTE’s assassination of former prime minister Rajiv 
Gandhi in 1991. India banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization the 
following year and issued an arrest warrant for Prabhakaran. Thereaf-
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ter, India has kept a firm stand in not getting formally involved in Sri 
Lanka’s peace process. After the fifth process started off, Indian for-
eign secretary Kanwal Sibal visited Sri Lanka and admitted that though 
“logically we should be involved,” the “legal complexities” were such 
that “our options are certainly limited” (Sambandan 2002). These legal 
complexities are based on the LTTE’s banning for crimes in India, in-
cluding the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. But because all parties rec-
ognized India’s strategic interests in Sri Lanka, both the government 
and the LTTE, as well as the mediators, regularly consulted India. The 
Norwegians stressed that all the key points were discussed with India 
since the peace could not be achieved without India’s support and since 
“India’s interest in Sri Lanka is legitimate” (Rupesinghe 2006b, 339). 
Nonetheless, India accepted the Norwegian involvement only with 
great reluctance and generally resented the increased internationaliza-
tion in its own “backyard” (Philipson and Thangarajah 2005). 
 Although, India had clearly stated that it would not become a for-
mal party to the fifth peace process, there were still voices calling for 
its stronger intervention after the fighting resumed. As the CPA re-
port points out, in the case of more limited international interest in 
Sri Lanka, India would have been the only candidate for high-profile 
intervention as the regional power, but in this case it was “conditioned 
by the ‘once bitten twice shy’ effect of the IPKF experience in the late 
80s.” The CPA further states that Indian interest in Sri Lanka has also 
changed as economic interests are increasingly taking the central place. 
“Consequently, high profile political or in the extreme case, military in-
tervention, carries with it the risks of upsetting and even undermining 
the growing economic stake” (CPA 2007, 5).
8.2.2 The Cochair system
 The cochairs of the peace process—Norway, Japan, the United Sta-
tes, and the EU—became institutionalized as a group at the Tokyo Con-
ference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka, which took 
place in June 2003 without the LTTE’s participation. At this conferen-
ce, the donors collectively pledged foreign aid of approximately US$4.5 
billion over the four-year period 2003-06 and closely linked this to the 
progress of the peace talks (Shanmugaratnam and Stokke 2004). This 
conditionality policy, perceived as a big carrot, was about to become a 
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big failure by the international community. Positive incentives did not 
succeed in getting the parties back to the negotiating table. Neither Sri 
Lanka nor the LTTE was aid dependent, and the conference added to 
the LTTE’s increasing unhappiness, since it felt that it was not being 
treated as an equal party. Also, the LTTE saw no point in international 
fund-raising when “it did not have a legally constituted instrument un-
der its control to receive the funds for reconstruction” (Shanmugaratnam 
and Stokke 2004, 16). Since several important donors still banned the 
LTTE, it was not clear how the organization could enjoy the benefits of 
the policy of incentives. In the end, the tsunami that struck Sri Lanka in 
December 2004 flushed away the remnants of the conditionality policy 
because “the threat of withholding aid in an ‘over-aided’ environment 
will have very little effect” (Goodhand and Klem 2005, 14). The “donors 
dangled the carrot assuming the process was moving in the right direc-
tion, but when this proved to be a false assumption they did not replace 
the carrot with a stick” (Frerks and Klem 2006, 54).
 Relations between cochairs were considered good: they were mainly 
speaking with one voice by issuing common statements, with no signi-
ficant spoilers among them. The cochair mechanism provided a broad 
base as well as a division of labor (ICG 2006).
 But this division of labor was accidental and “based purely upon the 
policies of the home foreign ministry and aid ministry policies, not on 
the needs of the peace process in Sri Lanka” (Philipson and Thangara-
jah 2005, 48). Moreover, the way the mediators split the tasks did not 
seem to put to good use the different types and degrees of leverage that 
each could apply to the warring parties. Although it could be argued 
that the U.S. strategy of being a biased mediator who would deliver the 
government could have produced important results, this potential was 
never used to the fullest (Touval and Zartman 1985). On one hand, 
the United States lacked the strategic interest to motivate its use of 
more decisive carrots and sticks in its relations with the government in 
Colombo. On the other, by widely ignoring the LTTE, the United Sta-
tes weakened the chances of making the LTTE more flexible in peace 
talks. The United States has engaged with terrorist organizations before, 
when engagement furthered its own strategic interests. Not talking to 
the LTTE was a policy choice, not a legal requirement (Lunstead 2007). 
Therefore, this suggests that the limited role of the United States resul-
ted from its limited strategic interests in the conflict.
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 The cochairs’ use of sticks was limited to condemning statements. 
Several scholars and organizations, including Uyangoda, Bouffard and 
Carment, Smith, and the CPA, have criticized this level of involvement 
that does not go beyond scolding. As the parties to the conflict became 
aware of the mediators’ limited interests and restrained use of sticks, the 
mediating parties’ leverage was also limited. The CPA stated that the 
government of Sri Lanka was aware of the limits to international inte-
rests in Sri Lanka, which paved the way to the “let’s see what we can get 
away with” attitude toward international opinion.” Moreover, the go-
vernment also realized that it could engage with other, non-Western in-
ternational actors, such as Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia, which were 
willing to offer their assistance without any conditions (CPA 2007). 
That prediction proved true. The new kid on the block, offering uncon-
ditional financial, military, and diplomatic support, has been, since early 
2007, a player with straightforward—and certainly strategic—interests: 
China. After the March 2007 agreement that allowed China to build a 
$1 billion port in southern Sri Lanka, allegedly to use as a refueling and 
docking station for its navy, Beijing appears to have significantly increa-
sed arms sales to Sri Lanka. China has also provided crucial diplomatic 
support in the UN Security Council, blocking efforts to put Sri Lanka 
on the agenda, and also boosted financial aid to Sri Lanka, even as We-
stern countries have reduced their contributions (Page 2009). A spoiler 
had indeed emerged.
8.2.3  Failure of the Peace Process
 In 2003, the United States barred the LTTE from attending a semi-
nar held in Washington to discuss the peace process, on the grounds 
that the United States listed the LTTE as a terrorist organization. In 
response, the LTTE suspended the talks and refused to attend the To-
kyo conference of June 2003, where donors had pledged $4.5 billion to 
the peace process. The LTTE stated that the international community 
and the Sri Lankan government had failed to recognize it as an equal 
party to the process. The peace process stalled. This was complicated 
by the cohabitation crisis between President Kumaratunga, of SLFP, 
and Prime Minister Wikcremesinghe, of UNP. The crisis had been sim-
mering since the beginning of the peace process, because the president, 
who was the commander in chief, head of state, and head of the cabi-
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net—with the power to call for elections at any time she liked after the 
government had been in office for a year—was largely excluded from 
the peace process. The crisis culminated in the president’s taking over 
three key ministries in November 2003, followed by the dissolution of 
the parliament and, finally, the downfall of the UNF government (Fer-
nando 2006). But Oslo’s facilitation continued after the government 
changed and also after the newly elected president, with a nationalist 
and pro-military-solution platform, Mahinda Rajapaksa of the SLFP, 
came to power in 2005. 
 In 2006, the no-war, no-peace period that had lasted since the peace 
process stalled in 2003 descended into a low-intensity conflict, then 
into open war, particularly in the east. Nonetheless, two rounds of peace 
talks (Geneva I and II) did take place in 2006 in Geneva. The first round 
was held on February 19-20, and the second on October 28-29. But 
the 2006 efforts to get the peace process moving essentially failed. The 
failure to implement the agreements of Geneva I severely undermined 
the prospects for further talks.
 The peace talks, which had started off so promisingly, led by a deep-
ly committed prime minister and experienced Norwegian mediators, 
stalled in 2003 and failed in 2006, for a variety of reasons. For one, Sri 
Lanka’s ethnic conflict has repeatedly demonstrated a capacity for in-
tense reescalation (Uyangoda 2007). As Höglund and Svensson point 
out, one of the motivations for the cease-fire, for both sides, may have 
been the opportunity to rearm and reorganize for the future (Höglund 
and Svensson 2009). Therefore, it appears that one of the reasons the 
peace process failed was because the parties never really lost the appetite 
for a military solution (Smith 2007). Second, the parties failed to sign 
even an interim settlement agreement. With no political agreement, the 
relationship between the government and the LTTE was based entirely 
on the CFA. Uyangoda points out that the basis for the negotiations 
and the CFA “was the preservation of the parties’ strategic interests 
through a condition of no-war. . . . Consequently, the problem-solving 
and conflict transformation approach became entirely absent” (Uyango-
da 2006, 4). Third, the peace process was focused exclusively on two par-
ties: the government, led by Wickremesinghe, and the LTTE. President 
Kumaratunga and other southern political elites were largely excluded 
from the process, and non-LTTE Tamil parties and Muslim parties 
had no role at all. As pointed out by the ICG, “much of the dynamic of 
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this conflict is within ethnic communities, and the failure of the peace 
process to address this, made a lasting peace less likely” (ICG 2006, i).
In 2004, two significant developments changed the balance of power 
between the parties. The defection of the LTTE’s eastern commander, 
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as Colonel Karuna, and the 
losses suffered by the LTTE’s naval wing in the tsunami of December 
2004 led some sections of the government and armed forces to believe 
that the LTTE’s offensive capacity was weakened and that a highly con-
centrated war against the LTTE, with the help of the breakaway fac-
tion, would be winnable (Uyangoda 2006).
 In conclusion, all the above-mentioned developments induced the 
parties to start exploring their military options again and contributed to 
the subsequent failure of the talks. But without discounting the inter-
nal developments that contributed to the failure of the peace talks, it is 
important to understand the part that the international mediators and 
their self-interest played in the peace process. Third-parties’ interests 
proved to be quite weak to engage in a properly coordinated multiparty 
mediation process. Therefore, the evident lack of strategic interests wit-
hin the cochair system created an environment within which Norway 
was unable to successfully coordinate multiparty mediation efforts thro-
ugh the cochair system - providing support for previously hypothesized 
H9. The leverage that the third parties possessed was never used to gu-
ide the disputants toward a mutually acceptable solution. Instead the 
mediators, such as the US or even the EU, blocked any possibility of 
reaching a solution through the peace process due to their reluctance to 
engage in direct talks with the LTTE. This “defection” strategy created 
internal incoherence within mediating coalition, which was a signal for 
the government (which had solid relations with the US and the EU) 
that a military solution could be still explored. This provides sufficient 
evidence of the existence of a causal mechanism that was previously 
hypothesized in H9, indicating that in case mediators do not reach a 
convergence of interests, the conflicting sides will be induced to defect 
from negotiations, making it more likely for the peace process to fail.
 The fact that in the case of Sri Lanka the needed strategic intere-
sts hampered the achievement of convergence of interests between the 
third-parties as the process was unfolding. Weak interests in the conflict 
induced the parties not to rethink their policies as the peace process was 
hitting the wall. This research hypothesized that in cases where the third 
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parties realize that their ongoing strategies are not producing expected 
result they will be induced to rethink their policies (H7). However, due 
to a lack of interest in the conflict the parties were not also interested in 
altering their strategies. As the mediators were unable to reach conver-
gence of interests, and rather maintained their initial position regarding 
the conflict, the conflicting sides saw this as a signal of not committing 
to the peace process as well, and eventually resorted back to violence, 
which confirms previously hypothesized H4.

discussion and conclusion
CHAPTER 
IX 
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Chapter IX: Discussion and Conclusion
9.1 Insights from the model
 The model presented in this dissertation underlines that employment 
of cooperative strategies for parties involved is actually more beneficial 
than spoiling the process. In fact, even cumulative costs of cooperating 
and mediating complemented with potential benefits of acting as a spo-
iler still do not manage to match the benefits generated by cooperative 
strategies. As the model shows, although the choice of non-cooperating 
at first might appear appealing for a third-party, spoiling the process 
might actually backfire. Third-party’s decision not to cooperate while 
the multiparty endeavor is under way - thus implying that other media-
tors are engaged in the mediation in a cooperative manner - undercuts 
its own potential to exercise influence (or leverage) in the mediation and 
looses the potential to create expected benefits for itself and its partner 
side in the conflict. As long as the biased mediator is outside the media-
ting coalition, the conflicting party it is supporting might still remain in 
the process. In such circumstances the chances that potential solutions 
will be tilted to its partner’s advantage (i.e. conflicting side it supports) 
get reduced. Consequently, as that particular conflicting side is loosing 
through mediation, so will its outside partners (i.e. biased mediators), 
even though they are officially not cooperating in the process. For in-
stance, the international reputation of a third party might be undermi-
ned. At the same time their leverage to influence future developments 
in the process might be considerably undercut. Therefore, the model 
induces a conclusion that both the non-cooperative outside actor and 
its partner party to the conflict will face far smaller benefits than those 
who opt to cooperate and potentially (through constructive dialogue 
and exercising necessary leverage) move the proposed solution to their 
advantage. 
 In light of a lower payoff, it is expected that a rational (biased) me-
diator will chose alter its strategy and start cooperating with the rest of 
the group. Although the process of cooperation implies certain costs, 
and as such produces smaller utility that in cases when no party coo-
perates (point (a) in the model), the choice of altering the strategy and 
start cooperating will undeniably generate bigger benefits compared to 
those attained if a mediator remains outside the mediating coalition. By 
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being a part of the mediating coalition, each mediator is able to exercise 
a certain influence over the process, and potentially negotiate a solution 
that is in favor of the side in the conflict that they have special relations 
with. Thus, (biased) mediators attain important utility as the conflicting 
side that they support actually starts gaining important benefits through 
mediation. Despite the costs of mediating and cooperating, the second 
outside actor still manages to create greater benefits through coordina-
ted activities than if it opted to spoil the process and stay outside of the 
coalition. This only if the assumption from ToM - that mutual defection 
is not an option any more - continues to hold. Therefore, the model 
prescribes a dynamic that unequivocally remains in line with the initial 
statement and definition that cooperation implies the creation of new 
gains for each party that were unavailable to them by unilateral action, 
albeit at some costs (Zartman and Touval 2010).
 If interpreted through classical game theory, cooperation represents 
a dominant strategy in this model, and the Nash equilibrium is point 
(c) (2,2). ToM also provides a similar interpretation, given that once 
the multiparty mediation starts, cooperative behavior produces higher 
payoffs than defection, and the final state is also in point (c). Ove-
rall, cooperation can be identified as a rational strategy that leads to 
nonmyopic equilibria. Once a party chooses to cooperate, short-term 
goals which induced a party to defect are no longer a priority. Rather, 
for a rational outside party that received low payoffs from a defecting 
strategy, cooperation becomes a useful mechanism through which it is 
possible to limit the other side’s utility.
9.2 Analyzing cooperation and coordination
 As cooperation proved to be decidedly beneficial not only to the 
overall process but more importantly also to the parties themselves, this 
research also wanted to go a step further and understand what mecha-
nisms can induce a party to deter from defecting from the group. This 
notion has been already put forward by Sisk, who emphasized that the 
“game theory contributes to mediation strategies through the finding 
that one can encourage moderation and deter ‘defection’ in bargaining rela-
tionships by not allowing a player to gain from a defection strategy, even 
if it imposes additional costs to cooperation to prevent a defector’s gain” 
(emphasis added Sisk 2009, 48).
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 Inducing a party to switch from defection to cooperative behavior 
is obviously not a simple process, as it directly implies interference in 
another party’s policy objectives. It would be too simplistic to assume 
that just by reproving party’s non-cooperative behavior or warning that 
such behavior is not constructive for the overall process of mediation 
would motivate a change in defector’s strategy. This research departed 
from a rational choice assumption that in order to change its stratagem 
and pursue cooperative strategies the defecting party needs to realize 
the potential benefits of such a change. As third-parties get involved in 
managing a particular conflict not only for altruistic and humanitarian 
reasons but also to gain something from it (Greig 2005), the choice of 
cooperating also needs to be in line with party’s self-interests. This rese-
arch hypothesized three different reasons why a party would change its 
policy objectives. 
 On one hand, significant developments on a systemic level caused 
by dramatic political, social, economic and/or natural events might in-
duce a party to rethink its current guiding principles. This research re-
ferred to this mechanism as exogenous geo-political shifts. The rationale 
for assuming that such developments might alter third-party’s behavior 
from non-cooperative to cooperative stems from the assumption that 
no policy objective is ever self-motivated or self-sufficient to linger in-
definitely; it is rather a building block of a complex network of strategic 
choices developed by each actor in the international arena. Since such 
incidents rarely affect one actor at a time they may cause not only a shift 
in priorities with on party but also the needed convergence of interests 
among several actors that might induce cooperative behavior. In other 
words, once their interests are compatible, third-parties will be more 
inclined to cooperate.
 On the other hand, following the logic of ‘ripeness’ theory (Zartman 
1989), changes in the conflict dynamics might induce those outside actors 
that are directly involved in the conflict - for example by providing lo-
gistical and/or military support – to consider using mediation as a ‘way 
out’ and a suitable alternative to end the conflict in a peaceful manner. 
Mediators are rarely just passive bystanders. Once involved in managing 
a conflict, mediators unequivocally become an important element that 
affects both the conflict dynamics and more importantly potential solu-
tion of the dispute. 
 Finally, taking into account that defection is often a direct expre-
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ssion of a party’s self-interested goals, another way of deterring a party 
from defecting is to engage it in a bargaining process, where an alterna-
tive to its current strategy can be found. Confrontation of self-interests 
between mediators in order to find common ground on an acceptable 
outcome to the conflict shifts the focus from negotiating with conflic-
ting sides (mediating) to negotiation between mediators.
 To sum up, when the mediating coalition is faced with conflicting 
interests, if one mediator decides to defect from the group dynamic, this 
will have an important impact on the negotiation dynamics between 
the conflicting sides. If the mediators manage to achieve convergence of 
policy objectives among them, there are bigger chances that the peace 
process will be successful. In case mediators do not reach such conver-
gence, the conflicting sides will be induced to defect from negotiations, 
making it more likely for the peace process to fail. Combined insights 
from existing international mediation theory and the game-theoretical 
model were tested on five case studies. 
9.2.1 Exogenous  Geo-Political Shifts
 Exogenous geo-political shifts - significant developments on a 
systemic level caused by pivotal political, social, economic and/or na-
tural events - might encourage a party to rethink its guiding principles. 
This is because no policy objective is ever self-motivated or indepen-
dently strong enough to linger indefinitely; it should rather be seen as a 
building block of a complex network of strategic choices developed by 
each actor in the international arena. Since such incidents rarely affect 
one actor at a time, they may cause not only a shift in priorities within 
a party, but also a convergence of interests among several actors. Once 
their interests are compatible, parties will be more inclined to coopera-
te. As the case of Tajikistan shows, Taliban storming of Kabul induced 
Russia and Iran to rethink their policies in the region, put more pressure 
on conflicting sides in Tajikistan and drive them toward a commonly 
acceptable solution. In Cambodia, two events had a similar impact. As 
Hampson and Zartman indicate, “Gorbachev’s accession to power in 
the Soviet Union in the mid 1980s brought changes in the interests and 
positions of major outside parties. As a part of its overall effort to nor-
malize relations with China, the Soviet Union began to step up its own 
efforts to resolve the conflict, by encouraging Vietnam to withdraw its 
Siniša Vuković
222
army unit from Cambodia and threatening termination of its military 
and economic aid to Vietnam” (2012, 4). In fact the secret warning that 
the USSR delivered to Vietnam, in which they indicated their intention 
to stop supporting Vietnam’s military presence in Cambodia and con-
frontation with China, resulted in Vietnam’s announcement of troop 
withdrawal (which initially did not produce needed results to move the 
process toward an agreement) that on the long run contributed to Sino-
Vietnamese rapprochement. In Namibia, the advent of Gorbachev to 
power also proved to be of crucial importance for the achievement of 
rapprochement between the USSR and the US, and their subsequent 
convergence of interests in managing the conflict through by linking 
together the issues pertinent to the conflicts in Angola and Namibia. 
Finally in Kosovo, changes on the systemic level also had an effect, 
however this time negative. When Russia started restoring its global 
relevance in the late 90s, its policies shifted from implicit compliance 
to implicit confrontation with the West, especially with the US. For 
Levitin this “deterioration has to be understood in the context of more 
general and long standing trends in Russian foreign policy” (Levitin 
2000, 138).           
9.2.2 Changes in Conflict Dynamics
 Changes in the conflict dynamics might induce those outside actors 
that are directly involved in the conflict - for example by providing logi-
stical and/or military support – to consider using mediation as a viable 
option for ending the conflict. This argument follows the logic of the 
theory of ‘ripeness’ (Zartman 1989) which prescribes specific conditi-
ons for ripeness to occur. In principle the theory focuses on conflicting 
parties’ perceptions that they are in a “mutually hurting stalemate” and 
that they can identify “a sense of way out” through mediation. Zartman 
notes that, “these can be brought to the conflicting parties’ attention by 
a mediator or an opposing party if they are not immediately recognized 
by the party itself, and they can be resisted so long as the conflicting 
party refuses or is otherwise able to block out their perception” (Zar-
tman and de Soto 2010, 6). A similar logic could be applied to the per-
ception of a mediator that has been invested in the conflict but is not a 
direct party to the conflict. As Sisk rightfully noted, once the mediation 
process starts it does not produce an automatic termination of hostilities 
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(2010). In fact, violence can be seen as a “beyond-the-table tactic used 
not as an alternative to bargaining but as an integral part of the nego-
tiation” (Sisk 2010, 2-3). As the increase in the costs of supporting a 
war get complemented with a perception of a potential stalemate which 
might only exacerbate those costs, the outside party might perceive a 
ripe moment to change its strategy and engage in a cooperative medi-
tation effort to manage the conflict. In case of Tajikistan, each time the 
parties failed to come to an agreement, they would resort to violence. 
This was especially problematic for Russia that had stationed troops. 
Aware that such violent dynamics produce unwanted costs in lives and 
military equipment, Russia would resort to more active strategies in or-
der to push the government to accommodate the opposition and find 
a commonly acceptable solution. In the case of Namibia the achieved 
stalemate between Cuban and South African troops was an indication 
that a military victory in the conflict is unfeasible and that the present 
non cooperative strategy in the peace process was not producing any 
substantial results that would outweigh the military stalemate. In the 
case of Cambodia, the Soviet decision to stop financing the Vietnamese 
“tug of war” with China and change the strategies toward Beijing in-
duced a more cooperative strategy for both between Soviet Union and 
China, and between China and Vietnam. Finally, in the case of Kosovo, 
the new reality on the ground created by UNMIK’s presence, prompted 
Russia to agree with the rest of the Contact Group on independence as 
a viable solution to the problem. However this convergence did not last 
for long, and chances of acting in concert faded. 
9.2.3 Negotiating for cooperation
 Both exogenous geo-political shifts and changes of conflict dynamic 
imply that the defector will change their strategy by their own initiative. 
However, a third trigger of cooperation is also feasible – the initiative 
might come from the rest of the coalition, through bargaining for coo-
peration. In view of the fact that defection is often a direct expression 
of party’s self-interested goals, another way of encouraging change is to 
engage a defecting party in a bargaining process, where an alternative to 
their current behavior can be found by offering them sufficient incen-
tives to make participation an attractive option. Zartman refers to this 
challenge as building a ‘team of rivals’, and notes that even when the 
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mediation is conducted by “global or regional competitors,” they still 
need to “have the wisdom to realize that they share a common problem 
or project which can only be resolved together” (Hampson and Zar-
tman 2012, 2). 
 When cooperating with other mediators, biased mediators are use-
ful insomuch as they can use their special relationship with one conflic-
ting side to influence its behavior, positions and perceptions and con-
sequently move it toward an agreement (Touval and Zartman 1985). 
However, when these actors decide not to cooperate with the rest of 
the group, the conflicting side that they have a special relationship with 
might suffer in the negotiation process.  The potential mediator’s deci-
sion to deflect is costly for the state it supports. In such circumstances, 
the party to the conflict might find the agreement less attractive, and 
consequently refuse to accept it. By cementing their positions, non-co-
operative actors produce significant complications for the bargaining 
process and put mediation efforts at risk. As the case studies show, the 
lack of conflicting side’s to cooperate in the peace process might range 
from a mere stalling of the process to the use of violence as a “beyond-
the-table tactic” (Sisk 2010, 2-3). 
 At a certain point, the coalition members might pick up this signal, 
approach the defector and bargain for a new arrangement which will 
create new benefits for both. However, it is not always clear who should 
take responsibility for steering a party off a non-cooperative course. As 
experience shows in these situations, the responsibility for encouraging 
a mediator to develop a common idea about a final solution and opt for 
cooperative strategy might rest with others in the mediating coalition. 
In the case of Cambodia, the US managed to create momentum within 
the P5 and negotiate an acceptable solution for USSR and China which 
was crucial for the success of the peace process. Nonetheless, as noted 
by Solomon, “ultimately, the success came when the two major prota-
gonists in the region’s conflicts of the 1980’s and 1990s – China and 
Vietnam made a secret, bilateral deal to reconcile their differences and 
support the United Nations peace plan for Cambodia” (Solomon 2000, 
4). A similar dynamic was also tried in the case of Kosovo with the last 
attempt by Troika, when the EU not only tried to find a solution to the 
conflict but also to mediate a solution acceptable to other mediators 
(the US and Russia). However this effort eventually failed driving the 
process to a deadlock. 
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 In sum, although each of the three reasons to change policy objecti-
ves seem to work on their own, success is most guaranteed if combined. 
The case of Cambodia proves this point, as “the combined effects of 
a military stalemate among Cambodia’s political factions, diplomatic 
efforts to construct a settlement during the preceding decade by a num-
ber of interested parties, and the desire of the major powers to disenga-
ge from Indochina’s travails created a context for successful diplomacy” 
(Solomon 2000, 4).     
9.2.4 Strategic Interest, Legitimacy and Achievement  
of Coordination
 All five case studies also provided sufficient support for previously 
hypothesized dynamics regarding the coordination of multiple media-
tors. As expected, the stronger the mediators’ strategic interest in the 
conflict for a mediator the higher the chances of successful mediation 
through a coordinated effort by mediators in a coalition. The case of 
Sri Lanka indicates the significance of strategic interests for a coor-
dinated endeavor between multiple mediators. As the cochairs lacked 
strategic interests in the conflict, they were unwilling to employ their 
leverages to guide the parties in conflict toward and agreement, ma-
king the Norway-led mediation efforts to a deadlock. Similarly, in case 
of Tajikistan, strategic relevance of the area for both Russia and Iran, 
especially in light of a perceived threat coming from Afghanistan and 
increasing costs of supporting the warfare for Russia which was not 
yielding expected results (i.e. victory through military means), allowed 
for a well coordinated mediation activity under the UN leadership. The 
UN leadership was perceived as legitimate by both Russia and Iran as 
its involvement was not incompatible with their interests in the conflict. 
A somewhat different dynamic was observed in the case of Namibia, 
where the US - generally perceived as a powerful state - had a cle-
ar set of interests to promote in the conflict, and was certainly biased 
toward particular conflicting sides; it still managed to be an effective 
coordinator of mediation activities. First of all, its mediation activities 
were gradually accepted and publically stated by all conflicting sides as 
‘indispensible’, allowing the US to acquire the necessary degree of legi-
timacy as was hypothesized in H10. At the same time the US managed 
to generate converging interests with the USSR (key patron state of 
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MPLA and Cuba) which in turn, as was hypothesized in 11c, allowed 
for a successfully coordinated multiparty mediation effort by a powerful 
(and biased) state. Similarly, in the case of Cambodia, the US managed 
to successfully coordinate mediation activities even though it was qu-
ite clear to all the parties involved that it had an agenda it was trying 
to promote. However, in this case the success was more related to the 
fact that the US was able to ‘borrow’ the needed degree of legitimacy 
from the UN, as it skillfully transferred the bargaining process between 
mediators (with incompatible interests) to the UN bodies. Again, just 
as in the case of Namibia, the US was able to take the leadership role 
once the powerful states managed to reach an agreement and reach a 
convergence of interests amongst themselves, as was hypothesized in 
H11c. Finally, in the case of Kosovo, the strategic interests of key patron 
states were not moving towards a convergence point (as was the case 
in Tajikistan, Cambodia and Namibia). In fact, every time the parties 
signaled readiness to work together and transfer the responsibility of 
coordination to a particular party, such as the UN, the conflicting sides 
were moving toward reaching an agreement. However, the necessary 
degree of legitimacy, that the UN initially enjoyed (most likely do to 
its reputation and credibility) was gradually challenged by those third 
parties (in this case Russia) who saw UN’s agenda and proposals for 
conflict resolution as incompatible with their interests. 
 Therefore, reflecting on what was previously stated for all case stu-
dies it could be concluded that a successfully coordinated multiparty 
mediation activity is directly dependent on the compatibility of interests 
between the party that coordinates and third-parties that have strong 
vested interests in the conflict and leverage to influence the behavior of 
at least one of the conflicting sides. Consequently, while coordinator’s 
legitimacy is a very important ingredient for a successfully coordinated 
effort, it can not be put into effect before the third-parties have reached 
the needed convergence of interest. This in other words supports the 
initial premise of this research, where the first step of a successful mul-
tiparty mediation effort is the achievement of third-parties’ willingness 
to cooperate (convergence of interests), which opens the doors to the 
second stage of coordination where the parties split the task of levera-
ging the parties toward an agreement.                    
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9.3 Conclusion
 This research departed from the assumption that cooperation betwe-
en mediators is not only beneficial to the multiparty mediation process 
but also to them as rational actors who are driven by self-interests. Even 
despite the inevitable costs of mediation coupled with costs of coo-
perating, cooperation still proves to be more beneficial than defecting 
strategies. 
 As the five case studies illustrate, cooperation between mediators is 
by no means exogenous to the process. First of all, cooperation changes 
in intensity according to the dynamics of the conflict and of the conflict 
management process. 
 As all three examples show, when outside parties do not have con-
verging interests on how the conflict should end they often resort to 
limited cooperation. Limited cooperation produces a limited result. 
When third parties are unwilling to use its full mediating potential – 
for instance, when a patron state is unwilling to use more directive stra-
tegies to move the partner party in conflict toward an agreement - this 
choice might send mixed signals to the conflicting parties which might 
produce lack of commitment to negotiate a settlement. In other words, 
lack of cooperation within the mediating coalition directly gets transpo-
sed into the lack of cooperation between the conflicting sides and third 
parties.  
 However when the situation on the ground changes and becomes 
unbearable to the outside actors they might decide to achieve full co-
operation. Cooperating in these circumstances becomes more ‘cost/be-
nefit efficient’ and ‘effective’ (Zartman 2009) than previous strategies. 
At the same time, if these changes do not induce all parties to engage 
in cooperative manner, then one party that has been ‘convinced’ tries to 
encourage those ones that are still resorting to defecting strategies. As 
the case studies suggest, the party which has the strongest interest in 
resolving the conflict will most likely be the one that will try to encou-
rage the other side to establish a more cooperative mutual relationship. 
Ultimately, it is worth noting that coordination might also be related to 
a much bigger framework of relations and strategic choices an outside 
party has and makes. As most (self ) interests are interrelated into a 
network of strategic interests, developments on the regional and global 
level which might endanger these strategic interests have the potential 
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in inducing a third party of radically shifting its outlook on the actual 
conflict. In these circumstances cooperation again proves to be more 
‘cost/benefit efficient’ and ‘effective’, which allows the third party to 
explore the option of cooperating in order to preserve its self-interests.  
As parties manage to achieve convergence of interests and become able 
to work from a ‘common script’, this sends a strong signal to the par-
ties in conflict that they should also be more inclined to cooperate and 
compromise both with mediators and other conflicting side. Overall, 
this signaling helps the mediating effort to move conflicting sides more 
smoothly toward an agreement. 
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Acronyms:
 
ANC - African National Congress
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CFA - Cease-Fire Agreement
CGDK - Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CIS - Community of Independent States
CPK - Communist Party of Kampuchea
DK - Democratic Kampuchea
DPT - Democratic Party of Tajikistan
DS –Democratic Party in Serbia
EU – European Union 
FNLA - National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FUNCINPEC - National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, 
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
GRAE - Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile
ICG – International Crisis Group
ICJ - International Court of Justice
IO – International Organization
IRP - Islamic Renaissance Party
KFOR – Kosovo Forces
KPNLF - Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
KPRP - Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party 
LDK – Democratic League of Kosovo
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
MID – Militarized Interstate Disputes
MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO - Non Governmental organization
NME - Nonmyopic equilibria
OUA - Organization of African Union
OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P-5 - Permanent Five Members of the Security Council of the United 
Nations
PISG – Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
PPK – Parliamentary Party of Kosovo 
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PRK - People’s Republic of Kampuchea
SADF - South African Defense Force
SNC - Supreme National Council
SWANU - South West African National Union
SWAPO - South West Africa’s People Organization
SRCG - Special Representatives of the Secretary General 
ToM - Theory of Moves
UCK – Kosovo Liberation Army
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNF - United National Front
UNITA - Union of Total Independence of Angola
UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMOT - United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOSEK – UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
US – United States (of America)
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
UTO - United Tajiki Opposition
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summary
 Contemporary scholarship defines the processes where a conflict is 
managed (i.e. mediated) by more than one third party as multiparty me-
diation (Crocker et al. 1999; Crocker et al. 2001). Even though in recent 
years multiparty mediation processes have been under growing acade-
mic scrutiny, traditional literature on international mediation recogni-
zed the benefits of having multiple mediators working in concert. As 
emphasized by Zartman, “if a number of conciliators are available to the 
parties themselves and if a number of friends of the conflicting parties 
can coordinate their good offices and pressure, the chances of success 
are improved” (Zartman 1989, 276). To this day, several studies have 
shown the potential benefits and liabilities of having multiple mediators 
(Crocker et. Al 1999; Crocker et al. 2001, Diehl and Lepgold 2003), the 
relationship between the size of the mediating coalition and its effecti-
veness (Böhmelt 2011), and the need to have a cooperative endeavor by 
multiple mediators in order to achieve success in the mediation process 
(Whitfield 2007, Böhmelt 2011, Hampson and Zartman 2012). 
 In essence, the aim of this dissertation is to explain in more details 
the effects of cooperation and coordination on multiparty mediation. As 
previous illustrated studies have shown, crucial challenges that must be 
overcome in multiparty mediation processes are the (1) achievement of 
adequate cooperation among the mediators and (2) consequent coordina-
tion of their activities in the mediation process. While the two concepts 
have in common the presumption that actors involved in the mediating 
coalition need to have shared goals on how to resolve the conflict, the-
re is still a clear difference between the two: a necessary prerequisite 
for a successful cooperation is that all parties recognize mutual benefits 
of working together; once the parties perceive the benefits of working 
together, cooperation might lead to a coordinated endeavor which im-
plies a more mechanical process of dividing the labor effectively, and 
clarifying who needs to do what, when and how. 
 Crucial ingredients for a successful multiparty mediation seem to 
be ‘consistency in interests’ and ‘cooperation and coordination’ between me-
diators. The aim of this dissertation is to further expand the existing 
knowledge on multiparty mediation by answering a number of (sub)
research questions. First of all, how much do the ‘consistency of interests’ 
and ‘cooperation and coordination’ affect the overall process? Given the 
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dynamic nature of cooperation, and likelihood that a party changes its 
behavior from cooperative to non-cooperative throughout the process 
of multiparty mediation, it is important to understand if the efforts that 
lack cooperation inevitably end in failure? Similarly, what happens to 
the mediation process when mediating parties do not share the same 
idea and interest in a common solution? At the same time, present re-
search explored the obstacles in achieving coordination and coherence 
between various mediators in such an environment and how to surmo-
unt the problems that multiple mediators face when operating without 
a ‘common script’ in attempting to mediate a negotiated settlement. In 
other words, this study will investigate which mechanisms (both on the 
systemic and contextual level) have the potential to deter defection from 
a (potential) member of the multiparty mediation coalition?  Finally, as 
the number of states and international actors that are involved in me-
diation increases, a careful assessment is necessary not only of their rela-
tive institutional strengths and weaknesses, but also of how to promote 
complementary efforts and how to synchronize the whole process when 
one actor is transferring the responsibilities for mediation to others. In 
other words, this research will try to point out the importance of self-
interests that motivate third-parties to get involved and to unveil the 
link between coordination and self-interests (also described as strategic 
interests) and the impact of such interaction on the overall effectiveness 
of the mediating process. 
 Multiparty mediation is not a new theory of mediation, rather an 
advancement of the existing knowledge of international mediation as 
method of conflict management. Therefore, this dissertation will start 
by laying out a theoretical framework of mediation in Chapter 1. Exi-
sting literature will reflect the multicausal nature of the mediating pro-
cess, where interplay of a variety of factors (systemic and behavioral) 
directly affects the effectiveness of the process. Once the fundamental 
theoretical framework of international mediation has been described, 
this research will move to the exiting knowledge of multiparty media-
tion in Chapter 2. Given the existing limitations of current knowled-
ge on multiparty mediation, this research will aim to expand it with a 
game theoretical model that was developed in order to observe a general 
pattern of mediators’ behavior in multiparty mediation. The model will 
be interpreted using the Theory of Moves (Brams 1994). Reflecting on 
the insights from the existing literature on mediation and the game the-
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oretical model, this research will generate several hypotheses regarding 
the dynamic of cooperation and coordination in multiparty mediation. 
These will be tested on the basis of five different case studies, of recent 
international conflicts that were managed through a multiparty endea-
vor. The existing studies (Kriesberg 1996, Crocker et al. 1999, Crocker 
et al. 2001, Böhmelt 2011) have all shown that there is a strong correla-
tion between cooperation and coordination among multiple mediators 
and success in multiparty mediation. Present research will aim to go one 
step further and try to analyze potential existence of a causal mechanism 
between success in multiparty mediation and cooperative and coordina-
ted activities of multiple mediators. One of the most suitable methods 
of examining causality is certainly process tracing (George and Bennett 
2005, Beach and Pedersen 2012), and this study will conduct a process 
tracing analysis on five different case studies of multiparty mediation.   
 The cases were selected based on two criteria. The first one is quite 
straightforward, and it implies that a particular international conflict 
was managed by multiple mediators. Second criteria, prescribed in pro-
cess tracing literature (Beach and Pedersen 2012), implies the existence 
of both hypothesized X and outcome Y, which in this research means 
the existence of a cooperative (and coordinated) effort and (un)succe-
ssful outcome. Therefore, three cases that were selected had a successful 
outcome - Tajikistan, Namibia and Cambodia - while two failed - Sri 
Lanka and Kosovo. In principle, using a process tracing method, this 
research will analyze various dynamics surrounding the achievement of 
necessary cooperation and subsequent coordination between mediators, 
and the effect these had on the outcome of the peace process.  The dis-
sertation will conclude with a discussion on various factors that could 
induce the change in mediators’ attitudes and promote cooperative be-
havior within the mediating coalition, which in turn would improve the 
chances of successfully managing the conflict.
 The model presented in this dissertation underlines that employment 
of cooperative strategies for parties involved is actually more beneficial 
than spoiling the process. In fact, even cumulative costs of cooperating 
and mediating complemented with potential benefits of acting as a spo-
iler still do not manage to match the benefits generated by cooperative 
strategies. As the model shows, although the choice of non-cooperating 
at first might appear appealing for a third-party, spoiling the process 
might actually backfire. Third-party’s decision not to cooperate while 
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the multiparty endeavor is under way - thus implying that other media-
tors are engaged in the mediation in a cooperative manner - undercuts 
its own potential to exercise influence (or leverage) in the mediation and 
looses the potential to create expected benefits for itself and its partner 
side in the conflict. As long as the biased mediator is outside the media-
ting coalition, the conflicting party it is supporting might still remain in 
the process. In such circumstances the chances that potential solutions 
will be tilted to its partner’s advantage (i.e. conflicting side it supports) 
get reduced. Consequently, as that particular conflicting side is loosing 
through mediation, so will its outside partners (i.e. biased mediators), 
even though they are officially not cooperating in the process. For in-
stance, the international reputation of a third party might be undermi-
ned. At the same time their leverage to influence future developments 
in the process might be considerably undercut. Therefore, the model 
induces a conclusion that both the non-cooperative outside actor and 
its partner party to the conflict will face far smaller benefits than those 
who opt to cooperate and potentially (through constructive dialogue 
and exercising necessary leverage) move the proposed solution to their 
advantage. 
 In light of a lower payoff, it is expected that a rational (biased) me-
diator will chose alter its strategy and start cooperating with the rest of 
the group. Although the process of cooperation implies certain costs, 
and as such produces smaller utility that in cases when no party coo-
perates, the choice of altering the strategy and start cooperating will 
undeniably generate bigger benefits compared to those attained if a me-
diator remains outside the mediating coalition. By being a part of the 
mediating coalition, each mediator is able to exercise a certain influence 
over the process, and potentially negotiate a solution that is in favor of 
the side in the conflict that they have special relations with. Thus, (bia-
sed) mediators attain important utility as the conflicting side that they 
support actually starts gaining important benefits through mediation. 
Despite the costs of mediating and cooperating, the second outside ac-
tor still manages to create greater benefits through coordinated activiti-
es than if it opted to spoil the process and stay outside of the coalition. 
This only if the assumption from ToM - that mutual defection is not an 
option any more - continues to hold. Therefore, the model prescribes a 
dynamic that unequivocally remains in line with the initial statement 
and definition that cooperation implies the creation of new gains for 
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each party that were unavailable to them by unilateral action, albeit at 
some costs (Zartman and Touval 2010).
 If interpreted through classical game theory, cooperation represents 
a dominant strategy in this model. ToM also provides a similar interpre-
tation, given that once the multiparty mediation starts, cooperative be-
havior produces higher payoffs than defection. Overall, cooperation can 
be identified as a rational strategy that leads to nonmyopic equilibria. 
Once a party chooses to cooperate, short-term goals which induced a 
party to defect are no longer a priority. Rather, for a rational outside 
party that received low payoffs from a defecting strategy, cooperation 
becomes a useful mechanism through which it is possible to limit the 
other side’s utility.
 As cooperation proved to be decidedly beneficial not only to the 
overall process but more importantly also to the parties themselves, this 
research also wanted to go a step further and understand what mecha-
nisms can induce a party to deter from defecting from the group. This 
notion has been already put forward by Sisk, who emphasized that the 
“game theory contributes to mediation strategies through the finding 
that one can encourage moderation and deter ‘defection’ in bargaining rela-
tionships by not allowing a player to gain from a defection strategy, even 
if it imposes additional costs to cooperation to prevent a defector’s gain” 
(emphasis added Sisk 2009, 48).
 Inducing a party to switch from defection to cooperative behavior 
is obviously not a simple process, as it directly implies interference in 
another party’s policy objectives. It would be too simplistic to assume 
that just by reproving party’s non-cooperative behavior or warning that 
such behavior is not constructive for the overall process of mediation 
would motivate a change in defector’s strategy. This research departed 
from a rational choice assumption that in order to change its stratagem 
and pursue cooperative strategies the defecting party needs to realize 
the potential benefits of such a change. As third-parties get involved in 
managing a particular conflict not only for altruistic and humanitarian 
reasons but also to gain something from it (Greig 2005), the choice of 
cooperating also needs to be in line with party’s self-interests. This rese-
arch hypothesized three different reasons why a party would change its 
policy objectives. 
 On one hand, significant developments on a systemic level caused 
by dramatic political, social, economic and/or natural events might in-
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duce a party to rethink its current guiding principles. This research re-
ferred to this mechanism as exogenous geo-political shifts. The rationale 
for assuming that such developments might alter third-party’s behavior 
from non-cooperative to cooperative stems from the assumption that 
no policy objective is ever self-motivated or self-sufficient to linger in-
definitely; it is rather a building block of a complex network of strategic 
choices developed by each actor in the international arena. Since such 
incidents rarely affect one actor at a time they may cause not only a shift 
in priorities with on party but also the needed convergence of interests 
among several actors that might induce cooperative behavior. In other 
words, once their interests are compatible, third-parties will be more 
inclined to cooperate. As the case of Tajikistan shows, Taliban storming 
of Kabul induced Russia and Iran to rethink their policies in the regi-
on, put more pressure on conflicting sides in Tajikistan and drive them 
toward a commonly acceptable solution. In Cambodia, two events had a 
similar impact. As Hampson and Zartman indicate, “Gorbachev’s acce-
ssion to power in the Soviet Union in the mid 1980s brought changes in 
the interests and positions of major outside parties. As a part of its ove-
rall effort to normalize relations with China, the Soviet Union began to 
step up its own efforts to resolve the conflict, by encouraging Vietnam 
to withdraw its army unit from Cambodia and threatening termination 
of its military and economic aid to Vietnam” (2012, 4). In fact the secret 
warning that the USSR delivered to Vietnam, in which they indica-
ted their intention to stop supporting Vietnam’s military presence in 
Cambodia and confrontation with China, resulted in Vietnam’s anno-
uncement of troop withdrawal (which initially did not produce needed 
results to move the process toward an agreement) that on the long run 
contributed to Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement. In Namibia, the ad-
vent of Gorbachev to power also proved to be of crucial importance for 
the achievement of rapprochement between the USSR and the US, and 
their subsequent convergence of interests in managing the conflict thro-
ugh by linking together the issues pertinent to the conflicts in Angola 
and Namibia. Finally in Kosovo, changes on the systemic level also had 
an effect, however this time negative. When Russia started restoring its 
global relevance in the late 90s, its policies shifted from implicit com-
pliance to implicit confrontation with the West, especially with the US. 
For Levitin this “deterioration has to be understood in the context of 
more general and long standing trends in Russian foreign policy” (Le-
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vitin 2000, 138).           
 On the other hand, following the logic of ‘ripeness’ theory (Zar-
tman 1989), changes in the conflict dynamics might induce those outside 
actors that are directly involved in the conflict - for example by provi-
ding logistical and/or military support – to consider using mediation 
as a ‘way out’ and a suitable alternative to end the conflict in a peace-
ful manner. Mediators are rarely just passive bystanders. Once involved 
in managing a conflict, mediators unequivocally become an important 
element that affects both the conflict dynamics and more importantly 
potential solution of the dispute. In case of Tajikistan, each time the 
parties failed to come to an agreement, they would resort to violence. 
This was especially problematic for Russia that had stationed troops. 
Aware that such violent dynamics produce unwanted costs in lives and 
military equipment, Russia would resort to more active strategies in or-
der to push the government to accommodate the opposition and find 
a commonly acceptable solution. In the case of Namibia the achieved 
stalemate between Cuban and South African troops was an indication 
that a military victory in the conflict is unfeasible and that the present 
non cooperative strategy in the peace process was not producing any 
substantial results that would outweigh the military stalemate. In the 
case of Cambodia, the Soviet decision to stop financing the Vietnamese 
“tug of war” with China and change the strategies toward Beijing in-
duced a more cooperative strategy for both between Soviet Union and 
China, and between China and Vietnam. Finally, in the case of Kosovo, 
the new reality on the ground created by UNMIK’s presence, prompted 
Russia to agree with the rest of the Contact Group on independence as 
a viable solution to the problem. However this convergence did not last 
for long, and chances of acting in concert faded.
 Finally, taking into account that defection is often a direct expre-
ssion of a party’s self-interested goals, another way of deterring a party 
from defecting is to engage it in a bargaining process, where an alterna-
tive to its current strategy can be found. Confrontation of self-interests 
between mediators in order to find common ground on an acceptable 
outcome to the conflict shifts the focus from negotiating with conflic-
ting sides (mediating) to negotiation between mediators. As experience 
shows in these situations, the responsibility for encouraging a mediator 
to develop a common idea about a final solution and opt for cooperative 
strategy might rest with others in the mediating coalition. In the case 
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of Cambodia, the US managed to create momentum within the P5 and 
negotiate an acceptable solution for USSR and China which was crucial 
for the success of the peace process. Nonetheless, as noted by Solomon, 
“ultimately, the success came when the two major protagonists in the 
region’s conflicts of the 1980’s and 1990s – China and Vietnam made a 
secret, bilateral deal to reconcile their differences and support the Uni-
ted Nations peace plan for Cambodia” (Solomon 2000, 4). A similar 
dynamic was also tried in the case of Kosovo with the last attempt by 
Troika, when the EU not only tried to find a solution to the conflict but 
also to mediate a solution acceptable to other mediators (the US and 
Russia). However this effort eventually failed driving the process to a 
deadlock. 
 Although each of the three reasons to change policy objectives seem 
to work on their own, success is most guaranteed if combined. The case 
of Cambodia proves this point, as “the combined effects of a military 
stalemate among Cambodia’s political factions, diplomatic efforts to 
construct a settlement during the preceding decade by a number of in-
terested parties, and the desire of the major powers to disengage from 
Indochina’s travails created a context for successful diplomacy” (Solo-
mon 2000, 4).  
 To sum up, when the mediating coalition is faced with conflicting 
interests, if one mediator decides to defect from the group dynamic, this 
will have an important impact on the negotiation dynamics between 
the conflicting sides. If the mediators manage to achieve convergence of 
policy objectives among them, there are bigger chances that the peace 
process will be successful. In case mediators do not reach such conver-
gence, the conflicting sides will be induced to defect from negotiations, 
making it more likely for the peace process to fail. 
 All five case studies also provided sufficient support for previously 
hypothesized dynamics regarding the coordination of multiple media-
tors. As expected, the stronger the mediators’ strategic interest in the 
conflict for a mediator the higher the chances of successful mediation 
through a coordinated effort by mediators in a coalition. Therefore, re-
flecting on what was previously stated for all case studies it could be 
concluded that a successfully coordinated multiparty mediation activity 
is directly dependent on the compatibility of interests between the par-
ty that coordinates and third-parties that have strong vested interests 
in the conflict and leverage to influence the behavior of at least one of 
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the conflicting sides. Consequently, while coordinator’s legitimacy is a 
very important ingredient for a successfully coordinated effort, it can 
not be put into effect before the third-parties have reached the needed 
convergence of interest. This in other words supports the initial premise 
of this research, where the first step of a successful multiparty media-
tion effort is the achievement of third-parties’ willingness to cooperate 
(convergence of interests), which opens the doors to the second stage 
of coordination where the parties split the task of leveraging the parties 
toward an agreement.                    
 This research departed from the assumption that cooperation betwe-
en mediators is not only beneficial to the multiparty mediation process 
but also to them as rational actors who are driven by self-interests. Even 
despite the inevitable costs of mediation coupled with costs of coo-
perating, cooperation still proves to be more beneficial than defecting 
strategies. 
 As the five case studies illustrate, cooperation between mediators is 
by no means exogenous to the process. First of all, cooperation changes 
in intensity according to the dynamics of the conflict and of the conflict 
management process. As all three examples show, when outside parties 
do not have converging interests on how the conflict should end they 
often resort to limited cooperation. Limited cooperation produces a li-
mited result. When third parties are unwilling to use its full mediating 
potential – for instance, when a patron state is unwilling to use more di-
rective strategies to move the partner party in conflict toward an agree-
ment - this choice might send mixed signals to the conflicting parties 
which might produce lack of commitment to negotiate a settlement. In 
other words, lack of cooperation within the mediating coalition directly 
gets transposed into the lack of cooperation between the conflicting 
sides and third parties.  
 However when the situation on the ground changes and becomes 
unbearable to the outside actors they might decide to achieve full coo-
peration. Cooperating in these circumstances becomes more ‘cost/bene-
fit efficient’ and ‘effective’ (Zartman 2009) than previous strategies. At 
the same time, if these changes do not induce all parties to engage in 
a cooperative manner, then one party that has been ‘convinced’ tries to 
encourage those ones that are still resorting to defecting strategies. As 
the case studies suggest, the party which has the strongest interest in 
resolving the conflict will most likely be the one that will try to encou-
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rage the other side to establish a more cooperative mutual relationship. 
Ultimately, it is worth noting that coordination might also be related to 
a much bigger framework of relations and strategic choices an outside 
party has and makes. As most (self ) interests are interrelated into a 
network of strategic interests, developments on the regional and global 
level which might endanger these strategic interests have the potential 
in inducing a third party of radically shifting its outlook on the actual 
conflict. Again in these circumstances cooperation again proves to be 
more ‘cost/benefit efficient’ and ‘effective’, which allows the third party 
to explore the option of cooperating in order to preserve its self-intere-
sts.      
 As parties manage to achieve convergence of interests and become 
able to work from a ‘common script’, this sends a strong signal to the 
parties in conflict that they should also be more inclined to cooperate 
and compromise both with mediators and the other conflicting side. 
Overall, this signaling helps the mediating effort to move conflicting 
sides more smoothly toward an agreement.  
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samenvatting
 Bij bemiddeling in internationale conflicten is steeds vaker sprake 
van meer dan één bemiddelende partij. In de literatuur wordt dit mul-
tiparty mediation genoemd (Crocker et al. 1999; Crocker et al. 2001). 
Recente casussen van multiparty mediation oogstten veel kritiek, maar 
de traditionele literatuur over internationale conflictbeheersing ziet 
voordelen in gecoördineerde bemiddeling door meerdere partijen. Zar-
tman benadrukt: “if a number of conciliators are available to the parties 
themselves and if a number of friends of the conflicting parties can 
coordinate their good offices and pressure, the chances of success are 
improved” (Zartman 1989, 276). Meerdere onderzoekers hebben zich 
beziggehouden met multiparty mediation. Er is bestudeerd welke kan-
sen en risico’s dergelijke bemiddelingsprocessen met zich meebrengen 
(Crocker et al. 1999; Crocker et al. 2001, Diehl en Lepgold 2003). Te-
vens is er gekeken naar de relatie tussen de grootte van de bemidde-
lende coalitie en de doeltreffendheid ervan (Böhmelt 2011). Daarnaast 
is onderzocht wat het belang is van samenwerking en afstemming tus-
sen de betrokken bemiddelaars voor een geslaagde multiparty mediation 
(Whitfield 2007, Böhmelt 2011, Hampson en Zartman 2012).
 In dit proefschrift worden de effecten van coöperatie en coördinatie 
in multiparty mediation nader onderzocht. De bovengenoemde studies 
hebben aangetoond dat er twee cruciale uitdagingen zijn in ieder multi-
party mediation proces: (1) het bereiken van een adequate coöperatie tus-
sen de bemiddelaars en (2) consequente coördinatie van hun activiteiten 
in het bemiddelingsproces. Zowel coöperatie als coördinatie veronder-
stellen dat de bemiddelaars hetzelfde doel voor ogen hebben aangaande 
het oplossen van het conflict. Voorts is een vereiste dat alle partijen de 
voordelen inzien van samenwerking. Daardoor wordt immers coördina-
tie mogelijk en kunnen zij hun inspanningen op elkaar afstemmen. Dit 
maakt de weg vrij voor een meer efficiënte organisatie van mediation en 
een taakverdeling tussen de bemiddelaars.
 Coöperatie en coördinatie zijn voor het welslagen van multiparty 
mediation van cruciaal belang. Dat vergt een zekere ‘consistentie van be-
langen’ tussen de bemiddelaars. In dit proefschrift zijn deze bevindingen 
kritisch onderzocht. De onderliggende vragen van dit onderzoek luiden 
als volgt. In hoeverre beïnvloeden de ‘consistentie van belangen’ en de 
‘coöperatie en coördinatie’ tussen de bemiddelaars het bemiddelings-
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proces? Een zekere dynamiek is inherent aan iedere samenwerking; de 
voorkeuren van bemiddelaars zijn geen statisch gegeven. Partijen kun-
nen gedurende het proces van opstelling veranderen, bijvoorbeeld van 
coöperatief naar niet-coöperatief. Maar wil dit ook zeggen dat media-
tion zonder coöperatie onvermijdelijk mislukt? En wat gebeurt er wan-
neer de bemiddelaars niet opereren vanuit gedeelde belangen of streven 
naar verschillende oplossingen?
 Dit proefschrift heeft tevens onderzocht wat de obstakels zijn voor 
het bereiken van samenwerking en belangenconvergentie tussen meer-
dere bemiddelaars onder dergelijke dynamische condities. Het ontbre-
ken van een ‘gemeenschappelijk script’ tussen de bemiddelaars bemoei-
lijkt de onderhandelingen. Hoe kan dit probleem worden opgelost? In 
dit proefschrift is bekeken welke mechanismen (op het systemische 
en het contextuele niveau) (potentiële) bemiddelaars aan boord van de 
multipary mediation kunnen houden.
 Tenslotte is, met het oog op een alsmaar groeiend aantal bemid-
delaars – staten en andere internationale actoren – niet alleen gekeken 
naar ieders relatieve institutionele sterke en zwakke punten, maar ook 
naar de wijze waarop een gemeenschappelijk, gecoördineerd optreden 
kan worden bevorderd en de vraag hoe er moet worden omgegaan met 
de overdracht van verantwoordelijkheden tussen bemiddelaars.
 Daarmee raakt dit onderzoek expliciet aan het eigenbelang dat een 
derde partij motiveert (blijvend) te participeren als bemiddelaar in een 
multiparty mediation. Bemiddelingsproces. Er is getracht om inzicht te 
geven in de relatie leggen tussen enerzijds coördinatie en coöperatie 
en anderzijds het eigenbelang, dan wel de strategische interessen, van 
bemiddelende partijen. Onderzocht is wat de invloed is van deze wis-
selwerking op de algehele effectiviteit van het mediation proces.
 Multiparty mediation is niet zozeer een nieuwe bemiddelingstheorie; 
zij bouwt voort op de bestaande inzichten met betrekking tot bemid-
deling als een methode voor het hanteren van internationale conflicten. 
Dit proefschrift begint dan ook met een schets van een theoretisch ka-
der voor mediation. Aan de hand van de bestaande literatuur wordt de 
multi-causaliteit van het bemiddelingsproces belicht. Er wordt bekeken 
hoe de interactie tussen verschillende (systemische en gedrags-) facto-
ren de effectiviteit van het bemiddelingsproces beïnvloedt. In  hoofd-
stuk twee wordt vervolgens ingegaan op de bestaande inzichten om-
trent multiparty mediation. Er wordt geconstateerd dat deze enigszins 
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beperkt zijn. Om in deze leemte te voorzien, introduceert dit onderzoek 
een speltheoretisch model, waarmee algemene patronen kunnen wor-
den ontdekt in het gedrag van bemiddelaars. Dit model wordt geïnter-
preteerd met behulp van de Theory of Moves (Brams, 1994). Indachtig 
de bestaande literatuur over mediation en met gebruikmaking van het 
speltheoretische model worden enkele hypothesen geformuleerd aan-
gaande de dynamiek van coöperatie en coördinatie in multiparty media-
tion. Deze worden getoetst aan de hand van vijf case studies van recente 
internationale conflicten waarin multiparty mediation is toegepast: Ta-
dzjikistan, Namibië, Cambodja, Kosovo en Sri Lanka. 
 Eerdere studies (Kriesberg 1996, Crocker et al. 1999, Crocker et 
al. 2001, Böhmelt 2011) hebben aangetoond dat er een sterke corre-
latie bestaat tussen enerzijds coördinatie en coöperatie tussen de be-
middelaars en anderzijds het succes van mediation. Dit onderzoek gaat 
een stap verder en onderzoekt welk causaal mechanisme mogelijk ten 
grondslag ligt aan deze correlatie. Met behulp van process tracing (Ge-
orge and Bennett 2005, Beach and Pedersen 2012), een zeer geschikte 
methode om causale relaties te analyseren, worden de vijf casus bestu-
deerd. Er is gekeken naar de dynamiek in het bereiken van de nood-
zakelijke coöperatie en coördinatie tussen de betrokken bemiddelende 
partijen en het effect daarvan op het vredesproces. Drie van de vijf casus 
bleken een succes: Tadzjikistan, Namibië en Cambodja. In de andere 
twee gevallen was multiparty mediation geen succes: Sri Lanka en Ko-
sovo. Het proefschrift eindigt met een discussie over de verschillende 
factoren die het gedrag van bemiddelaars kunnen beïnvloeden, opdat 
zij beter samenwerken en hun inspanningen meer op elkaar afstemmen, 
hetgeen de kans vergroot op een succesvolle oplossing van conflicten.
 Het model dat wordt uitgewerkt in deze studie, toont aan dat bemid-
delaars meer baat hebben bij het volgen van coöperatieve strategieën dan 
bij het tegenwerken van het bemiddelingsproces — zelfs wanneer men 
de cumulatieve kosten van coöperatie en bemiddeling optelt bij de po-
tentiële voordelen van eventueel obstructief of destructief handelen. Op 
het eerste gezicht kan het aantrekkelijk lijken voor een derde om zich 
non-coöperatief op te stellen, maar uit het model volgt dat dit veeleer 
een ongewenst effect sorteert. Wanneer een multiparty mediation reeds 
in gang is gezet — en de overige bemiddelaars dus impliciet aangeven 
samen te willen werken — ondermijnt het niet-samenwerken de positie 
van de niet-coöperatieve bemiddelaar. Hij/zij kan minder invloed uit-
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oefenen op het bemiddelingsproces. Daardoor wordt de mogelijkheid 
beperkt de eigen belangen te behartigen en voordelen te behalen uit het 
proces — noch ten gunste van zichzelf, noch ten bate van de partner-
partij in het conflict. Ook wanneer de partner-partij zelf wél betrok-
ken blijft in het bemiddelingsproces, kan zij daarin schade oplopen. De 
partner-partij heeft zonder bevriende bemiddelaar immers minder in-
vloed op het uiteindelijke akkoord. De kans is niet denkbeeldig dat dit 
akkoord ook daardoor nadelig uitvalt voor de niet-coöperatieve partij.
 Bovendien zijn aan non-coöperatie ook langere-termijnrisico’s ver-
bonden. De internationale reputatie kan erdoor worden geschaad. Dit 
kan de invloed van de niet-coöperatieve partij in toekomstige internati-
onale conflicten verminderen. Volgens het in dit proefschrift toegepaste 
model zijn een niet-coöperatieve buitenstaander en diens partner-partij 
dan ook slechter af dan de partijen die voor samenwerking kiezen.
 De onderliggende aanname van het model, in lijn met de Theory of 
Moves, is dat wederzijdse non-coöperatie geen rationele optie is. De 
kosten-batenanalyse valt immers voor alle bemiddelaars hetzelfde uit: 
door samenwerking creëren zij kansen die niet voorhanden zijn wan-
neer de partijen unilateraal zouden handelen, zij het met enkele kosten 
(Zartman en Touval, 2010).
 Bezien vanuit de klassieke speltheorie is coöperatie de dominante 
strategie. Wanneer het bemiddelingsproces eenmaal is begonnen, en de 
partijen ook hun lange-termijnbelangen in acht nemen, brengt mede-
werking altijd meer nut (utility) op dan tegenwerking. Voor een ratio-
nele partij die zich eerder afzijdig hield van de bemiddeling (ofwel: non-
coöperatief gedrag vertoonde), is een coöperatieve opstelling nu juist 
hét middel om het nut (utility) van de andere partijen te verminderen.
 Na de vaststelling dat samenwerking zowel het bemiddelingsproces 
dient als ook de belangen van alle betrokken partijen, zet dit proef-
schrift een volgende stap. Onderzocht is welke mechanismen partijen 
ervan kunnen weerhouden om non-coöperatief gedrag te vertonen. Zo-
als Sisk stelt: “game theory contributes to mediation strategies through 
the finding that one can encourage moderation and deter ‘defection’ in bar-
gaining relationships by not allowing a player to gain from a defection 
strategy, even if it imposes additional costs to cooperation to prevent a 
defector’s gain” (mijn nadruk; Sisk 2009, 48).
 Het blijkt niet eenvoudig een derde partij ertoe te bewegen om van 
non-coöperatie over te gaan tot samenwerking. Er kan niet simpelweg 
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worden volstaan met een berisping of een beroep op het algemeen be-
lang. Bemiddelaars participeren namelijk niet enkel om altruïstische en 
humanitaire redenen, maar ook omdat zij er zelf wat uit willen halen 
(Greig 2005). In dit proefschrift wordt uitgegaan van deze aanname uit 
de rationele-keuzetheorie: als rationele actoren kiezen partijen hun be-
leidsdoelen met het oog op hun eigenbelang. Willen bemiddelaars die 
niet geneigd zijn tot participatie, hun strategie wijzigen en alsnog gaan 
samenwerken in een multiparty mediation coalitie, dan moeten zij daarin 
potentiële voordelen voor zichzelf zien.
 In dit proefschrift zijn drie hypotheses getoetst over de vraag waar-
om partijen hun beleidsdoelen zouden bijstellen en zouden overgaan 
tot coöperatie. De eerste hypothese houdt in dat grootschalige en dra-
matische politieke, sociale, economische veranderingen en/of natuur-
rampen partijen ertoe kunnen dwingen hun beleidsdoelen te herzien. In 
dergelijke gevallen is sprake van ‘exogene geopolitieke verschuivingen’ 
(exogeneous geopolitical shifts). De aanname is dat deze shifts gedrags-
veranderingen teweeg kunnen brengen omdat geen enkel beleidsdoel 
geheel op zichzelf staat. Integendeel, beleidsdoelen zijn slechts één klein 
onderdeel van een complex netwerk van strategische keuzes die acto-
ren maken in de internationale arena. Dergelijke shifts betreffen meestal 
meerdere actoren. Daarom is het mogelijk dat deze niet alleen leiden 
tot gewijzigde prioriteiten en strategieveranderingen bij één partij; zij 
kunnen ook een convergentie van belangen tussen meerdere partijen 
in de hand werken. En dat bevordert coöperatief gedrag. Met andere 
woorden, exogene geopolitieke verschuivingen kunnen de belangen van 
meerdere actoren doen samenvallen en daarmee de dynamiek in media-
tion processen beïnvloeden.
 Zo bracht in de casus Tadzjikistan de bestorming van Kabul door de 
Taliban veranderingen teweeg in de opstelling van Rusland en Iran. Dit 
incident bracht beide partijen ertoe hun beleid ten aanzien van de regio 
te herzien. Zij kwamen tot het besef zij meer druk moesten uitoefenen 
op de strijdende partijen in Tadzjikistan om tot een oplossing te komen 
die voor alle partijen aanvaardbaar was.
 In de casus Cambodja hadden twee exogene verschuivingen een 
vergelijkbaar effect. Zoals Hampson en Zartman hebben beschrenen: 
“Gorbachev’s accession to power in the Soviet Union in the mid 1980s 
brought changes in the interests and positions of major outside parties. 
As a part of its overall effort to normalize relations with China, the 
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Soviet Union began to step up its own efforts to resolve the conflict, by 
encouraging Vietnam to withdraw its army unit from Cambodia and 
threatening termination of its military and economic aid to Vietnam” 
(2012, 4). Daarnaast deed de Sovjet-Unie, in het geheim, een waar-
schuwing uitgaan aan Vietnam. De sovjets gaven te kennen Vietnam 
niet langer te steunen in hun militaire aanwezigheid in Cambodja en 
hun confrontatie met China. Dit bracht Vietnam ertoe zijn milities uit 
Cambodja terug te trekken. In eerste instantie leidde dit niet tot het 
gewenste resultaat, maar uiteindelijk leidde deze geopolitieke verschui-
ving tot rapprochement tussen China en Vietnam.
 In de casus Namibië was de toenadering tussen de Sovjet-Unie en 
de VS van doorslaggevend belang. Beide grootmachten hadden tegen-
gestelde belangen in de conflicten die werden uitgevochten in Angola 
en Namibië. Met de komst van Gorbatsjov werd belangenconvergentie 
mogelijk en werd samenwerking in de bemiddeling in beide conflicten 
een reële optie.
 In Kosovo brachten exogene geopolitieke verschuivingen juist ne-
gatieve veranderingen met zich mee. Aan het eind van de jaren ’90 pro-
beerde Rusland zijn positie als grootmacht te heroveren. De opstelling 
veranderde van impliciete meegaandheid met het Westen naar impli-
ciete confrontatie – met name met de VS. Zoals Levitin stelt: deze “de-
terioration has to be understood in the context of more general and long 
standing trends in Russian foreign policy” (Levitin 2000, 138).
 De tweede hypothese met betrekking tot factoren die kunnen leiden 
tot beleidsveranderingen inzake participatie in mediation, is geënt op de 
Ripeness Theory (Zartman 1989). Getoetst is in hoeverre veranderingen 
in de dynamiek van conflicten (changes in conflict dynamics) partijen er-
toe kunnen dwingen hun beleidsdoelen bij te stellen. Actoren die geen 
partij zijn in een conflict, maar wel daarin zijn betrokken – bijvoor-
beeld door het verlenen van logistieke of militaire steun – kunnen in 
de dynamiek van een conflict een aanleiding zien om mediation te gaan 
toepassen als een uitweg uit het conflict en een vreedzaam, voordeliger 
alternatief om het conflict te beslechten. Bemiddelaars zijn zelden enkel 
passieve toeschouwers. Eens zij actief in de oplossing van het conflict 
worden betrokken, gaan zij de dynamiek van het conflict mede bepalen 
en, belangrijker nog, de lijnen uitzetten voor een mogelijke oplossing 
ervan.
 In het geval van Tadzjikistan zochten de strijdende partijen, steeds 
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als zij er niet in slaagden tot een akkoord te komen, hun toevlucht tot 
geweld. Dit was vooral een probleem voor Rusland, dat troepen had ge-
stationeerd in de republiek. Rusland raakte meer en meer doordrongen 
van de ongewenste verliezen aan levens en militair materieel die deze 
gewelddadige dynamiek met zich meebracht. Het gevolg was een meer 
actieve strategie om de Tadzjiekse overheid ervan te overtuigen de op-
positie tegemoet te komen en een voor iedereen aanvaardbare oplossing 
te vinden.
 In de casus Namibië was de patstelling tussen de Cubaanse en Zuid-
Afrikaanse troepen een indicatie dat een militaire overwinning in het 
conflict niet haalbaar was en dat een non-coöperatieve strategie in het 
vredesproces niet langer opwoog tegen de nadelen van deze voortdu-
rende impasse.
 In Cambodja leidde het besluit van de Sovjet-Unie om de Vietna-
mese tug of war met China niet langer te financieren en de relaties met 
Beijing te verbeteren tot een verandering in de dynamiek van het con-
flict. Zowel China en Vietnam als ook de Sovjet-Unie en China gingen 
over tot een nieuwe, meer coöperatieve strategie.
 In de casus Kosovo, tenslotte, zette een nieuwe factor in het con-
flict — de aanwezigheid van UNMIK — Rusland ertoe aan om mee 
te gaan in de zienswijze van de overige leden van de Contact Group en 
de onafhankelijkheid van de republiek als een levensvatbare optie te ac-
cepteren. Deze convergentie van belangen hield echter niet lang stand 
en de kansen voor eensgezind handelen in dit conflict verslechterden.
 Non-coöperatie in multiparty mediation komt dikwijls voort uit het 
eigenbelang van een partij. Een derde hypothese die in dit proefschrift 
is getoetst, houdt in dat onwillige partijen aan het bemiddelingsproces 
kunnen worden gecommiteerd door hen te betrekken in onderhande-
lingen die een gunstig alternatief bieden voor hun strategie. Daarmee 
verwordt mediation tot een confrontatie van de eigenbelangen van be-
middelaars om raakvlakken te vinden voor een wederzijds aanvaardbare 
oplossing van het conflict. De nadruk verschuift van onderhandelingen 
met de strijdende partijen naar een onderhandeling tussen de bemid-
delaars. De ervaring leert dat het in zulke situaties aan de overige, wel-
willende bemiddelaars is een oplossing te bedenken voor het conflict 
waarin ook de onwillige partij zich kan vinden.
 In het conflict in Cambodja slaagden de VS erin een momentum 
binnen de P5 te creëren en een oplossing uit te onderhandelen die zo-
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wel voor de Sovjet-Unie als ook voor China aanvaardbaar was. Dit bleek 
cruciaal voor het succes van de bemiddeling. Niettemin, zoals Solomon 
beargumenteert, “ultimately, the success came when the two major pro-
tagonists in the region’s conflicts of the 1980’s and 1990s – China and 
Vietnam made a secret, bilateral deal to reconcile their differences and 
support the United Nations peace plan for Cambodia” (Solomon 2000, 4).
 Een vergelijkbare dynamiek is te ontwaren in de laatste bemidde-
lingspoging die de Trojka in Kosovo ondernam. In dit geval zocht de 
EU niet alleen een naar een oplossing voor het conflict zelf; men hield 
ook oog voor de belangen van de twee andere bemiddelaars, de VS en 
Rusland. Deze poging mislukte echter, waardoor het gehele bemidde-
lingsproces in een impasse terecht kwam.
 Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat exogene geopolitieke verschuivingen, 
veranderingen in de dynamiek van een conflict en het verzoenen van de 
belangen van bemiddelaars coöperatie in multiparty mediation kunnen 
bevorderen. De meeste kans op een succesvolle bemiddeling bestaat als 
deze factoren tegelijkertijd optreden.
 De casus Cambodja illustreert dit punt. Daar bleek dat “the combi-
ned effects of a military stalemate among Cambodia’s political factions, 
diplomatic efforts to construct a settlement during the preceding deca-
de by a number of interested parties, and the desire of the major powers 
to disengage from Indochina’s travails created a context for successful 
diplomacy” (Solomon 2000, 4).
 Wanneer een coalitie van bemiddelaars zich ziet geconfronteerd met 
tegenstrijdige belangen en één partij besluit uit de onderhandelingen te 
stappen, dan heeft dit belangrijke gevolgen voor het bemiddelingspro-
ces. Wanneer de mediators erin slagen hun beleidsdoelen te laten con-
vergeren, is de kans groter dat er succes wordt geboekt in het vredes-
proces. Andersom leidt niet-convergentie eerder tot non-coöperatie en 
falen van het vredesproces.
 De vijf case studies in dit proefschrift bevestigen tevens de veron-
derstelde belangenafweging die speelt in de coördinatie van de partici-
patie van meerdere bemiddelaars. Hoe groter het strategisch belang van 
de bemiddelaars in een conflict, des te groter wordt de kans op gecoör-
dineerde multiparty mediation. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt voorts dat succes 
daarvan direct afhankelijk is van de verenigbaarheid van de belangen 
van de coördinerende partij en die van van de derde partijen. Eveneens 
van belang is de mate waarin deze derde partijen een belang hebben in 
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het onderhavige conflict en hoeveel invloed zij kunnen uitoefenen op 
het gedrag van tenminste een van de strijdende partijen. De legitimiteit 
van de coördinerende partij kan pas ten gelde worden gemaakt wanneer 
de derde partijen een convergentie van belangen hebben bereikt. Daar-
mee is aan het uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek voldaan: de eerste stap 
in een succesvolle multiparty mediation behelst het bereiken van bereid-
willigheid tot coöperatie onder de bemiddelaars. Dit maakt de weg vrij 
voor de tweede fase binnen het bemiddelingsproces: coördinatie van de 
inspanningen van de bemiddelaars waarmee zij de strijdende partijen 
richting een akkoord kunnen sturen.
 Een tweede aanname van dit proefschrift luidt dat samenwerking 
tussen meerdere bemiddelaars niet alleen voordelig is voor het bemid-
delingsproces, maar ook voor de bemiddelaars zelf. Zij zijn rationele 
actoren die zich laten leiden door hun eigenbelang. Met bemiddelings-
inspanningen en coöperatie zijn weliswaar kosten gemoeid, maar uit de 
in dit onderzoek bestudeerde praktijk blijkt dat samenwerking meer nut 
oplevert dan non-coöperatief gedrag.
 Zoals de vijf case studies laten zien, is coöperatie tussen de bemid-
delaars absoluut niet exogeen aan het proces. Ten eerste beïnvloedt de 
dynamiek van het conflict de intensiteit van samenwerking en het daar-
mee het proces van conflictbeheersing. De voorbeelden die in dit proef-
schrift zijn aangehaald, tonen aan dat derde partijen, wanneer zij geen 
convergerende belangen koesteren ten aanzien van de uitkomst van een 
conflict, dikwijls kiezen voor een beperkte samenwerking. Beperkte sa-
menwerking levert op haar beurt weinig resultaat voor het vredesproces. 
Wanneer derden niet hun volledige potentieel voor bemiddeling ge-
bruiken – bijvoorbeeld door na te laten druk op een bevriende partij uit 
te oefenen – zendt dit gemengde signalen naar de strijdende partijen en 
kan dit ten koste gaan van hun bereidheid om een oplossing uit te on-
derhandelen. Een gebrek aan coöperatie binnen de bemiddelende coali-
tie vertaalt zich direct in een gebrek aan coöperatie tussen de strijdende 
partijen en derden.
 Wanneer echter het conflict voor derde partijen onwenselijke vor-
men aanneemt, kunnen deze besluiten volledig coöperatief te handelen. 
Samenwerken in deze omstandigheden wordt dan meer cost/benefit ef-
ficient en effective (Zartman 2009) dan de tot dan toe gevolgde strate-
gieën. Indien dergelijke ontwikkelingen in het conflict er niet toe leiden 
dat álle partijen coöperatief gedrag gaan vertonen, dan kan de partij, die 
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wel is omgegaan, proberen de non-coöperatieve partijen te overtuigen 
van de noodzaak van samenwerking. De case studies in dit proefschrift 
suggereren dat het meestal de partij is die het meest gebaat is bij een 
oplossing van het conflict die deze rol van aanjager op zich neemt.
 Het vraagstuk van coördinatie kan ook worden gerelateerd aan het 
grotere kader van betrekkingen die een externe partij onderhoudt en de 
strategische keuzes die zij maakt. Aangezien (eigen)belangen daarmee 
doorgaans nauw verband houden, kunnen veranderingen op regionaal 
en mondiaal niveau die deze belangen in gevaar brengen, een derde par-
tij ertoe bewegen haar visie op een conflict radicaal te wijzigen. Ook dan 
wordt coöperatief gedrag meer cost/benefit efficient en effectief, omdat 
partijen zodoende hun (eigen)belangen kunnen veiligstellen.
 Wanneer de partijen die zijn betrokken in multiparty mediation een 
convergentie van belangen bereiken en gaan samenwerken vanuit een 
gedeeld script, dan zenden zij een krachtig signaal uit naar de strijdende 
partijen: ook zij zouden meer geneigd moeten zijn tot coöperatie en 
compromissen, zowel met de bemiddelaars als ook onderling. Een der-
gelijk signaal ondersteunt het bemiddelingsproces en de stelt de strij-
dende partijen in staat om eenvoudiger tot een vergelijk te komen.
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